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REPLACING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
INTRODUCTION
The displacement of inefficient managers ranks among the chief
problems of corporate law. Inefficient managers underutilize
corporate assets, erode shareholder wealth, and reduce the share
price of the corporation's common stock. In theory, shareholders'
remedy for inefficient management is to elect new directors who
will displace them and operate the corporation more efficiently,
driving its stock price higher. In practice, however, managers'
control over the proxy machinery and the shareholders' collective
action problems make voting inefficient management out of office
virtually impossible.
The fallback remedy has been the hostile takeover. In a hostile
takeover, a bidder perceives that the target corporation's value
under incumbent management is less than it could be in the
bidder's hands. The bidder purchases a controlling block of the
target corporation's stock at a substantial premium above the then
market price, installs its own board of directors, and squeezes out
any remaining shareholders through a second-step, cash-out merger.
Takeovers provide shareholders with a better return on their
investment than they would have received had incumbent man-
agement remained in control. The takeover (or "control") premium
compensates the target's shareholders for much of their loss due to
the incumbent management's inefficiency. The possibility of
takeover pressures managers of other corporations to maximize
shareholder value.
The primary disadvantage of takeovers is that they place
shareholders at the mercy of other persons-either the bidder or
incumbent management. Specifically, takeovers can force share-
holders to tender their shares even when they value the shares more
than the tender offer price.1 Two-tiered, front-end-loaded take-
' Such takeovers arguably distort the choice ofsecurityholders; resisting the offer
necessarily places the unwilling participant in a potentially worse position than if she
tendered. For example, shareholders who "vote against" accepting a tender offer by
not tendering do not have their shares purchased and thus are exposed to receiving
inferior consideration for their shares in a second-step, squeeze-out merger. The
most elegant theoretical solution to these strategic disadvantages involves allowing the
securityholder both to vote against the transaction and, in case her side loses, to
participate in the transaction as if she had supported it. See Lucian A. Bebchuk,
Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1693, 1747-50 (1985) (describing various ways bidders can force shareholders to
tender even when shareholders consider the offer price to be lower than the target's
intrinsic value and proposing a regime that allows shareholders to vote on approving
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overs confront dispersed shareholders with a "prisoner's dilemma"-
unless they tender, they can be squeezed out of their equity
ownership later at a lesser price. Thus, opponents of takeovers
claim, shareholders do not tender voluntarily.
2
On the other hand, sophisticated takeover defenses currently
block shareholders from selling to bidders, even when they wish to
do so.' Shareholders remain at the mercy of managers, who can
remove the market's most serious constraints on managerial
the tender offer and to tender and have their shares purchased in a successful tender
offer even if they have voted against the tender offer). Unfortunately, under current
law, takeovers do not provide shareholders with such protections. Dissolution, on the
other hand, by its structure, inherently does. See infra notes 5-8 and accompanying
text (explaining how dissolution compels the implication of Revlon's auction duties).
Experts have vigorously contested the claim that takeovers are coercive. See
Michael Bradley, Anand Desai & E. Han Kim, Synergistic Gains from Corporate
Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and Acquiring Firms, 21
J. FIN. ECON. 3, 32-37 (1988) (creating a theoretical model allowing managers to
structure a self tender that will always dominate an attempt to acquire the target
below its pre-offer market value); see also FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R.
FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 180-81 (1991) (describing
ways to defeat coercive bids).
To "protect" shareholders from exploitation, managers employed takeover
defenses, which not accidentally also shielded themselves, driving up the premiums
required to dislodge them. See, e.g., id. at 172-73 (noting that market forces exist that
can prevent bidders from coercing shareholders into tendering prematurely);John
C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1206 (1984)
(concluding that substantial takeover premiums will persist, even if regulatory
constraints are relaxed, and that such premiums will place a severe limitation on the
theory of the takeover as a "comprehensive corrective of managerial inefficiency").
2 Experts sometimes tout proxy contests as a less coercive alternative to takeovers
because they do not create prisoner's dilemma problems. Even if the dissident slate
gains control of the board, the dissidents do not thereby cause some shareholders to
exit the corporation under conditions that disadvantage other shareholders. Conse-
quently, proxy contests do not put shareholders in any strategic disadvantage.
Collective action problems, however, render proxy contests generally ineffectual
for disciplining management. Economic incentives make the proxy fight uneconomi-
cal for most dissidents, even if they have correctly perceived significant erosion in
shareholder value. In addition, the nature of a proxy fight invites rational apathy by
shareholders. Unlike the tender offer, which provides a single offered share price
which stands in stark contrast with the pre-takeover price, a proxy contest confronts
shareholders with huge informational burdens. Shareholders must sift through
competing election materials to decide which group of nominees will best run the
company. The complexity of such a decision creates inertia that favors the incum-
bents. Knowing that one's decision will not tip the balance of the contest, most
shareholders remain uninvolved and doom most proxy fights to failure.
For brief, clear discussion of collective action problems and citations to recent
literature, seeJoseph A. Grundfest,Just Vote No: A Minimalist StrategyforDealing with
the Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 908-11 (1993).
' See infra note 25.
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inefficiency and, in effect, entrench themselves.
This Article will demonstrate that voluntary dissolution can and
should replace hostile takeovers as the preferred means to oust
inefficient corporate management. In a voluntary dissolution,
shareholders of the subject corporation ("S") holding a specified
percentage of stock would initiate a vote to dissolve the corporation.
If holders of a majority of the shares4 vote to dissolve S, the law
would require the board to obtain the highest value by auctioning
the corporation. Such auctions will almost always produce substan-
tial premiums for S shareholders.
Voluntary dissolution provides all of the benefits of the
takeover, while avoiding all of its harms. First, dissolution does not
expose shareholders to the prisoner's dilemma. If holders of
sufficient shares vote to dissolve, dissenting shareholders still
receive a pro rata share of the proceeds; they are not treated
discriminatorily or otherwise exploited.5 If the initiative fails, no
dissolution will occur, and S's stock price should resume trading at
its pre-vote level. Consequently, shareholders will vote for voluntary
dissolution only when they genuinely wish to force an auction.
Second, voluntary dissolution circumvents takeover defenses. At
the corporate level, voluntary dissolution triggers an auction of the
corporation. The duty of the S board shifts from managing S's
ongoing business to getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company.7 Getting the best price necessitates that the
4 Some states require a simple, affirmative majority to approve dissolution; others
require a supermajority. Among states that already permit shareholders to initiate
dissolution, California requires holders of an affirmative majority of the stock to
approve dissolution; New York and Illinois require holders of two-thirds of the stock
to approve dissolution. See infra part IV.A.1 (discussing shareholder powers to initiate
dissolution).
' Indeed, if any shareholders are discriminated against, they can sue in equity to
block the transaction. See infra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the law's
intervention to protect minority shareholders).
6 Put differently, dissolution enables shareholders to trigger Revlon's auction
duties. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986), the Delaware Supreme Court enunciated the rule that when the break-up of
the company becomes inevitable and/or the company is for sale, the duty of the
board of directors changes "from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company."
Id. at 182. In its Time-Warner decision, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that
dissolution triggers Revlon duties. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51 (Del. 1989) (holding that, because there was no evidence that
"the dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity [was] inevitable," no Revlon duties
arose).
7 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 ("The duty of the board had thus changed from the
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board redeem any poison pill in order to accept the winning bid.
State anti-takeover statutes consistently permit management to
accept "friendly" bids. Since the auction's winning bid will have
been invited by shareholder-initiated dissolution, by definition it will
be friendly. Management must approve the best bid, and this
approval will disarm all the anti-takeover laws' potentially negative
consequences.
8
Third, dissolution will discipline managers sooner than take-
overs, thus reducing impairment of shareholder wealth and
disruption to non-shareholder constituencies. Dissolution will
enable shareholders to trigger an auction and displace inefficient
managers well before occurrence of the major erosion of share-
holder value normally required before bidders launch takeovers. In
addition, dissolution will empower shareholders to accept whatever
sized premiums they choose, making it more likely that shareholders
will accept smaller premiums than management would otherwise
force bidders to pay.9
Fourth, dissolution frees shareholders from having to rely on
bidders identifying and pursuing takeover targets. Dissolution
allows public shareholders to initiate an auction even before a
bidder has surfaced. As such, dissolution would be a kind of
servomechanism that automatically disciplines managerially-created
losses of value.
Finally, as I demonstrate elsewhere,"° in addition to its superi-
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's
value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit.").
8 Thus, dissolution allows the company's takeover defenses to be penetrated, but
only from "the inside," i.e., by the shareholders, thereby avoiding the opposing
threats of management entrenchment and bidder opportunism that have driven some
commentators to espouse abandoning market solutions for regulatory ones. See, e.g.,
Coffee, supra note 1, at 1250-64 (recommending regulation of takeover battles to
protect shareholders from both managers and bidders). Dissolution would stop
preclusive takeover defenses from reducing shareholder wealth, because the
combination of dissolution and preclusive defenses vests the decision to sell the
company exclusively in shareholders' hands.
9 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597,
601 (1989) (noting that management resistance precluded shareholders from being
able to accept generous premiums of 30% and made premiums of upwards of 50%
necessary). By allowing a majority ofshareholders to implicitly set a lower reservation
price when they initiate an auction, dissolution will increase the number of companies
disciplined without risking shareholder exploitation.
"' See Park McGinty, Mastering the Servant: Using Voluntary Dissolution As
Shareholder Self Help for Protecting Shareholders from Their Agents (1995)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Mastering the Servant];
Park McGinty, Reforming the Appraisal Remedy (1995) (unpublished manuscript, on
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ority to hostile takeover as a method for redeploying corporate
assets, voluntary dissolution would provide effective protections
against acute managerial opportunism, against inefficient business
combinations-such as the merger between Time, Inc. and Warner
Communication, Inc.'-that preclude shareholders from more
wealth-producing transactions, and against inadequate compensa-
tion in corporate freezeouts by majority shareholders.
The rest of this Article comprises six parts. Part I explains the
current need for a mechanism to replace inefficient management.
Part II compares the use of involuntary judicial dissolution in the
close corporation with the use of voluntary dissolution in the public
corporation. Part III explains how dissolution would work as a
business matter, while Parts IV and V explain how dissolution would
work under state corporate law and federal securities law, respec-
tively. Although most states do not provide shareholders a realistic
ability to initiate voluntary dissolution in spite of board opposi-
tion, 12 a surprisingly substantial number of states do provide such
file with author).
1 For description of the facts of the case, see Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litig., Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 (Del. Ch. 1989). For extended analysis, see Mastering the
Servant, supra note 10.
12 For present purposes, statutes that require boards to initiate a dissolution vote
come in two basic forms. The first form explicitly vests exclusive power to initiate
dissolution proceedings in the board. The second form allows shareholders to initiate
dissolution but requires unanimous shareholder approval. (All such jurisdictions
provide that the board can initiate dissolution, with shareholder approval necessary.)
Because managers of public companies will inevitably own some shares of their
companies, in such jurisdictions, board-initiated dissolution will be the only realistic
method of dissolution. (In the following citations, states that allow unanimous
shareholder approval are marked with an asterisk. The first statutory provision listed
is that which authorizes the board to initiate approval; the second is that which grants
the unanimous shareholder right.)
See the statutes of Alabama* [ALA. CODE § 10-2B-14.02(f) (1994); ALA. CODE §
10-2B-14.02(f) (1994)]; Arizona* [Apiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-084(1) (1990), repealed
by 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 223, § 3 (effective Jan. 1, 1996); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-083(1) (1990), repealed by 1994 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 223, § 3 (effective Jan. 1,
1996)]; Colorado [COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-114-102(2)(b) (1995)]; Connecticut [CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-376(c) (West 1987), repealed y 1994 Conn. Acts 94-186, § 214
(effective Jan. 1, 1997)]; Delaware* [DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(a) (1991); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(c) (1991); Georgia [GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1402(b)(1) (1994)];
Hawaii* [HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-84(1) (1992); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-83 (1992)];
Idaho* [IDAHO CODE § 30-1-84 (1980); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-83 (1980)]; Indiana [IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-45-2(b)(1) (Burns 1976), amended by IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-45-
2(b)(1) (Burns 1995) (effectiveJuly 1, 1996)]; Iowa [IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1402(2)(a)
(West 1991)]; Kansas [KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6804(a) (1988)]; Kentucky [KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271B.14-020(2)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merril1 1989)]; Maryland [MD. CODE
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a right."3 For simplicity, Part IV will restrict itself to analyzing the
corporate law of the three most important commercial jurisdictions
outside Delaware: New York, California, and Illinois. Finally, Part
VI suggests a mechanism whereby shareholders can vote to forgo
dissolution for five-year periods, thereby minimizing unnecessary
monitoring costs.
I. THE CURRENT NEED FOR A MECHANISM TO REPLACE
INEFFICIENT MANAGEMENT
Traditionally, corporate law delegates to the board of directors
the power to manage the corporation because such delegation is
efficient. According to the standard view, shareholders specialize
in bearing the risk of their investment, and management specializes
in running the corporation's affairs. Consequently, shareholders in
American corporations have very few positive rights. They do,
ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 3-403(b)(1) (1993)]; Michigan [MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(804)(3) (Callaghan 1988)]; Mississippi [MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-14.02(b)(1)
(1989)]; Missouri* [Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.464(2)(1) (Vernon 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.466 (Vernon 1991)]; Montana [MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-932(2)(a) (1993)];
Nebraska* [NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2083(1) (1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2082 (1991)];
Nevada [NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.580(1) (1993)]; New Hampshire [N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 293-A:14.02(b)(1) (1994)]; NewJersey* [N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-4(2) (West 1988);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-3 (West 1988)]; New Mexico* [N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-3
(Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-2 (Michie 1993)]; North Carolina [N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 55-14-02(b)(1) (1990)]; Oklahoma [OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1096(A) (West
1995)]; Oregon* [OR. REV. STAT. § 60.624 (1993); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.624 (1993)];
Pennsylvania [15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1972(a) (1995)]; Rhode Island* [R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 7-1.1-77(1) (1992); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-76(a) (1992)]; South Carolina [S.C. CODE
ANN. § 33-14-102(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990)]; South Dakota [S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 47-7-4.1(1) (1991)]; Tennessee* [TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-17-104(c)(1) (1995); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-17-104(a) (1995)]; Texas* [TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.03(A)(1)
(West 1996); TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 6.02(A) (West 1980)]; Utah [UTAH CODE
ANN. § 16-1Oa-1402(2)(a) (1995)]; Vermont [VT. STAT. ANN. tit. llA, § 14.02(b)(1)
(1993)]; Virginia [VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-742(B)(1) (Michie 1993)]; Washington
[WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.14.020(2)(a) (West 1994)]; West Virginia* [W. VA.
CODE § 31-1-126(a) (1988); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-125 (1988)]; Wisconsin [WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 180.1402(1)(a) (West 1992)]; Wyoming [WYO. STAT. § 17-16-1402(b)(i) (1989)].
Is See ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.605 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-710 (Michie
1987); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900(a) (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1402(6) (West
1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.15 (Smith-Hurd 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12:142A (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1103(1)(A)(2) (West
1988); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156, § 100(a) (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.721(2)(a) (West 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1001 (McKinney 1986); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-107 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.86(E) (Anderson
1992).
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however, enjoy the essential authority to elect directors and to sell
their shares.
Experts have traditionally characterized public corporation
shareholders as capable of escaping managerial oppression by
selling their stock in liquid securities markets. 4 However, markets
discount the firm's shares to the extent that managerial
underperformance destroys wealth. Thus, the public shareholder
may escape by selling, but if no one constrains management from
decreasing firm value, the selling shareholder may be largely shorn
of the value of her investment.
As recognized as early as 1963,"5 hostile takeovers or, more
formally, the market for corporate control has played a central role
in reducing agency costs when shareholders are too dispersed to
discipline management directly. Hostile takeovers played an active
role through the 1970s and 1980s. Through the mid-1980s, a fully
financed and determined bidder that had purchased a substantial
block of target company stock could expect to see the target taken
over. The bidder would profit whether it or another bidder
acquired the target corporation or whether the target restructured
itself so as to maximize share value. 6 Shareholders would receive
" Indeed, important commentators have argued that it is solely the illiquidity of
close corporations that allows insiders to exploit minority shareholders. See, e.g.,
J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REv. 1 (1977)
(proposing that exploitation is uniquely related to illiquidity); Terry A. O'Neill, Self-
Interest and Concern for Others in the Owner-Managed Firm: A Suggested Approach to
Dissolution and Fiduciary Obligation in Close Corporations, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 646,
663-77 (1992) (distinguishing public corporation shareholders from close corporation
shareholders largely on the basis of the formers' ability to sell shares on the market
when dissatisfied); Ralph A. Peeples, The Use and Misuse of the BusinessJudgment Rule
in the Close Corporation, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 456,462 (1985) (noting that "judicial
deference to managerial decisions is based on an assumption of stock liquidity").
" The earliest accounts of the market for corporate control in the economic
literature are Robin Marris, A Model of the "Managerial"Enteiprise, 77 Q.J. ECON. 185,
189-90 (1963) (describing the mechanism by which inefficient management is more
likely to be the subject of a takeover), and in the legal literature, Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 112 (1965)
(describing how the takeover market allows more efficient managers to purchase
target stock at depressed prices and extract more value from the target).
6 See, e.g., Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance
of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. ECON. 29, 30, 51-52 (1989) (finding that
dissident activity typically increases shareholder wealth, especially where it leads to
the sale or liquidation of the company). Indeed, DeAngelo and DeAngelo found that
fewer than one fifth of sample firms that were targets of proxy fights during the
period 1978-1985 remained independent public companies managed by the same
persons three years after a proxy fight. See id. at 52.
1996]
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a premium, and underutilized assets would move to higher valued
uses. On balance, takeovers significantly benefitted society, yielding
huge premiums to target shareholders and leading to a resurgence
of American productivity. 7
Towards the end of the 1980s, however, corporations increas-
ingly employed new takeover defenses that effectively prevented
target shareholders from selling their shares to a bidder without
incumbent management's approval.'" At the corporation level,
17 For reviews of the evidence that takeovers generally benefitted society, see
FRANK R. LICHTENBERG, CORPORATE TAKEOVERS AND PRODUCTIVITY 127-33 (1992)
(concluding that takeovers in the 1980s reversed an earlier, inefficient trend towards
diversification and, by intensifying corporate focus on core business, increased
productivity); Bernard S. Black & Joseph A. Grundfest, Shareholder Gains from
Takeovers and Restructurings Between 1981 and 1986: $162 Billion Is a Lot of Money, J.
APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 1988, at 5, 5 (estimating that between 1981 and 1986
shareholders gained at least $162 billion from takeovers of public corporations,
divestitures, and leveraged recapitalizations and that such takeovers helped fuel the
contemporaneous rapid growth in manufacturing productivity);James A. Brickley &
Leonard D. Van Drunen, Internal Coiporate Restructuring: An Empirical Analysis, 12
J. ACCT. & ECON. 251, 253 (1990) (finding that restructurings by underperforming
firms to increase efficiency result in increased share prices even when short-term
operating results are negative, suggesting that the stock market does not pressure
managers to adopt a short-term perspective); Grundfest, supra note 2, at 869-73;
Gregg A.Jarrell,James A. Brickley &Jeffry M. Netter, The Marketfor Coiporate Control:
The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERP. 49, 58 (1988) ("We therefore
conclude that evidence is consistent with the notion that these corporate transactions
reflect economically beneficial reshufflings of productive assets."); Michael C.Jensen,
Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance,J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 1991, at 13,
15 (noting productivity gains from takeovers and estimating that during the period
1976-1990 target shareholders received approximately $650 billion in takeover
premiums); Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. EcON.
PERSP. 21, 26-28 (1988) [hereinafter,Jensen, Takeovers]; Michael C.Jensen & Richard
S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON.
5, 9, 22 (1983) (finding that target firm shareholders experience large gains, bidding
firm shareholders do not lose, and gains do not come from increased market power
in violation of antitrust laws); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence,
and Regulation, 9 YALEJ. ON REG. 119, 122-25 (1992) (interpreting economics and
finance literature to find that takeovers increase social wealth with no comparable
offsetting losses to non-shareholder constituencies); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, The Takeover Wave of the 1980s, 249 SCIENCE 745, 747 (1990) (dismissing
common objections to takeovers); cf. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial
Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48J. FIN. 831, 837, 850 n.30
(1993) [hereinafterJensen, Modern Industrial Revolution] (updating an estimate of the
amount of target shareholder gains received during the years from 1976-1990 to $750
billion in 1992 dollars and listing 43 studies since 1984 confirming that public
corporations' internal control systems have failed to cause management to maximize
efficiency and value).
18 See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 2, at 858-65 ("The takeover wars are over.
Management won.").
REPLACING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
shareholders' rights plans, or "poison pills," made hostile takeovers
prohibitively expensive. 19 Most states also enacted effective anti-
takeover legislation.2" While hostile takeovers do occur, in compari-
son to the 1980s, they are rare and, thus, no longer pose the same
disciplinary threat to management.
Today, management can normally prevent any unsolicited
takeover it disfavors (and, most likely, it disfavors them all). Courts
have only rarely nullified management's decisions and intervened to
enable shareholders to obtain generous takeover premiums.
21
Indeed, in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,22 the
Delaware Supreme Court signalled a willingness to allow manage-
ment to block hostile takeovers, no matter how generous the
premium. 23 Management can thus hold hostage the corporation's
value, including any takeover premium that might be offered to
shareholders. 24  Public shareholders, thus, now resemble close
corporation shareholders in being trapped by those controlling the
firm from exiting the corporation at something approaching their
pro rata share of the corporation's full value, even where holders of
over ninety percent of the shares want to sell.25 Because manage-
19 See infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text (discussing how a poison pill
inflicts intolerable economic loss on any bidder who triggers the flip-over or flip-in
rights).
2 See infra notes 181-84 and accompanying text (discussing state anti-takeover
statutes); John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1440-52
(1991) (describing various anti-takeover statutes as of 1991).
21 See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch.) (holding
that a mild "threat to shareholders' economic interests" from noncoercive stock offer
did notjustify effectively foreclosing shareholders from accepting offer through use
of defensive poison pill rights), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Grand
Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988) (forcing board to
redeem pill because the board's decision to keep poison pill in place, thereby
precluding shareholders from accepting tender offer, was disproportional to the
threat).
' 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
25 SeeJonathanJ. Lerner, Did the Time Decision Torpedo the Hostile Bid?, MERGERS
& ACQuIsrrIONS,Jan.-Feb. 1990, at 41, 41 (discussing the impact of the Time-Warner
case); Stephen J. Massey, Chancellor Allen'sJurisprudence and the Theoly of Corporate
Law, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 683, 757-68 (1992) (describing the later evolution of
Delaware case law on the proportionality standard of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Corp., from Interco to its evisceration in Time-Warner).
24 For the case that hostile takeovers are virtually impossible, see Grundfest, supra
note 2, at 857-64.
2 See, e.g., Michael Quint, Interco Bars Negotiations on Rales Bid: Company Says It'll
Push Own Revamping Plan If Offer Is Withdrawn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1988, at D4
(reporting that, nearly 9% of Interco's shares having already been voluntarily sold to
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ment often treats non-management public shareholders the same
way that controlling shareholders treat minority shareholders in
close corporations, this Article will sometimes refer to these non-
management public shareholders as "minority shareholders."
In the search for a new, non-takeover mechanism to discipline
management, some commentators have focused on increased
activism by institutional shareholders. 26 These commentators cite
the apparent monitoring success of large shareholders in Japanese
and German corporations27 or other foreign governance mecha-
the bidder, an additional 84% was tendered, amounting to 93% of Interco's stock;
but, using the preclusive poison pill takeover defense, Interco management still
resisted the bidder's offer as "inadequate"); see also Pillsbuiy, 558 A.2d at 1058
(reporting that approximately 87% of Pillsbury's shares were tendered into the
bidder's tender offer, which Pillsbury management, using the preclusive poison pill
takeover defense, still resisted as "inadequate").
Without court action, shareholders would have been precluded from selling their
shares. Although courageous decisions by Delaware's Chancery Court forced
redemption of the preclusive takeover defenses in the two cases mentioned, it is
doubtful that the Delaware Supreme Court would reach the same result. See Time-
Warner, 571 A.2d at 1153.
To the extent that the Court of Chancery has recently [determined that
precluding shareholders from being able to sell their shares for a 59%
premium over the pre-bid price was not proportional to the threat of share-
holders receiving inadequate value in the bidder's non-coercive tender offer]
in certain of its opinions, we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping
with a proper Unocal analysis.
Id.
6 See e.g., Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811,827 (1992) (recommending expanding the role
of institutional shareholders); Alfred F. Conard, Beyond Managerialism: Investor
Capitalism?, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 117, 163 (1988) (recommending lessening con-
straints hindering institutional investors and their increased activism); George W.
Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 Wis.
L. REV. 881, 923 (recommending that proxy solicitations be vested exclusively in a
committee of the corporation's 10 or 20 largest shareholders); Ronald J. Gilson &
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional
Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875, 904 (1991) (recommending that boards include
a cadre of professional independent directors in the separate pay of institutional
shareholders).
'See generally Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring. The
Empirical Evidence, 39 UCLA L. REv. 895 (1992) (discussing the implications of
comparative corporate governance analysis); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993) (describing the Japanese keiretsu
system as an alternative corporate governance and industrial organizational form and
noting that it has not yet proved itself as an effective substitute for takeovers); Mark
J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States,
102 YALE L.J. 1927 (1993) (discussing how the three countries' organization of
financial intermediaries and politics interact with and shape different corporate
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nisms.28 In addition, independent directors have grown more
prominent and have exerted more forceful oversight of laggard
corporations. 29  Finally, constructive legal deregulation may
facilitate management discipline. Numerous commentators have
noted the perverse effects on American corporate governance of
laws and regulations that foreclose larger shareholders from
monitoring their agents more effectively." Congress and the SEC
are removing some of these obstacles to monitoring.
Although many of the suggested reforms warrant support, they
may well fall short of effective management discipline. Even when
institutional investors admit wanting to influence management, they
consistently disclaim any intention to influence the direction of the
corporation's day-to-day business31 and focus instead on certain
structural or procedural matters, such as anti-takeover defenses,
32
reform of proxy regulations, and confidential voting.3 Only rarely
governance paradigms).
2 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Investment Companies As Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L. REV.
985, 997 (1993) (using Swedish investment company monitoring as a model for active
large shareholder involvement in corporate governance).
2 See Grundfest, supra note 2, at 880-900 (providing illuminating case histories of
four recent turnovers of underperforming managers); see alsoJohn W. Byrd & Kent
A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor Managers?: Evidence from Tender Offer Bids,
32 J. FIN. ECON. 195i 201-05 (1992) (indicating that a substantial percentage of
independent directors (optimally 40%-60%) improve managers' performance, for
example, in making acquisitions).
" See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV.
520, 585, 608 (1990) ("[L]egal barriers, manager agenda control, and conflicts of
interest may be important reasons why shareholders do as little as they do.");Joseph
A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 89, 110, passim
(1990) (describing how "[l]egislators and regulators can generate, exacerbate, and
reallocate the costs and benefits associated with agency problems for the benefit of
politically favored constituencies"); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American
Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 10, 65 (1991) [hereinafter Roe, A Political
Theory] (arguing that the legal system has limited control by financial institutions and
that the restrictions imposed by the legal system have a political explanation); Mark
J. Roe, Takeover Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND LEVERAGED
BuyouTs MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321,322 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993)
(noting that, because Congress encouraged investment by small, scattered investors,
none had enough incentive or means to see that the firm was well run).
- See Black, supra note 26, at 834 (noting that institutional investors "appear to
understand that they can't micromanage individual companies").
12 See John Pound, Where Shareholder Activism Is Paramount, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7,
1993, at A16 (describing institutional investors' forcing a resistant CEO to consider
negotiations with an unsolicited bidder that the CEO had originally spurned).
" See generally Black, supra note 26, at 834-39 (noting ways in which institutional
investors can increase value to companies they own without micromanaging); Edward
B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79
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do they challenge management on corporate strategy.
3 4
Management's ability to withhold business and thus to pressure fund
managers to benefit management, rather than shareholders, further
undermines the possibility of radically improved institutional
shareholder monitoring.
3 5
GEO. LJ. 445, 481-90 (1991) (discussing shareholder activism as measured by
shareholder resolutions in the form of takeover-related proposals and confidential
voting). Both Black and Rock carefully set forth the conflicts of interest and the
absence of aligned incentives between money managers and their beneficiaries that
make successful disciplining seem unlikely, apart from exceptionally focused issues
such as takeover defenses and decisions whether to continue with derivative suits.
Black is more optimistic than Rock that monitoring reforms can be effectively
expanded. See Black, supra note 26, at 834-35; Rock, supra, at 489.
', See Black, supra note 26, at 839. While encouraging the trend toward more
active oversight, prominent business law practitioners have warned that the more that
independent directors try to monitor ongoing business, as opposed to structural
issues like takeover defenses, the greater the legal liability they may face for violating
their duty of care. See Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Coiporate Governance
Reform and Directors' Duty of Care, N.Y. L.J., May 20, 1993, at 5, 6 ("The business
judgment rule, moreover, is less likely to shield directors from breach of the duty of
care in the monitoring context.").
" Overt conflicts of interest face fund managers who expect to do collateral
business with a corporation (for example, insurance companies that wish to sell
insurance to a corporation or commercial or investment banks that wish to lend
money to a corporation, underwrite its securities, or perform advisory services). See
JAMES E. HEARD & HOWARD D. SHERMAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY
VOTING SYSTEM 40 (Investor Responsibility Research Ctr. ed., 1987) (finding that
potential conflicts of interests are widespread among institutional fund managers);
James A. Brickley, Ronald C. Lease & Clifford W. Smith,Jr., Ownership Structure and
Voting on Anti-takeover Amendments, 20J. FIN. ECON. 267, 276-79, 284 (1988);John C.
Coffee,Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1321-22 (1991); Rock, supra note 33, at 469-72, 480; see also
Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
987, 989 (1994) (describing instances of "corrupt" relational investing in which large
shareholders benefit themselves or protect management to the detriment of other
shareholders and noting the "rather toothless legal controls" for stopping such
behavior); MarkJ. Roe, Political and Legal Restraints on Ownership and Control of Public
Companies, 27J. FIN. ECON. 7,29 (1990) ("Conflicts of interests tilt some institutional
investors toward management. Institutions that have something to sell to the
managers (a loan, a pension plan) are apt to succumb to managerial control.").
Private pension funds have similar conflicts: they make money by managing
corporations' pension funds. Because management selects which pension fund will
manage its employees' retirement money, it can take its business away from funds
that choose shareholder interests over manager interests. See Rock, supra note 33, at
469; Roe, supra, at 24-25; Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate
Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 796 (1993) (stating that public
pension funds face conflict problems similar to those encountered by private pension
funds). Potential corruption in the selection of private pension funds could be
significantly lessened by giving the beneficiaries the right to elect pension funds.
Recommendations for fund managers should come not only from management, but
also from large shareholders whose interests are aligned with the interests of the
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One promising, recently proposed reform, with which this
Article is quite compatible, would grant shareholders the ability to
initiate charter amendments dealing with corporate process and
structure.3 6 Just as most states require shareholders to approve but
do not allow shareholders to initiate voluntary dissolution,3" most
states require shareholders to approve but do not allow share-
holders to initiate charter amendments.3 8 As a consequence, once
workers qua shareholders.
Even absent a conflict, fund managers lack meaningful incentives that would
align their interest with shareholders. See Rock, supra note 33, at 469-78. Black,
however, argues that incentives for money managers to monitor effectively are more
effective than generally thought. See Black, supra note 26, at 876-82. For several
years, public pension funds have stood out as effective advocates for shareholder
wealth-maximizing behavior. Pro-management reaction against their efforts has
begun, however, and political pressures to restrain them grow in proportion to their
monitoring effectiveness. See Romano, supra, at 796-98. Romano explains how
political intervention works to the disadvantage of the principals (shareholders) and
to the advantage of agents (politicians, management) without conferring meaningful
benefits on the putative beneficiaries of the interference. See id.; see also William W.
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatoy Competition, Regulatory Capture and
Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1903-25 (1995) (describing the
incentive problems that impair institutional shareholders' effective participation in
corporate governance); Rock, supra note 33, at 471-72, 481 n.132 (noting that public
fund managers may be pressured by public interest groups as well as by state and
local governments); Roe, supra, at 27-29.
Finally, large shareholders are unlikely to trade the ease of exit that they
currently enjoy through their liquidity for the thorny problems of management
oversight. See Coffee, supra, at 1281-89.
'6 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 35, at 1872-76.
S7 See supra note 12.
s For statutes restricting the power to initiate charter amendments to the board,
see ALA. CODE § 10-2B-10.03(b)(1) (1994); ALAsKA STAT. § 10.06.504(2) (1989)
(providing that, although shareholders can propose charter amendments, the board
must present the amendment for a shareholder vote); AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-
059(A)(1) (1990), repealed by ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1003 (1995) (effectiveJan.
1, 1996); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-27-1003(B)(1) (Michie 1991); CAL. CORP. CODE § 902(a)
(West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-110-103(2)(a) (1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-360(b) (West 1995), repealed by 1994 Conn. Acts 94-186, § 214 (Reg. Sess.)
(effectiveJan. 1, 1997); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 607.1003(1) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1003(b)(1) (1994); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 415.59(1) (1992); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-59(a) (1995); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805,
para. 5/10.20(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-38-3(b) (Burns 1995);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1003(2)(a) (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6602(b)(1)
(1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.10-030(2)(a) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 805(1)(A) (West 1981); MD. CODE ANN., CoRPs. & ASS'NS
§ 2-604(b)(1) (1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-10.03(b)(1) (1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
351.090(1)(b) (Vernon 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-227(2)(a) (1993); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 21-2057(1) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78.390(1)(a) (1994); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 293-A:10.03(b)(1) (1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:9-2(4)(a) (West 1995); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 53-13.2(A) (Michie 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 803(a) (McKinney
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management has obtained a charter amendment, shareholders are
powerless, short of a proxy fight or takeover, to override the charter
provision. Freeing shareholders to control the charter amendment
process would both prevent abuses and guarantee greater manage-
ment accountability. For present purposes, however, shareholder
access to structure and process charter amendments, though
improving the power balance between shareholders and manage-
ment, will not provide shareholders with an autonomous means to
displace inefficient managers.
In any event, dissolution will not compete with such reforms but
will complement them. The ability of shareholders to force an
auction of the company if the board fails to maintain shareholder
value would empower shareholders far more than would changes in
the regulatory framework. Conversely, dissolution-at least in the
absence of a bid-is somewhat risky. Accordingly, shareholders
would resort to dissolution only when no practical remedy other
than the sale of the company exists. 39
Dissolution will also benefit non-shareholder constituencies.
Takeovers occur only when managerial ineffectiveness has lowered
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-10-03(b)(1) (1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
1077(B)(1) (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.437(2) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-1.1-
54(a)(1) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-10-103(b)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 47-2-11 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-20-103(b)(1) (1995); TEx. Bus.
CORP. ACT ANN. art. 4.02(A)(1) (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-1Oa-1003(2)(a)
(1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 10.03(b)(1) (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-707(B)(1)
(Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.10.030(2)(a) (West 1994); W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1-107(a) (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1003(1)(a) (West 1992); WYO. STAT. § 17-
16-1003(b)(i) (1989).
States that allow shareholders to initiate charter amendments are decidedly in the
minority, but they are by no means inconsiderable. See ALA. CODE § 10-21-
14.02(b)(1) (1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-330(c) (West 1995) (repealedJan. 1,
1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0702(1)(b) (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:31(B)
(West 1994); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156, § 71 (West 1992); MICH. STAT. ANN. §
21.200(611) (Callaghan 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.135(2) (West 1985); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-19(2) (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.71(A)(1) (Anderson
1992); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1912(a)(2) (1995).
"' ProfessorJohn Coffee has noted how self interest pushes the takeover market
to focus where it is most needed. Even if the market undervalues all corporations,
bidders will look for undermanaged companies where they can profit from a "double
gain," taking advantage of both (a) any systemic market discount and (b) the
possibilities for gain from increasing managerial efficiency in previously
undermanaged companies. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1172-73. Once dissolution
has freed arbitrageurs from their reliance on bidders to precipitate auctions,
arbitrageurs will have greater incentives to track down and to profit from such
"double gains" created by managerial inefficiencies, thereby ameliorating any market
inefficiencies that exist.
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the company's stock price sufficiently to allow bidders to offer huge
premiums. Similarly, outside directors have ejected executive
officers only when the loss of shareholder value has damaged the
directors' reputations." Such delayed discipline has necessitated
disruptive changes to restore the corporation's health and competi-
tiveness: restructurings, downsizings, layoffs, plant closings, and
other actions designed to wring more value from the company's
assets. Properly understood, the cause of the disruption is the
managerial inefficiency that eroded the corporation's value.
Disciplinary mechanisms-whether takeovers, more activist
boards, or dissolution-correct, not cause, these inefficiencies.
Because takeovers typically occur only after a significant decline in
value, a takeover constitutes a drastic remedy. Dissolution, on the
other hand, would intervene more promptly and operate more
continuously and more widely than do takeovers, thereby displacing
inefficient managers before the need for a radical remedy emerges.
Additionally, dissolution would indirectly discipline healthy
corporations by serving as a background threat against managerial
inefficiency, thus forestalling the need for later restructurings and
damage to other constituencies.
II. THE USE OF DISSOLUTION IN CLOSE CORPORATIONS
AND IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
A. The Use of Involuntary Judicial Dissolution
in Close Corporations
The benign use of involuntary judicial dissolution is well
understood in the close corporation context. 41 Close corporation
" Boards have recently begun displacing ineffective managements in some
numbers, but only after long periods of ineffective management. See, e.g., Black, supra
note 9, at 630-31 (declaring that monitoring of top managers by directors is "notable
mostly for its absence" and its sluggishness); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 28, at
995 n.40 (citing the aggressiveness of outside directors of General Motors, American
Express, and Westinghouse as examples of boards acting only after long periods of
poor performance); Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved
Corporate Governance, 48 Bus. LAw. 59,59 (1992) (stating that "[c]orporate governance
in the United States is not working the way it should" because directors are far too
slow to act). For discussion of structural limitations inherent in board dynamics that
curb the monitoring effectiveness of directors, see Jensen, Modern Industrial
Revolution, supra note 17, at 862-67.
41 See, e.g., Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the
Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 295-98 (1990) (discussing the
development of court-mandated dissolution); Donald F. Clifford,Jr., Close Corporation
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Shareholder Reasonable Expectations: The Larger Context, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 41,
41 (1987) (acknowledging the utility ofjudicial dissolution in discussing the doctrine
of disappointment of reasonable expectations); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 283 (1986) (noting
that "many states supply automatic rules for involuntary dissolution in closely held...
corporations"); Rodman Elfin, Suggested Revisions of the Law Pertaining to the Dissolution
of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 93, 110-15 (1987) (noting that
the ability to petition the court for involuntary dissolution is critical to minority share-
holders of close corporations and urging that statutes give close corporation
shareholders the ability to dissolve the corporation unless the charter provides to the
contrary); Shelby D. Green, "Reasonable Expectations" Define Board Power to Liquidate
a Solvent Close Corporation in Bankruptcy, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 421,424 (1992) (discussing
dissolution by the boards of close corporations experiencing financial difficulty and
recommending that, absent contrary charter provisions, "the power of the board of
directors of a solvent close corporation to file a voluntary petition for liquidation in
bankruptcy must be determined by the theory of'reasonable expectation'"); HarryJ.
Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits As a Remedy for Close
Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 26 (1986) (finding that "for the most
part judges have done a commendable job of balancing the expectation interests of
minority shareholders against inherent voting and management rights of majority
shareholders");John A.C. Hetherington, Baigainingfor Fiduciay Duties: Preserving the
Vulnerability of the Disadvantaged?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 341, 344 (1992) (defending the
use of involuntary dissolution to protect against majority shareholders oppressing
minorities by disputing claims that minority oppression of majority shareholders is
a pervasive problem); Jason S. Johnston, Opting In and Opting Out: Bargaining for
Fiduciary Duties in Cooperative Ventures, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 291,301-03 (1992) (finding
that allowing minority shareholders in a close corporation the option of dissolution
serves as a credible alternative to costly monitoring); Charles W. Murdock, The
Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority Shareholders and Its Inpact upon Valuation of
Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 425, 440-61 (1990) (stating that while
dissolution is not a drastic remedy, it is also not an extremely effective remedy
because minority shareholders are impacted disparately and noting that dissolution
is incorrectly viewed as "corporate death"); Joseph E. Olson, A Statutory Elixirfor the
Oppression Malady, 36 MERCER L. REV. 627, 628 (1985)'(applauding the expansion of
rights to minority shareholders in closely held corporations who may otherwise be
"locked in"); O'Neill, supra note 14, at 653 (advocating legal remedies that encourage
owner-managers in owner-managed firms to discuss problems and strike compro-
mises); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable
Expectations, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 199 (1988) [hereinafter Thompson, Shareholders'
Reasonable Expectations] (discussing the judicial development of a reasonable
expectations standard to determine whether involuntary dissolution should be given
as a remedy); Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause ofAction for Oppression, 48
Bus. LAW. 699, 699 (1993) (noting that courts broadly interpret the legislative
grounds for judicial dissolution of a corporation in assessing remedies).
For discussion urging greater protections for non-shareholder claimants against
dissolving corporations, whether close or public, see Moira A. Hogan, Comment, Life
After Death: Corporate Dissolution and the Continuing Corporate and Shareholder Liability
Doctrine in California, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 135 (1993) (describing the evolution
of remedies available to minority shareholders in close corporations).
Corporate law casebooks reserve extended analysis of dissolution for the close
corporation context. Casebooks focus almost exclusively on (judicially ordered)
involuntary dissolution. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND
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shareholders lack protections available to partners in general
partnerships and to shareholders in public corporations. Partners
can escape oppression by withdrawing from the partnership, thereby
dissolving the partnership and forcing a buyback of their partner-
ship interest. Corporate law has also adapted dissolution to protect
close corporation minority shareholders. Currently, where a court
finds that insiders have oppressed minority shareholders,42 it can
order dissolution and mandate payment to shareholders on a
proportionate basis. This remedy allows minority shareholders to
force insiders either to give them a fair price for their stock or to
have the corporation sold or liquidated. By decreeing dissolution,
the court removes from insiders the strategic advantages of total
control over corporate payouts.
In theory, involuntary judicial dissolution requires the break-up
of the corporation, but in practice, its effects are much milder. In
a ground-breaking article published in 1977, Professors
Hetherington and Dooley showed that court-ordered dissolution of
solvent close corporations typically led to the insiders buying out
the minority's shares, rather than causing the liquidation of the
corporation. 4 Hetherington and Dooley showed that involuntary
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 522-24,527-52 (7th ed. 1995);JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 764-84 (3d ed. 1989); MICHAEL P. DOOLEY,
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 1044-55 (1995); ROBERT W. HAMILTON, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS INCLUDING PARTNERSHIPS AND LIMITED PARTNER-
SHIPS 547-63 (5th ed. 1994); HARRY G. HENN, TEACHING MATERIALS ON THE LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS WITH COMPARISONS OF GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS AND
OTHER UNINCORPORATED ORGANIZATIONS AND SYNOPSIS OF AGENCY LAW 650-70 (2d
ed. 1986); WILLIAM A. KLEIN & J. MARK RAMSEYER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 626-52 (2d ed. 1994); LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BUSINESS ASSOCIA-
TIONS 225-75 (2d ed. 1990); LEWIS D. SOLOMON ET AL., CORPORATIONS: LAW AND
POLICY MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 518-30 (3d ed. 1994).
42 In the typical scenario, the corporation pays "executive compensation" that, in
a world without taxes, would be dividends to shareholders. Minority shareholders can
be damaged if they are terminated as officers: majority shareholders can then make
payouts only to those shareholders who are employees, even though originally
employee compensation was based on stock ownership. Because the corporation
limits dividends to avoid double taxation, minority shareholders have no basis for
expecting corporate payouts. See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173,
1180 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that the withholding of all cash payments from minority
shareholders constituted "oppressive action" and upholding the grant for dissolution
of the corporation).
See J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A
Proposed Statutorj Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV.
1, 29-30 (1977) (interpreting the results of a study of 54 cases involving petitions for
involuntary dissolution to be consistent with the proposition that "while a decision to
grant or deny dissolution will have some effect on whether the parties continue in
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dissolution merely changes legal status, shifting the parties'
bargaining leverage. Court-ordered dissolution places minority
shareholders in a favorable position to negotiate for something
approximating the fair value of their shares.4 4 Without a decree
of dissolution, minority shareholders are at a serious negotiating
disadvantage.45
Thus, involuntary dissolution for close corporations guards
against minority oppression. It either levels the terrain on which
oppressed minority shareholders negotiate or (quite rarely) forces
liquidation. In either event, dissolution unlocks from the grip of
insiders something approximating the full value of the minority's
shares, value which would otherwise remain lost to those share-
holders.
B. The Use of Voluntary Dissolution in Public Corporations
Although involuntary judicial dissolution is firmly established as
a remedy for oppression of close corporation minority shareholders,
no one heretofore has shown how voluntary dissolution could allow
public corporation shareholders to realize the fair value of their
stock.46 As described above, in the absence of takeovers, share-
business together, it will have no independent effect on the continued existence of
the firm").
Later studies have confirmed their findings. See 2 HAROLD MARSHJR., MARSH'S
CALIFORNIA CORPORATION LAW § 20.22, at 638 (1981 & Supp. 1986) (stating that "a
liquidation does not necessarily contemplate that the assets will be sold piecemeal and
the goodwill of the business sacrificed by a termination of the business"); Bahls, supra
note 41, at 297-98 (finding that dissolution does not typically lead to liquidation);
Murdock, supra note 41, at 441-43 (updating and reiterating the assertion that
dissolution does not lead to liquidation and social losses). But see Robert W. Hillman,
The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative
Permanence of Partnerships and Close Comporations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 69-75 (1982)
(noting the costs, as well as the benefits, of dissolving close corporations).
Research on the economics of liquidation shows that even piecemeal liquidation,
where the corporation is broken up and sold to several bidders, can enhance share-
holder value. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
44 See Hetherington, supra note 41, at 344 ("There seems to be no chance,
however, that [the price resulting from the bargaining following a decree of dissolu-
tion] will exceed the plaintiff's pro rata share of the going-concern value of the
firm.").
41 See id. ("[I]n the absence of a decree the majority would normally expect to buy
out the minority for less than its pro rata share of the going-concern value (an
illiquidity discount) .... ").
46 Indeed, voluntary dissolution can redress the-public corporation shareholders'
problem without disrupting the actual business run by the corporation. Just as a
corporate reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code merely reorders
existing claims against the corporation while leaving the underlying business operat-
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holders lack credible disciplinary mechanisms, and management can
thus allow shareholder wealth to decline. If dissatisfied sharehold-
ers exit, the price they receive is discounted by the expected loss of
wealth. Given the enormous size of public corporations, public
shareholders likely lose more in absolute dollar amounts than close
corporation shareholders.
Dissolution could enable public corporation shareholders to
stem such erosion of value. Dissolution would trigger the auction
of corporate assets out from under underperforming managers.
Shareholders ought to possess the power to compel an auction.
Shareholders, after all, create the corporation;4  they should have
the right to terminate its existence whenever they, as a group, wish.
Dissolution would not bear on the management of the corporation,
which remains in the hands of the board.
Shareholders would likely vote for dissolution only where a
bidder has actually offered a significant premium or where market
signals4" convince them to invite such bidding. Even where
dissolution results in a corporate break-up, the break-up value will
normally exceed the going-concern value.4
ing, so voluntary dissolution could provide for transfer of ownership and management
while leaving the underlying business operating as well. Just as corporate reorganiza-
tions afford creditors the maximal value of their investment, so too could voluntary
dissolutions afford shareholders the maximal value of their investment.
Traditionally, shareholders have been thought to lack the power to call for an
accounting comparable to the power that debtholders have to foreclose on the
corporation's assets if the firm defaults. At most, shareholders are treated as having
only the power to elect a slate of directors who would have the power, but not the
legal obligation, to make such an accounting. With dissolution, an absolute majority
of shareholders would have the right to a de facto "maturity," as it were, which right
they could accelerate when management "defaults" on maximizing shareholder value.
As with reorganizations, dissolution would impose substantial costs. Yet it would
provide greater benefits in guaranteeing shareholders the ability to liberate
themselves from suboptimizing management without themselves having to conduct
or wait for a takeover.
"' Technically, "shareholders" do not exist until the corporation issues and sells
its capital stock; it is the incorporator who creates the corporation. Realistically,
however, the shareholders create the corporation. The incorporator is a mere
functionary performing a ministerial task at the direction of those who cause the
corporation to be formed only because they will become its shareholders. See, e.g.,
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 601 (McKinney 1986) (stating that "[a]ny reference in this
chapter to a 'by-law adopted by the shareholders' shall include a by-law adopted by
the incorporator or incorporators").
"' For discussion of which market signals should trigger dissolution, see infra notes
51-63 and accompanying text.
49 See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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Thus, by voting for dissolution, public shareholders would
accomplish what a court accomplishes when it decrees involuntary
dissolution for a close corporation: the directive to insiders to give
shareholders the pro rata value of their shares or else see the
corporation liquidated. The board would dispose of either the
corporation's assets or its shares or merge the company with
another at the highest price reasonably attainable. After providing
for the corporation's liabilities, the board would distribute the
proceeds of this sale to the shareholders pro rata.
III. How DISSOLUTION WILL WORK As A BUSINESS MATTER
A. How Stock Market Professionals Will Signal to
Shareholders How to Vote
Where shareholders can force an auction, any large disparity
between S's current share price and its potential value at auction
(hereafter "disparity") creates significant arbitrage opportunities.
There are two primary situations in which shareholders will benefit
from using dissolution to force the auction and eliminate the
disparity. In the first situation, a bidder has already launched a
takeover battle. By triggering dissolution, shareholders circumvent
takeover defenses and force a Revlon-style auction." In the second
situation, no bidder has yet surfaced, but the magnitude of the
disparity implies that if shareholders force an auction, one or more
bidders will come forward and pay shareholders a significant
premium. Voting for dissolution then elicits bidders.
The arbitrage mechanism for identifying profits to be realized
via dissolution resembles that used in takeovers generally.5
Incumbent management's success or failure to maximize S's value
is reflected by S's stock price." If management has maximized the
value of S's assets, S's stock price will approximate the highest price
any potential new management could reasonably pay for use of
those assets, and any disparity will be small. On the other hand, if
management has not value-maximized, the disparity will be greater.
Where the disparity is sufficiently large, bidders can pay a substan-
tial premium and still profit from acquiring S.
o See supra notes 6-8.
5 For a still serviceable account of the market mechanisms that allowed bidders
to make arbitrage profits, see Manne, supra note 15, at 112-13.
52 For discussion of stock price as the most reliable indicator of the corporation's
value, see infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
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The dismal history of conglomerates before takeovers undid
much of their damage5" demonstrates that managers can allow
substantial disparities for considerable periods without redeploying
S's assets more productively. Where management fails to eliminate
the disparity and is unwilling to sell S voluntarily, the takeover
market has historically facilitated the transfer of S's assets to more
productive uses. Where bidders could operate or dispose of
underutilized corporate assets more profitably than incumbent
management, they could pay S's shareholders a premium sufficient
to induce them to sell their shares.
B. Why Dissolution Would Do a Better Job Eliciting
Bids Than Hostile Takeovers Have
Any bidder's willingness to pay a significant premium requires
three conditions: (1) credible information that S's assets would be
more valuable in other hands, (2) financing for the takeover, and (3)
the legal ability to consummate the takeover. During the takeover
era, bidders profited by satisfying all of these conditions themselves.
Today, however, takeover defenses reduce bidders' incentives to
expend the resources necessary to satisfy them. Even when bidders
can pay S's shareholders a substantial premium for S's assets, S's
management may well frustrate bidders' efforts. Dissolution can
remedy this management-created impasse by eliciting market
responses that will make bidding profitable. These market
responses will, in turn, recreate the conditions required for
profitably purchasing undermanaged assets.
1. Condition One: Credible Information That
the Subject Corporation's Assets Would Be
More Valuable in Other Hands
For bidders to bid, the disparity and arbitrage opportunity must
be credibly identified and communicated. During the takeover era,
bidders looking for disparities did the job of valuing targets largely
by themselves, although often assisted by investment banking firms.
" See, e.g., Black, supra note 27, at 903-06 (discussing evidence that corporate
diversification redluces company value); F.M. Scherer, Corporate Takeovers: The
Efficiency Arguments, 2 J. ECON. PERsP. 69, 71 (1988) (noting growing scholarly
agreement that conglomerate mergers "led to widespread failure, evidenced in low
returns to conglomerate firms' shareholders and extensive divestiture of ill-fitting,
poorly-managed subsidiaries").
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The bidder "certified" the disparity by actually purchasing S stock,
thereby exposing itself to loss on its investment.
5 4
Dissolution can improve takeover bidders' searching for
undermanaged firms by enlisting arbitrageurs, shareholders
(especially large shareholders), and bidders jointly in the search.
Arbitrageurs and institutional investors55 are uniquely suited to
uncover disparities and provide other information concerning S's
value to potential bidders.5 First, the current stock market price
provides, for free, an unbiased estimate of the value of S's assets
under present management. Second, arbitrageurs make their living
by buying stock when corporate assets are underutilized and other
managements are willing to pay target shareholders to acquire and
redeploy these assets. As S approaches the possibility of auction,
arbitrageurs' resources will focus on the value of S to other
managers.
Where shareholder-initiated dissolution is available, if the
disparity is large enough and if potential bidders are likely to pay a
substantial premium to existing shareholders, both arbitrageurs and
existing shareholders will profit from forcing a dissolution.
Arbitrageurs can profit by buying S stock before the shareholders
have voted to dissolve.5 7 Arbitrageurs' buying will then drive up
Similarly, "greenmail" frequently served the same signaling function, aiding the
takeover market. SeeJonathan R. Macey & Fred S. McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis
of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE LJ. 13, 28-32 (1985) (arguing that greenmail allows
those who generate information about the value of the corporation to profit from
discovering corporate resources that can be profitably redeployed, even where they
have no desire to manage such assets).
" Institutional investors are served by highly sophisticated investment advisors
who possess much the same analytical tools and technology as arbitrageurs. Like
arbitrageurs, these institutions can earn profits for their beneficiaries using dissolu-
tion. Because the focus of the present discussion is on arbitrage as tie mechanism
for identifying and capturing profits, the text will hereafter refer solely to
arbitrageurs. Such references should be understood to include, where appropriate,
institutional investors as well.
' Arbitrageurs working within a dissolution regime may spot potential gains more
efficiently than takeover bidders per se. All market participants, rather than any one
particular bidder, will be appraising any difference between S's current and potential
value, thereby washing out idiosyncracies peculiar to single bidders.
For discussion of risk arbitrageurs' institutional competence for triggering
auction contests, see Coffee, supra note 1, at 1290.
"' It is costly for a takeover bidder to ascertain that it could operate S more
profitably than current management. Indeed, the most convincing theoretical argu-
ment for prohibiting management from conducting auctions derives from the large
"search costs" incurred by the initial bidder in identifying the best target. By free
riding on the search efforts of the initial bidder, later bidders retain greater resources
with which to bid against the former. Allowing such free riding reduces incentives
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the share price, thus signaling shareholders to approve dissolution.
By investing their own money, arbitrageurs bond the quality of their
information about an imminent premium. When arbitrageurs
predict an auction at a premium, they will bid up the share price to
the maximum where their returns from the auction proceeds
compensate them for their investment. Because dissolution
eliminates target managers' ability to block the auction, arbitrageurs
face less risk and can buy more S stock at higher prices. When
arbitrageurs predict a large premium, they signal a major disparity,
thus certifying S's worth to one or more potential bidders."
Where arbitrageurs are correct, they profit handsomely. By
contrast, where they cannot cause a substantial price increase,
thereby credibly communicating a disparity to bidders, bidders will
pro tanto have less incentive to offer a premium. If, in the absence
of a substantial premium, S shareholders then vote against the
dissolution, arbitrageurs lose money on their investment. Thus, the
inherent riskiness of investing on the prospect that shareholders will
dissolve S and that bidders will purchase S at a premium will make
arbitrageurs focus only on those corporations with the greatest
disparities.5 9
to identify targets. See EASTERBROOK & FiSCHEL, supra note 1, at 187-90 (stating that
auctions injure the initial bidder who spends time and money discovering targets,
thereby allowing subsequent bidders to enter the fray at a lower cost).
Dissolution, on the other hand, would encourage players other than bidders to
identify the disparity. For example, investment banking firms and other financial
institutions that analyze corporations in the ordinary course of their business develop
information that would frequently reveal any significant disparity but that, in the
absence of a bidder, is typically not a source of substantial trading gains. These
market participants could use this information profitably by purchasing shares and,
shortly thereafter, disseminating this information and arousing support for
dissolution. Thus, the dissolution regime aligns different parties' interests and
resources for the benefit of all: (a) those who have information about which they are
sufficiently certain to trade can profit from such trades if they are correct; (b)
potential bidders who can maximize the value of corporate assets are aided in their
search by an army of investment professionals who are compensated only through
their own trades and only if their information and judgment are correct; and (c)
shareholders who want to sell their shares at a premium can force an auction, if a
premium is likely.
" See Arnoud W.A. Boot, Why Hang On to Losers? Divestitures and Takeovers, 47J.
FiN. 1401, 1416 (1992) (suggesting that takeover bids signal not only that the target
is inefficient but also that the bidder "has identified a high-value user for the target's
incompatible asset").
59 Coffee has made a similar point concerning the wealth-enhancing effect of
hostile takeovers at high premiums. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1232 (arguing that
"the more a party is willing to invest in its own judgment, the greater the confidence
that society can also place in it"). For discussion of arbitrageurs' risk-return calcula-
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To the extent that arbitrageurs, foreseeing profits from a
bidding situation, have purchased S stock and driven up its price,
existing shareholders can infer that "Wall Street" believes that a vote
for dissolution will result in a significant premium. 0 The greater
the premium that arbitrageurs expect from any particular situation,
the more they will pay for S stock, the sharper the rise in its price,
the greater the potential profits to existing shareholders on account
of the anticipated dissolution," the greater the likelihood that S
tions, see David F. Larcker & Thomas Lys, An Empirical Analysis of the Incentives To
Engage in Costly Information Acquisition: The Case of Risk Arbitrage, 18J. FIN. ECON.
111, 118-23 (1987).
' Because upward price movement near the time of the dissolution vote will
suggest the market's expectation that S will be sold at a premium, management may
attempt to obscure the price movement's meaning. It could try to offset the rise by
manipulating stock prices downward, perhaps by releasing bad news (such as unfavor-
able future prospects) or by taking actions that will push its stock price down (such
as lowering dividends). The nature of the dissolution vote, however, should make
such behavior unavailing. If there is sufficient support for dissolution, the share price
should become a function of likely prices in an auction, rather than of management's
future deployment of corporate assets.
On the other hand, management may announce favorable projections and then
claim that the upward price movement is more a function of improving company
prospects than of any benefit from approving S's dissolution. Such positive signals
might confuse shareholders, but the extent of such confusion is limited by the
dictates of the securities laws and, more importantly, by traders and investigative
journalists who decode the meaning of such price movements.
Naturally, certain investment banking firms will find it lucrative consistently to
echo management's views. If they consistently favor management, however, they will
have difficulty maintaining their credibility. Where dissolution is rejected, one of two
things will happen. If improved company fortunes truly caused the share price
increase, the stock price should remain at the same level after shareholders reject
dissolution. If, on the other hand, the share price rose due to the expectation of
gains from an auction, the stock price should fall to its level before the upcoming
dissolution vote could have any price effect. (I assume a regime in which sharehold-
ers are restricted to only one dissolution vote per year. See, e.g., infra note 124 and
accompanying text (citing a New York statute limiting dissolutions to one per year).)
Sources correctly interpreting the data will thus correctly predict the post-vote stock
behavior, while biased sources will discredit themselves.
In this respect, the lapse of time before the next dissolution vote may provide
clearer market reactions than takeover bids. The defeat of any one takeover bid will
not necessarily forestall another bid, and share prices could remain elevated in hopes
of another bid materializing shortly. See Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, & E. Han
Kim, The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offerg: Information or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN.
ECON. 183, 189-98 (1983) (finding that abnormal returns for target corporation stock
remained present for those firms that were later taken over but dissipated for those
firms whose subsequent bids did not materialize). Speculators hoping for dissolution
because they view the subject corporation as underperforming will likely hold their
stock only if they anticipate another dissolution vote soon. Thus, where shareholders
can call dissolution votes only once in any 12-month period, most of the dissolution-
premium in the share price should vanish if dissolution fails.
"' Similar market reactions are observed when managers announce their plan
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shareholders will vote to trigger S's auction, and the greater the
attention potential bidders should pay to S as an acquisition
target.62  Conversely, if S's stock price does not rise, market
professionals are signaling that they do not anticipate a premium
from auctioning the company,63 and existing shareholders will
know to vote against dissolution.
Empirical evidence indicates that voluntary dissolution can
significantly increase shareholders' wealth but that managers initiate
dissolution only when doing so serves their own interests. A 1993
study by Gayle Erwin of all sixty-one voluntary liquidations between
1973 and 199164 found significant market price gains associated
with announcements of the liquidations. 61 Other studies have also
voluntarily to liquidate their corporations; the greater the disparity, the higher the
rise in share price at the announcement. See Gayle R. Erwin, Live or Let Die? An
Analysis of the Decision to Voluntarily Liquidate the Firm 151 (1993) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University) ("[W]hen the break-up value of the firm is
higher than its value as a going concern, the market ... view[s] the news of the
impending sale more favorably the more underutilized the assets .... ").
62 Note that bidders should not be deterred if S's market price increases, even
before the bidder makes a tender offer, to a price near the bidder's eventual price.
Shareholders want a premium over the share price of the company under incumbent
management (i.e., before the stock price moves due to prospects of dissolution). They
should be indifferent as to whether the price rises due to a bidder's actual offer or
due to the expectation of an offer that materializes after the price rises. Financial
analysts and the financial press can be counted on to explain the dynamics of the
price rise to less sophisticated shareholders.
65 For examples in the takeover context of courts properly attending to stock
market reaction to events, see City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 799
(Del. Ch.) (noting that, where shareholders were faced with the possibility of either
$74 per share in cash or a management-structured package putatively worth $76 per
share, the fact that market participants valued the stock at approximately $70 per
share indicated their doubts that the management's recapitalization was worth more
than the bidder's $74 per share), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). Applied
to the present proposal, such a market signal would caution shareholders to vote
against the recapitalization (and for dissolution) if they could. See Grand Metro. Pub.
Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1057 (Del. Ch. 1988) (stating that the stock
market reaction indicated that the bidder's offering price was fair and adequate).
The Delaware Supreme Court nischaracterized the chancery court's analysis as
"substituting its judgment as to what is a 'better' deal for that of a corporation's
board of directors." Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140,
1153 (Del. 1989). In fact, the chancery court was correctly using the market's
reaction to ascertain, as dictated by Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946 (Del. 1985), whether the risk to shareholders of their making an incorrect choice
was proportional to denying them the right to choose. See supra note 21. By using
dissolution, shareholders would not be dependent on the court to retain their right
to cash out their investment at full value.
" See Erwin, supra note 61, at 138-39, 143-44. Erwin eliminated mergers or sales
to one bidder, thereby selecting only management-initiated piecemeal liquidations in
which the firm's assets were sold to at least two buyers. See id.
' As had an earlier study, Erwin distinguished between firms that had been
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found that shareholders reap large positive abnormal returns from
voluntary liquidations.66 In addition, senior securityholders seem
subject to a bid for control by an outside, would-be acquiror (called the "control bid
group" in the earlier study) and those that had not (the "no control bid group"). For
the earlier study, see Gailen L. Hite,James E. Owers & Ronald C. Rogers, The Market
for Interfirr Asset Sales: Partial Sell-offs and Total Liquidations, 18J. FIN. ECON. 229,
248 (1987) (defining "control bids" as including merger proposals, tender offers,
contests for representation on the board of directors, and leveraged buyout
proposals). Erwin distinguished between firms that had been approached by friendly
or hostile bidders and those that had not been approached by either. See Erwin, supra
note 61, at 148-49.
The average increase in share price was higher for the no control bid group:
28.35% (z = 1.22) from the first liquidation press announcement to shareholder
confirmation of the plan and 64.91% (z = 0.81) for the total holding period from the
"pre-press date" through shareholder confirmation. See id. at 150. The pre-press date
was computed as "beginning with the year preceding any announcements of financial
distress, divestitures, or control contests." Id. at 149.
Erwin hypothesized that the control bid group had already seen significant price
appreciation due to the earlier acquisition overture(s) and would not show as high a
share price increase associated with the liquidation announcement. Her results for
the control bid group confirmed their lower returns for the period measured:
14.89% (z = 2.23) from the first liquidation press announcement to shareholder
confirmation of the plan and 29.42% (z = 1.77) for the total holding period. See id.
at 150.
" In a study of 49 firms that conducted piecemeal liquidations between 1963
and 1983, Hite, Owers, and Rogers found overall average abnormal gains of 25.67%
(z = 2.88) for the two years preceding the announcement month, and average
announcement-period gains of more than 12% associated with the liquidation
announcements themselves. See Hite et al., supra note 65, at 230, 247. Distinguishing
between the control bid group and the no control bid group, they found that the
stock of the control bid group had experienced its major price rise prior to the
liquidation month, while the major revaluation of the no control bid group occurred
during the liquidation announcement month, with "abnormal returns for the two
subsamples differ[ing] only in their timing, not in their approximate magnitudes."
Id. at 248.
Similarly, three other 1987 studies found large positive abnormal returns
associated with announcements of voluntary liquidations. Skantz and Marchesini
found announcement-month positive average excess returns of 21.4% and average
one-year gains of 41%. See Terrance R. Skantz & Roberto Marchesini, The Effect of
Voluntay Corporate Liquidation on Shareholder Wealth, 10 J. FIN. RES. 65, 65, 68
(1987).
Kim and Schatzberg found gains averaging 30%. See E. Han Kim & John D.
Schatzberg, Voluntay Corporate Liquidations, 19J. FIN. ECON. 311, 327 (1987).
Kudla found significant increases in the market value of common stock
associated with the liquidation announcement. See Ronald J. Kudla, Corporate
Insiders and the Liquidation Decision (1987) (unpublished manuscript, University of
Wisconsin-Eau Claire), summarized in RONALD J. KUDLA, VOLUNTARY CORPORATE
LIQUIDATIONS 35-36 (1988).
Positive gains were also found to be associated with announcements of partial
sell-offs. (Sell-offs dispose of one or more parts, rather than all, of a corporation's
assets.) See Scott C. Linn & Michael S. Rozeff, The Corporate Sell-off, MIDLAND CORP.
FIN. J., Summer 1984, at 17, 22 (finding that voluntary sell-offs create value for
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to gain as well.6"
Managers seem to initiate voluntary dissolution, however, only
when they (i) face the corporation's declining fortunes and (ii) own
a high percentage of stock.6" Given that managers seem virtually
divesting corporations' shareholders). Linn and Rozeff also list five other studies
finding statistically significant positive average abnormal gains of one to two percent
associated with announcements of sell-offs. See id. at 22-23. Linn and Rozeff present
arguments against the standard management explanations for the increase in share
price upon announcement of sell-offs, finding the most plausible explanation to be
"that the divested assets are worth more to someone else than to the current owner,
and that competition among firms for those assets allows the selling firm to obtain
'economic rents' from the sale." Id. at 25.
67 Where dissolved corporations are liquidated piecemeal, creditors obtain a
midstream acceleration of the maturity of their claims. See, e.g., William W. Bratton,
Jr., The Interpretation of Contracts Governing Corporate Debt Relationships, 5 CARDOZO L.
REV. 371, 399 (1984) ("Ultimately, dissolution matures all indebtedness by operation
of state law."). Whether voluntary creditors benefit or suffer from being paid early
depends on whether, at the time of liquidation, their investment trades at a discount
or premium. If, before the liquidation, the debt has undergone a midstream increase
in risk (or in the riskless rate) and therefore trades at a discount, the dissolution-
triggered prepayment will benefit creditors by eliminating the discount. Conversely,
if creditors' claims trade at a premium, dissolution will reduce creditors' wealth by
eliminating that premium.
The historical experience of management-initiated voluntary dissolutions suggests
that creditors will most often benefit from dissolution-triggered prepayment. Several
studies have indicated that values of debt obligations increase upon the announce-
ment of a voluntarily undertaken piecemeal-liquidation. See, e.g., Hite et al., supra
note 65, at 249 (finding that debt and preferred stock issues experienced two-day
returns of 8.57% [without adjustment for normal market returns], and noting that this
return provides "at least casual support for the notion that senior claimholders share
in the valuation increases associated with liquidation"); Kim & Schatzberg, supra note
66, at 326 ("[O]n average bondholders have benefitted from the debt-retirement
provision."); see also Erwin, supra note 61, at 110-11. Erwin hypothesized that the
benefits to senior securityholders derive from eliminating discounts due to liquidating
companies' previous financial difficulties. See id.
68 For example, one study found that factors which led managers to liquidate their
corporations included "unsolicited takeover attempts, large insider ownership of
common stocks, slow growth, large cash reserves, and deterioration in key financial
variables." Chinmoy Chosh, James E. Owers & Ronald C. Rogers, The Financial
Characteristics Associated with Voluntaiy Liquidations, 18J. Bus. FIN. & ACCT. 773, 774
(1991). The authors postulated that the firms' poor performance might have
attracted unsolicited suitors (and, in the long run, threatened bankruptcy) and that
managers, owning a large percentage of the stock, may have found voluntary liquida-
tion appealing as a way both to avoid possible bankruptcy and to frustrate hostile
suitors. See id. at 785-86. Chosh, Owers, and Rogers reported average inside
ownership of 24.09%. See id. at 780; see also Erwin, supra note 61, at 87. In her 1993
study, Erwin also found that liquidation was associated with significantly underutilized
assets, frequent financial distress, and attempts by outside suitors to acquire control.
Erwin found that, compared with industry peers, voluntarily liquidating firms are
"characterized by significantly underutilized assets prior to the liquidation decision,
as proxied by Tobin's q." Id. at 6. In Erwin's view, the most critical factor in insiders'
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never to initiate dissolution except when they stand to gain more as
shareholders than they will lose as officers, shareholders of large
corporations in which managers do not have large shareholdings will
need to initiate the dissolution themselves.
Market professionals have already demonstrated their skill in
anticipating the prices at which corporate assets will sell in voluntary
dissolutions. Erwin found that the share price rose promptly
following the liquidation announcement to incorporate the present
value of the expected increase in future cash flows from liquida-
tion.69 Similar market efficiency has been reported in connection
decision to liquidate was the combination of insiders controlling the board and
owning large shareholdings. Erwin's study found average insider shareholdings in the
year preceding the liquidation to be 33.2% (median = 29.0%). See id. at 87. Erwin
hypothesized that the combination of large shareholdings and board control
guaranteed that they would realize maximum value for their stock. See id. at 119-20.
A study by Ronald Kudla probed the agency cost question by investigating
whether the likelihood of voluntary dissolution increased in proportion to the
insiders' percentage ownership of stock. Based on the evidence, Kudla inferred that
larger equity holdings by insiders were positively associated with the wealth increase
from liquidation. See KUDLA, supra note 66, at 39.
Management's proportional stockholdings have also been shown to correlate
positively with tender offers' successes. See James F. Cotter & Marc Zenner, How
Managerial Wealth Affects the Tender Offer Process, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 63, 67 (1994)
(reporting that the probability of a successful tender offer is positively related to
changes that the takeover will produce in the managers' wealth: specifically, profits
managers reap having their shares purchased by the bidder). Kudla noted that, on
average, the insiders owned enough stock so that their salaries constituted only 3.5%
of the value of their stock, thereby making the tradeoff between losing theirjobs and
receiving consideration for their stock less disagreeable. See KUDLA, supra note 66,
at 41 n.8.
69 See Erwin, supra note 61, at 154. Erwin noted that "market participants
correctly estimated the piecemeal value of the firm's assets using a risk-adjusted
valuation model." Id. at 158. The average per share price following announcement
of the liquidation was $22.71; the average liquidating payouts, when discounted to
present value as of the announcement date using the firm's required rate of return,
was $23.13. See id. at 156-57.
Furthermore, after quickly impounding the gain from the impending liquidation,
the market's revaluation of the liquidating firm remained stable well after the
announcement. See id. at 154-55; see also infra Figure 1. Figure 1 illustrates that
"within the first week following the liquidation announcement, the market has fully
incorporated the expected value of the liquidation and that revaluation appears to
remain relatively constant thereafter. (Notice the upward drift prior to the
liquidation announcement as the market partially anticipates the increase in value, yet
there is no upward or downward drift in prices following the liquidation announce-
ments.)". Correspondence from Gail R. Erwin, Assistant Professor of Commerce,
McIntire School of Commerce, University of Virginia, to author (Nov. 24, 1995) (on
file with author). Professor Erwin statistically tested the efficiency of the market by
examining the cumulative abnormal returns and by discounting back the actual
liquidating dividends and comparing them to the price immediately following the
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FIGURE 1 Comparative Weekly Stock Price Behavior During the Six
Months Before and After the Announcement of Voluntary
Corporate Liquidation"0
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liquidation announcement. Her results indicate that "the increase in share value at
the time of the announcement is equivalent to the actual discounted cash flows from
the liquidation process." Id.
70 With weekly stock prices being normalized by the stock price six months prior
to the liquidation announcement.
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with voluntary corporate sell-offs7" and spin-offs. 2  Indeed, the
market demonstrates impressive efficiency by correctly anticipating
the sale of particular assets before their actual acquisition.
73
Studies have also confirmed risk arbitrageurs' ability to predict
accurately the success or failure of tender offers. 74 Historically,
the more confident that arbitrageurs were of the success of the bid,
the higher they would bid the target's share price above the pre-
announcement level.75  The relative degree of such arbitrageur-
influenced price increases, in turn, accurately predicted tender offer
results.76 One study found that arbitrageurs were able to predict
71 See e.g., Douglas Hearth & Janis K. Zaima, Voluntary Corporate Divestitures and
Value, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1984, at 10, 14 (finding significant positive price
movements through the announcement date, but no significant price movements after
the announcement date); Janis K. Zaima & Douglas Hearth, The Wealth Effects of
Voluntay Selloffs: Implicationsfor Divesting and Acquiring Firtns, 8J. FIN. RES. 227, 233
(1985) (reporting that generally, "the market reaction to a selloff announcement
occurs close to the announcement date and the new equilibrium price is reached
quickly").
' See, e.g., James A. Miles & James D. Rosenfeld, The Effect of Voluntay Spin-off
Announcements on Shareholder Wealth, 38 J. FIN. 1597, 1605 (1983) (finding that
average adjusted returns are abnormally positive before and especially on the
announcement day but are random after the announcement day, suggesting semi-
strong market efficiency valuing the transaction).
" Mitchell and Lehn found that, at the time managers announce they are making
an acquisition, the market, by revaluing the bidder's stock, is "able to immediately
provide an unbiased forecast of the likelihood that the assets will ultimately be
divested, long before any cash flows from the resulting business combination are
known." Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lelin, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?, 98
J. POL. ECON. 372, 388 (1990).
' See, e.g., Larcker & Lys, supra note 59, at 111-12, 117 (finding that arbitrageurs
were highly successful in predicting which firms would be acquired: firms whose
stock was purchased between December 1977 and December 1983 by one or more
risk arbitrageurs in amounts sufficient to require filing a Schedule 13D stating a pur-
pose of "arbitrage" or "to participate in a tender offer or merger" had a success rate
of 97.12% for being acquired or reorganized);JAMES H. LORIE, PETER DODD & MARY
H. KIMPTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES & EVIDENCE 70-73 Fig. 4-9 (reproduced
infra as Figure 2) (2d ed. 1985) (discussing how corporate takeovers and acquisitions
"best illustrate both the speed and unbiased nature of the efficient capital market").
' See William Samuelson & Leonard Rosenthal, Price Movements As Indicators of
Tender Offer Success, 41 J. FIN. 481, 497-98 (1986).
76 See Keith C. Brown & Michael V. Raymond, Risk Arbitrage and the Prediction of
Successful Corporate Takeovers, FIN. MGNIT., Autumn 1986, at 54, 55 (arguing that an
ongoing prediction as to the eventual success of the merger can be inferred from the
prices set in the post-announcement period); Samuelson & Rosenthal, supra note 75,
at 497 (arguing that the higher the arbitrageur-influenced price increases, the greater
the chance of tender success); see also William P. Dukes, Cheryl J. Frohlich &
Christopher K. Ma, Risk Arbitrage in Tender Offers, J. PORTFOLIO MCMT., Summer
1992, at 47, 47 (1992) (investigating the profit potential of risk arbitrage in tender
offers).
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whether mergers would fail or succeed as far as three months in
advance of the respective events." Further, even when initial bids
failed, the market correctly anticipated later, successful takeovers.
78
With few exceptions, arbitrageur-induced market prices measured
the expected (discounted) stock price of the target at the conclusion
of the contest, with their predictions improving as the conclusion
neared. 9
Market professionals' ability to predict both the break-up values
of liquidating corporations and the success rate of hostile takeovers
suggests that they will effectively aid economically efficient
dissolution. In search of profits, they will ferret out disparities in
the stock of companies ripe for dissolution and bid the stock up,
thus calling for auction of the corporation and asset redeployment.
One might object that stock prices rise for diverse reasons and
that a sudden rise in S stock by itself conveys no reliable informa-
tion. For example, the rise might result from improvements made
by incumbent management. Yet arbitrageurs have good incentives
to distinguish between news that favors dissolution and news that
discourages dissolution. Because arbitrageurs profit only if
shareholders dissolve S and auction it at a premium, arbitrageurs
will investigate which factors have influenced the stock price before
making their purchases. Once they have purchased, they will
communicate their knowledge to the financial community.
Furthermore, since only shareholders can dissolve the corporation
and only bidders pay premiums, arbitrageurs will profit from
persuading large shareholders to support dissolution and bidders to
buy S at a premium. Thus, arbitrageurs will likely share with
existing shareholders, other market participants, and potential
bidders the information about the disparity and the reasons that
favor a premium bid.
Managers will likely object that the stock market alone cannot
effectively allocate corporate assets. Yet, although criticisms of the
efficient markets hypothesis have diminished earlier optimism about
77 See Brown & Raymond, supra note 76, at 55.
' See Bradley et al., supra note 60, at 205 (arguing that the positive revaluation of
the shares of targets of unsuccessful tender offers is evidence that the capital market
anticipates a future, successful acquisition bid).79 See Samuelson & Rosenthal, supra note 75, at 497-98 (finding that "[w]ith few
exceptions, market prices are well-calibrated, i.e., the current target price during the
offer period measures the expected (discounted) stock price at the conclusion date"
and that opportunities for earning excess returns based on non-market "optimal
investment polic[ies]" occur infrequently).
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the market's absolute efficiency, ° the market can play an effective
role in the dissolution process. For the market to provide reliable
signals for purposes of dissolution, it need only supply more
accurate data than does management. In practice, the market is
likely to provide more accurate information than would inferior
management threatened with the prospect of dissolution.
First, even though, on average, insiders are able to earn
abnormal returns trading in their corporations' securities,
1
o For useful recent overviews of the initial acceptance of and ensuing challenges
to the market efficiency and market rationality hypotheses, see Eugene F. Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 761 (1985); Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992); Stephen F. LeRoy, Efficient
Capital Markets and Martingales, 27 J. EcON. LITERATURE 1583 (1989); Robert C.
Merton, On the Current State of the Stock Market Rationality Hypothesis, in MACROECO-
NOMICS AND FINANCE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRANCO MODIGLIANI 93 (Rudiger
Dornbusch et al. eds., 1987); William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market
Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 341 (1986).
For relevant commentary on market efficiency in the context of hostile takeovers,
see Reinier H. Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted"
Share Prices As an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891 (1988); Romano, supra
note 17, at 143-45, 152; Alan Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian
Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 165, 190 n.43 (1988); J. Gregory Sidak & Susan E.
Woodward, Takeover Premiums, Appraisal Rights and the Price Elasticity of a Firm's
Publicly Traded Stock, 25 GA. L. REv. 783 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums
Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Coiporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235
(1990).
For the most informative theoretical treatment of processes by which market
participants drive markets toward efficiency, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H.
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984). For the
most informative, brief account of practical mechanisms, see Chris Welles, Inside the
Arbitrage Game, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1981, at 41. See also Marilyn Much,
Arbitragers: Wall Street's Mystery Men, INDUSTRY WK., Oct. 1, 1979, at 69 (describing
the role of arbitrageurs in the market).
" See, e.g., H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Bidder Managers Knowingly Pay Too Much for Target
Firms?, 63J. Bus. 439, 441 (1990) [hereinafter Seyhun, Knowingly Pay?] ("[I]nsiders
earn an average of 3% abnormal return on their transactions."); H. Nejat Seyhun,
Insiders'Profits, Costs of Trading and Market Efficiency, 16J. FIN. ECON. 189, 189 (1986)
(stating that studies show that insiders' abnormal profits "vary from 3% to 30% during
holding periods of eight months to three years").
Skeptics of the market's relative superiority over management are correct in
believing that management possesses an enormous amount of information about the
company's innovations, productive capacities, pricing policies, etc. that other market
participants lack. The market, on the other hand, may know more about the state of
things outside the corporation: for example, the state of the economy, consumer
tastes, or competitors' products that may render the company's products obsolete.
(There is, however, debate over whether aggregate insider trades can anticipate future
macroeconomic performance. See, e.g., Mustafa Chowdhury,John S. Howe &Ji-Chai
Lin, The Relation Between Aggregate Insider Transactions and Stock Market Returns, 28J.
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evidence suggests that poor-performing managements (as reflected
by their vulnerability to hostile takeover bids) underperform the
market.82 The tendency for less efficient managers to lose money
relative to the market, even when they possess the same type of
"soft inside information" that better managers use to beat the
market, strongly suggests that the market is superior to weaker
managements in valuing corporations. Second, underperforming
management has compelling incentives to exaggerate its company's
value. To keep their jobs, managers will argue that the market
"undervalues" S and that dissolution will waste corporate value, even
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 431, 437 (1993) (finding that stock market returns
appear to cause insider transactions rather than the reverse and that the predictive
content of aggregate insider transactions for subsequent market returns appears
slight); H. Nejat Seyhun, Why Does Aggregate Insider Trading Predict Future Stock Re-
turns?, 107 Q.J. ECON. 1303, 1320 (1992) (finding that aggregate insider trading,
although negatively correlated with contemporaneous stock returns, is positively
correlated with future stock returns up to 20 months after the trades).)
Also, outsiders may learn through leaks about internal problems of which
corporate management is not aware. Thus, much of market professionals'
information is proprietary and just as inaccessible to management as management's
inside information is inaccessible to market professionals.
s Ekkehart Boehmer and Jeffry Netter studied trades by insiders in their own
companies' stock from the period one year before their companies made significant
acquisitions until, in the case of managers of companies that became targets of hostile
bids, the time of the hostile bid, which came on average approximately two years after
the first acquisition. They found that inside stock purchases by managers of firms
that were later subject to hostile bids were less successful in terms of the stock's post-
trade performance (and more optimistic about the value of their firm) than those of
managers of firms that were not later targets of hostile bids. See Ekkehart Boehmer
& Jeffry M. Netter, Management Optimism and Corporate Acquisitions: Evidence
from Insider Trading 2 (Mar. 1994) (unpublished working paper, University of
Georgia). In the 100 days surrounding their trades, efficient managers earned
positive abnormal returns averaging 6.17% (t = 3.79), while inefficient managers
earned average abnormal returns of -2.23% (t = -1.65). See id. tbl. 4.
Similarly, H. Nejat Seyhun found that managers of bidder corporations increase
their purchases of their own firms' stock before acquiring target firms, even when the
acquisitions reduced their own firms' market value by over 5%. See Seyhun, Knowingly
Pay?, supra note 81, at 451 tbl. 5.
This distinction between managers should not be surprising, since better-
performing managers should typically make more accurate valuations. For example,
superior managements make productive acquisitions; inferior managements make
unproductive acquisitions. See Larry H.P. Lang, Ren6 M. Stulz & Ralph A. Walkling,
Managerial Performance, Tobin's , and the Gains from Successful Tender Offers, 24J. FIN.
ECON. 137, 139 (1989) (noting that "one would expect poorly performing firms to
make poor investments," while well-managed firms would avoid those investments and
pay out dividends instead); Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Do
Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45J. FIN. 31, 33-34, 45 (1990) (showing
through statistical studies that "bad managers are bad acquirers" and that "firms with
better managers are also better acquirers").
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if the managers know such assertions lack merit. Consequently,
given that market prices apparently outperform weaker managers
and that the self-interest of inefficient managers encourages them
to overvalue S's worth, the market may be a better indicator as to
whether shareholders should dissolve a corporation.
2. Condition Two: Financing
In order to successfully consummate a takeover, bidders must
secure adequate financing. In theory, bidders can use corporate
securities rather than cash. Historically, however, in hostile bids
management typically points to the uncertain value of the bidders'
securities and characterizes these securities as inadequate and
coercive consideration, therebyjustifying management's rejection of
the bid. Courts typically accept this argument and allow manage-
ment to use takeover defenses unless the bidder has offered all cash
for all shares."3 To raise cash for the full purchase price, bidders
frequently need to borrow. Lenders, in turn, need to feel confident
that lending to the bidder will yield a profit.
Target management typically attempts to disrupt bidders'
financing by forcing bidders to incur large lender commitment fees
before the bidder could assess whether it could successfully acquire
the target. Although, historically, the junk bond market solved the
financing problem, the demise of Drexel Burnham Lambert and the
subsequent diminution of the junk bond market have increased the
difficulty of financing hostile takeovers.
Dissolution eliminates several of the primary financing problems
encountered in takeovers. First, dissolution pressures arbitrageurs
to assess the availability of financing because, practically speaking,
arbitrageurs investing in S's stock economically "bond" bidders'
potential for financing: if they are wrong, they lose money.
s See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985)
(noting that the use of "junk bonds" in the second-step, squeeze-out merger
constitutes "a classic coercive measure designed to stampede shareholders into
tendering at the first tier"); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796-97
(Del. Ch.) (describing how the structure of an offer can make the tender offer
coercive; noting that bidder's all-shares, all-cash offer "is in no respect coercive"),
appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988); Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. Co. v. Pillsbury
Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1052, 1056, 1058-59 (Del. Ch. 1988) (describing how the form
of payment could make tender offers coercive, and noting that bidder's consideration
was all cash and that inadequacy of price, not coerciveness, was the only issue
concerning the validity of the target's takeover defense).
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Second, dissolution allows bidders to use their own securities as
consideration. Because voluntary dissolution triggers a mandatory
sale of S-a "friendly" transaction by definition-dissolution
eliminates the possibility of management resistance. Once directors
must auction S, they have nothing to gain from disparaging the
bidder's securities as inadequate and coercive. Rather, as auction-
eers, they can use the bidders' expanded financing options to the
advantage of S's shareholders. S's board can, for example, condi-
tion its recommendation of one bidder's securities over another's
on a guarantee of the value of the bidder's securities.8 4 Knowing
that their board and the board's investment bankers have priced the
bidder's securities to reflect accurately their risk and return, S
shareholders can accept such securities with confidence. Able to
pay in securities as well as in cash, bidders can offer higher prices.
Finally, dissolution eliminates unnecessary financing costs
intentionally created by target management to disrupt bidders'
financing and otherwise to saddle bidders with onerous transaction
costs.8 5 Dissolution allows bidders to wait for shareholders to vote
' For examples of such guarantees, see Beth McGoldrick, Treasury Management:
Contingent-Value Rights: Are They Debt or Put Options?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, May
1990, at 161 (explaining contingent-value rights created in Dow's acquisition of
Marion Laboratories); Alison L. Cowan, Rival Bidder Diller Says: 'It's History', N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 1994, at D5 (describing Viacom's "contingent value right" given to
Paramount shareholders as partial acquisition consideration, entitling rightholders to
up to $12 of any difference between $48 per share and Viacom's actual share price
one year after closing the transaction); Glenn Ruffenach & Randall Smith, RJR Nabisco
Gets Major Jolt in Debt Ratings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1990, at A3 (describing reset
provisions on RJR Nabisco's bonds obligating RJR to reset interest rate so that the
bonds trade at 100% of face value on a specific date months after the acquisition of
RJR by KKR).
8 One relatively common ploy is for S's board to refuse to negotiate with the
bidder or consider removing takeover defenses without evidence of "firm" financing.
See, e.g., Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,39 (Del.
1994) (noting that under its No-Shop provision, Paramount was not allowed to discuss
the offer unless the disfavored bidder made an offer "which is not subject to any
material contingencies relating to financing"); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
884-85 (Del. 1985) (describing the target CEO's discrimination against the disfavored
bidder on the grounds that the disfavored bidder's financing was not firm, despite
having accepted the favored bidder's offer when its financing was not firm); Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986)
(describing a target board unanimously accepting bid of favored bidder over
disfavored bidder with equally credibl financing on the grounds, in part, that the
favored bidder's "financing was firmly in place"); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422, 429-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (discussing at length the
reciprocal relationship between financing and the credibility of a takeover bid).
While appearing harmless, this defense can impose substantial costs on the
bidder, since the bidder would typically only be able to demonstrate such firm
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to dissolve (thereby forcing the auction) before making irrevocable
their own obligations to lenders.
3. Condition Three: The Legal Ability to
Consummate the Acquisition
Assuming sound financing and willing S shareholders, each
bidder has to be assured that takeover defenses will not thwart its
bid. Irrespective of shareholder wishes, though, management
currently can threaten bidders' success. By the late 1980s, various
circumstances united to turn the tide in favor of management and
against hostile bids.8 Bidders' confidence that they could acquire
targets lessened, and hostile takeover bids declined.87 Today,
absent a replacement for takeovers, management can usually
preclude bidders from acquiring the corporation. Where sharehold-
ers can force an auction by voting for dissolution, however, they will
eliminate the risk that takeover defenses will block desired bids.
Bidders can, of course, play games with shareholders. They can,
for example, make a bid, let shareholders dissolve the corporation
and then reduce their price. It is, however, in market participants'
financing by triggering its own obligation to pay substantial commitment and other
fees to its creditors. See, e.g., LEO HERZEL & RICHARD W. SHEPRO, BIDDERS AND
TARGETS: MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN THE U.S. 483 (1990) (noting that it has
been "customary for a bank to charge a substantial fee for providing a commitment
letter.., in addition to the fees and interest covering the loan itself"). In the normal
takeover battle, management has very little doubt of the bidder's financing.
' Takeover defenses were strengthened in the 1980s both by states increasingly
adopting anti-takeover legislation and by companies increasingly adopting poison
pills. See e.g.,John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative
Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation, 59 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1430-31
(1991). Courts reviewing poison pills eventually understood that poison pills could
preclude bidders from purchasing shares tendered by shareholders. See Interco, 551
A.2d at 797-98; Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1053. As a consequence, only if a court forced
a board to redeem the poison pill rights could the bidder purchase the target stock.
Courts have forced poison pills to be redeemed only twice: the Delaware Chancery
Court's Interco and Pillsbury cases, referred to immediately above. In Time-Warner,
however, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed to repudiate the doctrinal grounds on
which the two Chancery Court opinions were based. See Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) ("To the extent that the Court of
Chancery has recently [applied the Unocal proportionality standard to free
shareholders from preclusive takeover defenses in order to allow them to choose
between accepting a tender offer and staying with incumbent management] in certain
of its opinions, we hereby reject such an approach as not in keeping with a proper
Unocal analysis."). Time-Warner thus seemed to allow boards effectively to preclude
shareholders from having their shares purchased by the bidder. See supra note 25;
see also Grundfest, supra note 2, at 858-59.
87 See Grundfest, supra note 2, at 858-59.
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self-interest to make dissolutions work. Bidders must credibly bond
that, after a shareholder vote approving dissolution, they will go
through with the transaction as indicated; otherwise, shareholders
will be less inclined to approve dissolution. In addition, the
riskiness of voting for dissolution where no concrete bidder has yet
emerged discourages shareholders from voting for dissolution in the
absence of a large disparity and the high likelihood of a premium.
Moreover, at any one time lenders will make only so much financing
available, forcing arbitrageurs and bidders to concentrate on firms
where the disparity (and the likely profit) is greatest. Finally, where
shareholders retain the right to revoke dissolution, they preclude
bidder opportunism."8
Dissolution, like the hostile takeover, presents the risk that inef-
ficient firms will bid for more efficient firms, thus deploying cor-
porate assets in the wrong direction. Again, market processes offer
the best protection. Historically, corporations that pursue value-
decreasing acquisitions are themselves taken over with abnormally
high frequency."9  Bidder management that takes over target
corporations and fails to increase their value will increase the
disparity in the bidder company's stock, thereby exposing such
inefficient bidders to dissolution.
90
8 See infra notes 130-39 and accompanying text.
s Mitchell and Lehn found that the stock market negatively values acquisitions by
firms that later become takeover targets and positively values acquisitions by firms
that do not. See Mitchell & Lehn, supra note 73, at 384. Acquisitions made by
targets-to-be are later divested at an average 40.7% rate versus only 9.1% for non-
targets. See id. at 388. Further, "the probability that a firm is a target, especially a
hostile target . .. is inversely and significantly related to the stock price effects
associated with announcements of the firm's acquisitions: the more negative these
effects, the higher the likelihood of a subsequent takeover attempt." Id. at 376; see
also infra Figure 3; Black, supra note 9, at 622-23 (arguing that "today's overpaying
bidders are likely to be tomorrow's targets"); Morck et al., supra note 82, at 34 (citing
Mitchell and Lehn). The dissolution regime, by allowing shareholders to punish
inefficient acquisitions by voting to dissolve, should discourage such wealth-reducing
acquisitions more effectively than have other remedies.
0 Lang, Stulz, and Walkling found that the "total takeover gain" (the increase
[decrease] in the combined market value of the bidder and target equity) varied
depending on management skill as proxied by Tobin's q. Tobin's q represents "the
ratio of the firm's market value to its replacement value" and "is an increasing
function of the quality of a firm's current and anticipated projects under existing
management." Lang et al., supra note 82, at 138-39. Whereas bidders with high
Tobin's q, on average, reap total takeover gain in excess of 10% when they take over
low q targets, low q bidders, on average, lose in excess of 4% when taking over high
q targets. See id. at 139.
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FIGURE 3 Stock Price Reactions to Acquisition Announcements, 1982-86
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On the shareholder side, institutional investors will be the
repeat players in the dissolution regime. As such, they have every
incentive to dissolve only underperforming, rather than effectively
managed, companies.9 ' Any extra costs from inefficient disso-
lutions or even from inefficient dissolution votes will, after all, come
at their expense as shareholders.
Thus, market players will gather the relevant information about
the advisability of auctioning the company and disseminate such
data to the appropriate parties. Whenever S's actual value sags too
far below its potential value in the hands of others, market reactions
will, as simply and efficiently as a thermostat, invite dissolution.
Because dissolution allows shareholders to trigger the auction
themselves, it puts discipline over management in the hands of
those who care most intensely: shareholders, rather than bidders or
managers.
IV. How DISSOLUTION WOULD WORK UNDER STATE LAW
Some states now permit only the board to initiate voluntary
dissolution; 92 others permit shareholders to do so as well.93
Because until now state legislatures have not thought of their
dissolution regimes as mechanisms to guarantee corporate health,
the current state of the law concerning voluntary dissolution results
more from historical accident than from any conscious philosophy.
Shareholders will benefit if the law allows them to initiate proce-
dures to voluntarily dissolve their corporations, and state legisla-
tures should change laws, where necessary, to allow them to do so.
Among the twelve states that currently allow shareholders to
initiate voluntary dissolution, the most commercially important are
California, New York, and Illinois.9 4 To illustrate how dissolution
would work under state law, this Part will explain how, under the
corporate laws of those three states, shareholders could cause
voluntary dissolution even against management wishes. It will
"' See John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance As a Multi-
Player Game, 78 GEO. LJ. 1495, 1542-44 (1990) (noting that the game theoretical
principle that cooperation dominates in iterated or repeated games may apply to
institutional investors).
See supra note 12.
9s See supra note 13.
For a limited, rather dated, but generally useful practice-oriented 1983 overview
of dissolution focusing on Delaware, New York, and California statutes, see AlbertJ.
Beveridge, III & Cynthia A. Lewis, Corporate Dissolutions and Liquidations, 6 CORP. L.
REV. 195 (1983).
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describe the specific procedures that shareholders would use to
effectuate dissolution, the obstacles they would need to avoid, the
tactics that management would likely use to try to obstruct dissolu-
tion, and the ways shareholders could counter such obstruction.
Finally, it will suggest ways legislators could improve legal rules
concerning dissolution in order to make it a more efficient regime
for corporate discipline.
A. Do Shareholders Have the Power to Initiate Dissolution?
1. Current Law
Shareholders of companies incorporated in Illinois, New York,
and California can initiate voluntary dissolution without board
approval and thereby force the directors to auction their
company.
95
Illinois requires two-thirds of the voting shares to approve
dissolution but allows corporations to change that percentage by
charter provision."5 It should be noted that Illinois contains a
" Delaware allows shareholders holding only a majority of shares to authorize
voluntary dissolution, but only if the board has first recommended dissolution. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(a) (1991). Consequently, this Article will not deal with
the Delaware law of dissolution in any detail.
96 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.15 (Smith-Hurd 1993). Section 12.15
comprises two different substantive provisions regarding voluntary dissolution: (a)
provisions concerning calling the dissolution vote and (b) provisions concerning the
percentage of votes required to authorize dissolution. Concerning calling the dissolution
vote, § 12.15(a) provides that voluntary
[d]issolution of a corporation may be authorized by a vote of shareholders,
in the following manner: (a) Either (1) The board of directors shall adopt
a resolution [proposing dissolution] or (2) Holders of not less than one-fifth
of all the outstanding shares entitled to vote on dissolution may, in writing,
propose the dissolution of the corporation to the board of directors; if the
directors fail or refuse to call a meeting of shareholders to consider such
proposal for more than one year after delivery thereof, the shareholders
proposing dissolution may call a meeting of the shareholders to consider
such proposal.
Id. § 12.15(a)(1), (2).
Concerning the actual vote required to authorize dissolution, § 12.15(c) provides
that "the resolution to dissolve voluntarily the corporation ... shall require for its
adoption the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding
shares entitled to vote on dissolution." Id. § 12.15(c). Section 12.15(d) permits
changing the percentage requirement via charter provision. See id. § 12.15(d).
Although one can read § 12.15 to allow shareholder-initiated voluntary dissolu-
tion against board wishes only where the vote has been called in the manner specified
by § 12.15(a), other provisions of Illinois's corporate statute are drafted in such a way
to create some ambiguity as to whether shareholders can use other means to effect
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potentially powerful provision that management might try to use
strategically. Section 12.15(c) provides, in addition to a require-
ment for a two-thirds supermajority for dissolution, that share-
holders can be empowered to vote as a class.97 The provision
requiring separate classes to approve dissolution by supermajority
will tempt management to create a separate class of stock, whether
common or preferred, with the right to vote on dissolution and
issue enough of this special class of stock to block dissolution to
itself, a company ESOP or other parties friendly to management.
Most states that allow shareholders to initiate dissolution without
board approval make similar provisions for voting as separate
classes.9" Given the transparent entrenchment motive for such
special classes of stock, courts normally should invalidate
management's issuance of such stock. Better still would be for
states to draft provisions, such as New York's, that entitle sharehold-
ers to vote as a single group, thereby forestalling management from
disenfranchising the majority of shareholders.
99
Like Illinois, New York requires a two-thirds supermajority to
authorize a voluntary non-judicial dissolution °° and allows the
charter to alter the specified percentage.10 1 Unlike Illinois, New
voluntary dissolution. See infra notes 109, 113, 121 and accompanying text.
" Section 12.15(c) provides, in relevant part, that:
the resolution to dissolve voluntarily the corporation ... shall require for
its adoption the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of the
outstanding shares entitled to vote on dissolution, unless any class of shares
is entitled to vote as a class in respect thereof, in which event the resolution
shall require for its adoption the affirmative vote of the holders of at least
two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of shares entitled to vote
as a class in respect thereof, and of the total outstanding shares entitled to
vote on dissolution.
§ 12.15(c) (emphasis added).
" See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 10.06.605 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-26-710 (Michie
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0704, .1402(6) (West 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805,
para. 5/12.15 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:142A (West 1994); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 1103(1)(A)(2) (West 1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
156B, § 100(a) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-107 (1995);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.86(E) (Anderson 1992).
9 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1001 (MeKinney 1986) (authorizing dissolution
"by the vote of the holders of two-thirds of all outstanding shares entitled to vote
thereon" (emphasis added)); cf. CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900 (West 1990) (authorizing
dissolution "by the vote of shareholders holding shares representing 50 percent or
more of the voting power" (emphasis added)). But cf. infra note 106 (noting that
California currently imposes a supermajority requirement for preferred shareholders
to approve dissolution).
100 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 1001 (McKinney 1986).
101 The percentage requirement of§ 1001 may be changed in two ways. First, to
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York also allows holders of a majority of shares, if "they deem a
dissolution to be beneficial to the shareholders," to petition a court
to dissolve the corporation judicially. 10 2 Although judicial dissolu-
tion under this provision is not guaranteed, New York law provides
that the benefit to the shareholders should govern.103  As one
prominent commentary notes, "When the proceeding is brought by
... a majority of the shareholders on their own volition, there will
normally be an inference that dissolution will be beneficial to the
shareholders."0 4
California allows holders of fifty percent or more of the voting
shares to authorize voluntary dissolution without board action.0 5
Unlike Illinois and New York, California does not allow charter
provisions to raise the required percentage of common stock and
thus to make dissolution harder to obtain.
0 6
grant minority shareholders a right to exit their investment, § 1002 allows the charter
to specify shareholders who "may require the dissolution of the corporation at will
or upon the occurrence of a specified event." Id. § 1002(a).
Second, § 616(a)(2) permits the charter to specify a greater proportion of
shareholder votes required for action than otherwise prescribed by statute. See id.
§ 616(a)(2).
Normally, corporations would not have or retain such provisions when they go
public. However, to the extent that dissolution becomes an effective form of disci-
pline, management will attempt to raise, via charter amendment, the percentage of
shares required to approve a dissolution. Shareholders should resist raising the
percentage required.
On the other hand, it is assumed that § 1002 allows a charter provision reducing,
as well as expanding, the percentage required to approve dissolution. See Daniel H.
O'Connell, Dissolution As a Remedy for Dissension and Deadlock in the New York Closely-
Held Corporation, 19 BUFF. L. REv. 585, 596 n.70 (1970) (citing Robert A. Kessler,
Arbitration of Intra-Corporate Disputes Under New York Laws, 19 ARB.J. 1, 14 (1964), as
suggesting the possibility that shareholders could vote to reduce the required
percentage). Shareholders, therefore, should press for a charter amendment lowering
the percentage requirement required for dissolution.
102 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1103(a) (McKinney 1986). Section 1103(c) provides,
however, that the charter may require a greater proportion than a majority. See id.
§ 1103(c). The cautions noted above with respect to the interplay of §§ 1001 and
1002 apply, mutatis mutandis, to the interplay between §§ 1103(a) and 1103(c).
10 See id. § IIII(b)(2) (stating that when shareholders petition the court for
dissolution, the court must consider that "the benefit to the shareholders of a dissolu-
tion is of paramount importance").
10 4 ISIDORE KANTRowrrz & SOL SLUTSKY, WHITE ON NEW YORK CORPORATIONS
1111.01[2] (Jonathon M. Hoff et al. eds., 13th ed. 1995) [hereinafter WHITE ON
CORPORATIONS] (citing In re Niagara Ins. Co., I Paige Ch. 258, 259 (N.Y. Ch. 1828));
see also In re Importers' & Grocers' Exch. (Hitch v. Hawley), 30 N.E. 401,403-04 (N.Y.
1892).
105 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900(a) (West 1990).
"0 Section 204 allows charter provisions to increase the percentage of votes
required for certain corporate actions but specifically excludes corporate actions
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2. Possible Improvements
States would increase shareholders' and other constituencies'
welfare by allowing shareholders to initiate voluntary dissolution
even against management's wishes. Those states that currently do
not permit shareholder-initiated dissolution should revise their
statutes to grant shareholders such a right. Further, states should
allow such action by vote of a simple majority. Supermajority
provisions permit insiders with substantial holdings to frustrate the
will of the majority.' To prevent strategic blocking, states should
not allow charter amendments to raise the percentage required for
approving voluntary dissolution above an affirmative majority for
common stock, unless shareholders can initiate changes to charter
provisions to protect themselves from managerial entrenchment. In
addition, states should require that charter provisions allowing class
voting on dissolution to be subject to shareholder approval. Where
shareholders approve separate classes being able to vote on
dissolution, so as to prevent managerial opportunism, states should
allow holders of two-thirds of the total voting power to override any
class's veto of dissolution. Finally, preferred stockholders should
not be allowed to block dissolution, although measures should
protect their interests from opportunism by common stockholders.
08
taken pursuant to § 1900, the section allowing shareholders to dissolve the
corporation. See id. § 204(a)(5). For an argument that the structure of California's
Corporations Code would permit shareholders to adopt provisions reducing (though
not increasing) the required percentage for a voluntary dissolution, see Edwin J.
Bradley, A Comparative Assessment of the California Close Corporation Provisions and a
Proposalfor Protecting Individual Participants, 9 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 865, 891-93 (1976).
Note that California law creates a possible ploy (akin to that created by Illinois
law, see supra note 97 and accompanying text) that management will be tempted to
use to block dissolution. California's § 402.5(b) allows corporate charters to include
provisions requiring a supermajority of preferred stock, not to exceed two-thirds, to
approve dissolution. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 402.5(b) (West 1990). Management may
be tempted to create a class of such preferred stock with the right to block dissolution
with only one-third of the preferred shares and then to acquire a blocking position
in the preferred stock. Shareholders should, naturally, resist such managerial action.
If solicited to authorize "blank check" preferred stock, shareholders should refuse,
unless provisions are included to protect common shareholders' practical ability to
dissolve the corporation.
0' Concerns that minority shareholders need supermajority provisions to prevent
oppression by the majority are unwarranted because minority shareholders who
receive disparate, unfavorable treatment can petition the court to have the dissolution
annulled or revoked. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
10 One expedient to protect preferred shareholders is to deem a shareholder-
initiated dissolution the legal equivalent of a liquidation, thereby entitling preferred
shareholders the right to the return of their investment plus any accrued but unpaid
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B. How Can Shareholders Call a Meeting and
Vote on Dissolving the Corporation?
1. Current Law
There are four circumstances in which shareholders can
authorize dissolution: (1) at the regular annual meeting of share-
holders, (2) at a special meeting of shareholders unrelated to
dissolution, (3) at a special meeting of shareholders specifically
related to dissolution, and (4) by written consent in lieu of a
meeting.
a. Annual Meeting of Shareholders
Where time is not of the essence, the annual meeting of
shareholders provides the best opportunity for shareholders to call
for dissolution. Corporate law allows shareholders at an annual
meeting to vote on any matter appropriate for shareholder
action.19 Through a simple vote, shareholders holding the
dividends. (Such a constructive liquidation may be needed because most dissolutions
will probably result in mergers, which do not trigger preferred shareholders' prefer-
ences in liquidation.)
10 New York law provides that"[a] meeting ofshareholders shall be held annually
for the election of directors and the transaction of other business on a date fixed by or
under the by-laws." N.Y. Bus. CORI. LAw § 602(b) (McKinney 1986) (emphasis
added).
California law provides that "in the case of the annual meeting,.. . subject to the
provisions of subdivision (f) [requiring notice for certain transactions, including
voluntary dissolution pursuant to § 1900] any proper matter may be presented at the
meeting for such action." CAL. CORP. CODE § 6 01(a) (West 1990).
Although the Illinois statute does not explicitly state that shareholders may
present any proper subject at the annual meeting, the structure of the statute implies
that they can. For example, § 7.05 provides that "[s]pecial meetings of the sharehold-
ers may be called... by the holders of not less than one-fifth of all the outstanding
shares entitled to vote on the matter for which the meeting is called." ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/7.05 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The statute's grant to shareholders
of the ability to call a special meeting at which they present matters for a vote implies
that shareholders may introduce at annual shareholder meetings motions on matters
on which they have the statutory power to act.
The question is whether Illinois § 12.15 constitutes the sole means by which
shareholders can initiate voluntary dissolution or if it merely guarantees that right
against recalcitrant boards, leaving other avenues open for shareholders to trigger
dissolution. If shareholder-initiated dissolution votes are restricted to the method set
forth in § 12.15(a), shareholders could not immediately trigger a dissolution vote at
the annual meeting, even if holders of 20% of the shares presented them in favor of
the vote. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.15(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993). Strong
policy reasons support reading the statute in favor of shareholders wishing to bypass
board obstruction. Holders of 20% of the voting stock will surmount collective action
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percentage of shares required under the applicable state law110 can
call for a vote on dissolution.
b. Special Meetings of Shareholders (Unrelated to Dissolution)
Where timing is more important, shareholders may prefer to call
a special shareholders' meeting to vote for dissolution. All states
provide for special meetings of shareholders, but not all states allow
shareholders to call a special meeting. Under many state regimes,
shareholders can call special meetings on their own only if the
corporation's charter or bylaws affirmatively so provide. In the
absence of such express rights, shareholders must wait until the
board calls a meeting or until the next scheduled annual meet-
ing.
111
Other states guarantee holders of a specified percentage of
shares the right to call special shareholder meetings." 2 Illinois
gives this right to shareholders owning twenty percent of the voting
stock. 3 California's current law is more liberal towards share-
holders and allows holders of ten percent of the voting power to call
special meetings.
1 1 4
problems and present their shares requesting a dissolution vote only after manage-.
ment has dissipated significant corporate wealth. Consequently, courts should read
the statute liberally in order to grant shareholders the power to initiate dissolution
free from board obstruction and delay, thereby protectingshareholders from further
wealth erosion.
110 Typically, as long as a shareholder has the financial wherewithal to call for the
vote, she can do so. This liberality has led to crank proposals for dissolution. See
infra note 123. Under a more optimal regime, dissolution votes could be called only
by holders of a substantial percentage of shares. See infra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text.
. New York law, for example, allows shareholders to call a special meeting only
if the charter or bylaws so provide. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 602(c) (McKinney
1986). Shareholders of New York corporations should, where necessary, alter the
organic documents to grant themselves the right to call special meetings.
See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (1975) (allowing only the board and
persons authorized by charter or bylaws to call special shareholder meetings).
112 In addition to Illinois and California, cited below (see it 'a notes 113-14), see,
e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ("RMBCA") § 7.02 (1985) (allowing, in
addition to the board and persons authorized by charter or bylaws, the holders of at
least 10% of votes to call a special meeting).
' See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/7.05 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (granting the right
to call special meetings to "the holders of not less than one-fifth of all the outstanding
shares entitled to vote on the matter for which the meeting is called"). Again, the
critical question is whether shareholders can call for voluntary dissolution other than
through § 12.15. See supra note 109; infra note 121.
14 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 600(d) (West 1990). The 1975 statute reduced the
percentage of shareholders required to call a special meeting from 20% to 10% in
REPLACING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
c. Special Meeting Specifically for the Purpose of Voting on Dissolution
In addition to providing for special meetings generally, Illinois
specifically allows holders of twenty percent of the company's shares
to propose voluntary dissolution." 5 If the board refuses for one
year to call a meeting to vote on the question, the proposing
shareholders may themselves call a shareholder meeting and a
vote."' New York also grants holders of ten percent of the stock
the indefeasible right to cause shareholders to vote on whether
"they deem a dissolution to be beneficial" to themselves and to
petition a court to dissolve the corporation on such grounds.
1 7
California, with its liberal provisions allowing holders of ten percent
of shares to call for special meetings, does not provide for special
meetings specifically related to voluntary dissolution.
d. Written Consent in Lieu of a Meeting
Finally, most states allow shareholders to act by signing written
consents, rather than by voting at a shareholder meeting. In the
most restrictive regimes, written consents can substitute for
shareholder meetings only if signed by holders of all of the shares.
New York follows this pattern." 8 Because management will always
own some stock, unanimity is impossible.
Illinois has two separate regimes for written consents. In section
12.10, Illinois specifically allows shareholders to voluntarily dissolve
order "[t]o facilitate and expand upon the right to call a special meeting of the
shareholders." Id. legislative committee cmt.
115 See ILL. ANN. STAT. cl 805, para. 5/12.15(a)(2) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
116 See id.
117 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1103(b) (McKinney 1986).
This right should prove more important in a popular movement to dissolve a
New York corporation than it might first appear. Superficially, the right merely
entitles 10% of the shareholders to cause a court to considerjudicially dissolving the
corporation. The court still has, from the shareholders' viewpoint, an uncomfortable
degree of discretion over whether to order dissolution. The court's discretion should,
however, be irrelevant: the initial proponent's call for dissolution triggers a share-
holder vote whether to approve dissolution. If more than two-thirds of the shares
vote for dissolution, that vote satisfies the requirements of§ 1001, and the dissolution
should be forthcoming without the review of the court. See supra note 100 and
accompanying text.
Naturally, if management attempts to thwart non-insider shareholders by voting
shares held or controlled by them against the dissolution, the court should give
special weight to the disinterested shareholders' wishes in deciding, pursuant to
§ 1103, whether to grant judicial dissolution.
118 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 615(a) (McKinney 1986).
1031
1032 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144:983
the corporation by written consent but requires unanimity." 9
Section 7.10(a) allows general shareholder action by non-unanimous
written consent.12  Although section 7.10(a) seems to exclude
shareholder-initiated voluntary dissolution from its scope, its
drafting leaves unresolved the question of whether shareholders
could use this second, more liberal consent provision for triggering
a dissolution vote.
21
Other states allow more liberal use of written consents, although
usually allowing the corporation's charter to restrict their use.
California, for example, allows shareholders to act by written
consent of the holders of voting shares sufficient to authorize the
action at a meeting, unless the charter provides to the contrary.
122
119 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.10 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (permitting
"[d]issolution of a corporation [to] be authorized by the unanimous consent in writing
of the holders of all outstanding shares entitled to vote on dissolution").
120 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/7.10(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (permitting
any action required by this Act to be taken at any annual or special meeting of the
shareholders" by written consent "by the holders of outstanding shares having not less
than the minimum number of votes that would be necessary to authorize or take such
action at a meeting").
121 Section 7.10(a) allows action by written consent "[u]nless otherwise provided
in the articles of incorporation or Section 12.10 of this Act." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805,
para. 5/7.10(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993). Section 12.10 of the Act provides only that
shareholders acting unanimously via written consent can dissolve the corporation, see
supra note 119; it does not, however, by its terms preclude other sections of the Act
from authorizing shareholder-initiated dissolution by less than a unanimous vote.
Consequently, although the legislature drafted § 7.10(a) so as to preclude sharehold-
ers from using written consents for dissolution if§ 12.10 provides otherwise, it did
not draft § 12.10 so as to "provide otherwise."
The Illinois statute expressly allows shareholders to dissolve the corporation
subject to the board's delay. See supra note 96. Read literally, the Illinois statute
leaves unresolved whether shareholders can dissolve the corporation without waiting
a year for the board to act. This ambiguity derives from § 12.15's dichotomy between
provisions for calling for the vote and provisions specifying what percentage is
required to authorize dissolution. Seesupra note 96. Although § 12.15(a)'s provisions
specifying how to call the meeting clearly allow the board to delay calling the vote for
a year, other sections in the statute that authorize shareholder action speak only of
obtaining the required percentage of shares and do not impose limits on calling the
matter to a vote. Section 7.10(a) allows written consent "by the holders of
outstanding shares having not less than the minimum number of votes that would be
necessary to authorize or take such action at a meeting." See supra note 120. Section
12.15(c) specifies that two-thirds of the outstanding voting shares would suffice to
authorize or take the action of voluntary dissolution. See supra note 96. Arguably,
§ 7.10(a)'s requirements would be fulfilled by written consent by holders of two-thirds
of the voting shares.
'2 See CAL. COPP. CODE § 603(a) (West 1990).
Whether written consents are useful depends on the corporation's charter.
Management's mergers and acquisitions specialists typically recommend adopting
charter provisions removing shareholders' ability to act by written consents. Share-
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2. Possible Improvements
States should guarantee shareholders the ability to call disso-
lution votes. First, states should empower holders of a specified
percentage of the corporation's common stock to call special
shareholder meetings for dissolution votes. In order to deter
frivolous disruption of the corporation, 23 states should require a
relatively high threshold percentage of shareholdings for calling a
dissolution vote: for example, ten percent of the shares or, in the
absence of other impediments to shareholder autonomy, such as
poison pills and anti-takeover statutes, even twenty percent.
The percentage requirement for calling a dissolution vote should
be less for annual meetings than for special meetings. Given that
the corporation's transaction costs for the meeting are already
"sunk," any significant additional costs associated with a vote on
dissolution will reflect shareholder dissatisfaction with management.
These incremental costs are no reason to increase shareholders'
difficulty in calling for a dissolution at the annual meeting. Thus,
ten percent of the shares should suffice to force a vote on dissolu-
tion at the annual shareholder meeting.
To prevent waste, the law could limit the frequency of dissolu-
tion votes. New York's provision restricting meetings to vote on
petitioning the court for judicial dissolution to only once in any
twelve-month period 124 makes sense and may warrant application
to all dissolution votes. While any particular time period required
before shareholders may again call for a dissolution vote will be
somewhat arbitrary, the required delay should strike a balance
between discouraging wasteful repetition of dissolution votes and
impeding legitimate shareholder wishes. The one-year period would
seem to satisfy both goals.
holders, naturally, should resist such amendments and, where they are present, press
for their removal.
123 For an example of a crank Rule 14a-8 shareholder proposal recommending
dissolution, see Exxon Corp., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. 19, 1974), 1974 SEC No-
Action Letter LEXIS 1669, at *5 (recommending that Exxon Corporation's holding
company be dissolved because other holding companies, such as "Pen-Centeral [sic],"
had experienced bankruptcy or financial difficulty). The proponent had made a
similar shareholder proposal concerning First National Boston Corporation in 1973.
See First Nat'l Boston Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,252, at 82,751-53 (Jan. 30, 1973).
124 N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1103(b) (McKinney 1986) (providing that a shareholder
meeting to petition the court forjudicial dissolution "may not be called more often
than once in any period of twelve consecutive months").
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In addition, the required delay would provide an important
informational function, helping shareholders discriminate between
share price increases due to new information about the company's
stand-alone value in the hands of incumbent management and
increases due to risk arbitrage in anticipation of an auction. Where
investors purchase solely in anticipation of a premium-inducing
auction but the dissolution vote fails, the knowledge that share-
holder-initiated dissolution cannot occur for another year will
discourage many investors from holding the stock. To the extent
they respond by selling the stock, the share price will revert toward
the pre-dissolution-vote level, indicating that the company's stand-
alone value in the hands of incumbent management is less than its
value at auction.
C. Are There Equitable Grounds to Stop Voluntary Dissolution,
Despite Compliance with Procedural Requirements?
Corporate law embraces the principle that courts may strike
down actions that comply strictly with a statute, if such actions
promote inequitable consequences. 2 ' Could voluntary dissolution
authorized by majority shareholders be inequitAble?126  The
potential victims of inequitable treatment are: (i) minority share-
125 See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971) (judicially
nullifying management's rescheduling of the annual stockholders' meeting as
inequitable, even though legally permissible). Early analyses of the majority's
improper use of procedurally correct rights have appropriately urged that because
procedures such as dissolution can be used to freeze out minority shareholders,
courts must be ready to intervene to forestall unequal treatment. See Norman D.
Lattin, Equitable Limitations on Statutoy or Charter Powers Given to Majority Stockholders,
30 MICH. L. REV. 645, 646 (1932). Lattin's article raises other concerns, however, that
seem archaic and unfounded: for example, railing against the "increasing danger of
[the majority's] selling out for the purpose of making a profit on shares," id. at 659,
or the purported "right of the minority to stay with the corporation in its new form"
after merger or dissolution, id. at 663. The modern evolution of the law has
narrowed the focus to that of equal treatment and vigilance against unfair self
dealing. For historical discussion of this shift in the law's concerns, see, e.g., Bayless
Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J.
223 (1962); ElliottJ. Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1981).
126 An early commentator stressed that voluntary dissolution's third-party effects
would disadvantage the non-insiders by cutting down on the time period within which
insiders could be sued and introducing procedural advantages to insiders. See George
D. Hornstein, Voluntay Dissolution-A New Development in IntracorporateAbuse, 51 YALE
L.J. 64, 69 (1941). Subsequent to Hornstein's article, states have taken action to give
relatively precise protections to third parties, but calls to expand those protections
continue. See Hogan, supra note 41, at 168-70.
REPLACING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
holders and (ii) non-shareholder creditors.
If a controlling shareholder uses voluntary dissolution to exploit
minority shareholders, the law will intervene to protect the minor-
ity.12 7 Equity concerns should be satisfied and judicial intervention
should be unwarranted, however, when the proceeds of any sale,
merger, or liquidation are distributed pro rata among the sharehold-
ers without differentially advantaging some shareholders over
others. Under the current proposal, shareholders of S would
receive their ratable share of the dissolution proceeds, and thus all
shareholders would benefit alike.
A separate question is whether courts should enjoin dissolution
due to its effect on non-shareholder third parties. Quite reasonably,
statutory provisions require that the dissolving corporation satisfy
or make provision for all of its liabilities before the corporation
makes distributions to shareholders. 2 ' Beyond that principle,
current law does not provide non-shareholder constituencies more
than those entitlements for which they have negotiated.129 This
2"See e.g., Whitman v. Fuqua, 549 F. Supp. 315, 322-23 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(explaining the court's authority to appoint a receiver or custodian when necessary
to protect the interests of minority shareholders); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting
Co., 123 N.E. 148, 152 (N.Y. 1919) (explaining that stockholders "cannot use their
corporate power in bad faith or for their individual advantage or purpose"); Martin
v. Donghia Assocs., 424 N.Y.S.2d 222, 224 (App. Div. 1980) (mem.) (upholding an
injunction against the majority shareholder where "the majority shareholder [was]
charged with corporate wrongdoing"); WHITE ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 104,
1 1001.03 (citing cases therein); Thompson, Shareholders'Reasonable Expectations, supra
note 41, at 237 (recognizing the "broader grounds" for which courts will order
remedies to protect minority shareholder interests).
"' Where liabilities are not assumed by action of a merger, the practical
difficulties providing for satisfaction of liabilities can be considerable. For description
of these practical difficulties, see Ann E. Conaway Stilson, Reexamining the Fiduciary
Paradigm at Corporate Insolvency and Dissolution: Defining Directors' Duties to Creditors,
20 DEL.J. CORP. L. 1 (1995). For the merger's avoidance of this problem, see infra
note 155.
'2 An early form of New York's statutory provisions regarding dissolution
directed courts to judge whether dissolution would be both "beneficial to the
stockholders ... and not injurious to the public." See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN
A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 446 (6th ed. 1988) (citing
New York's General Corporations Law § 117, predecessor of N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw
§ 1104 (McKinney 1986)) (emphasis added). Ajudicially activist New York decision
reviewing a petition for judicial dissolution focused on non-shareholder interests
and refused to order dissolution despite its benefits to the shareholders. See In
re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 119 N.E.2d 563, 565 (N.Y. 1954). Subsequently, the New
York legislature changed the statute to require that only shareholders' interests
be considered. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104 (omitting reference to non-
shareholder considerations, though leaving judicial dissolution discretionary with
the court); see also WHITE ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 104, 1 1103.01 ("Non-
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principle should remain. Optimal management of the corporation,
encouraged by the threat of dissolution, supplies the best protection
for non-shareholder interests. Allowing non-shareholders to
prevent voluntary dissolution would rescue the very managements
that dissolution should displace. Such managements -would likely
invoke other parties' interests in order to save their own jobs, even
as they render the corporation weaker and less able, over the long
term, to satisfy its obligations.
shareholders will generally be prohibited from participating in the proceedings.");
Note, Dissolution of the Close Corporation, 41 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 239,244 (1966) ("[T]he
provision for non-injury to the public has been deleted."). Accordingly, where
shareholders approve the dissolution by a supermajority sufficient to make the
dissolution a matter of right rather than ofjudicial discretion, the court should not
intervene. Thus, voluntary dissolution should not be vulnerable tojudicial meddling
in New York.
The same conclusion holds for Illinois. It should also hold for California,
although dicta in some California decisions create some confusion. Certain
California opinions in which courts were attempting to fashion novel theories of
fiduciary duties contain dicta suggesting that courts should consider whether
dissolution would benefit parties other than shareholders. These theories were
not supported by statute and have either created unwarranted and gratuitous
additions to conditions for dissolution or have been made in cases that have not
involved dissolution. See, e.g., In re Security Fin. Co., 317 P.2d 1, 6 (Cal. 1957)
(demonstrating that the dissolution in question was being carried out in "good faith"
by mentioning unnecessarily that, in addition to the traditional requirement that "no
advantage is secured over other shareholders," the facts that "in this case, all
alternative methods are foreclosed,. .. and no rights of third parties will be adversely
affected"); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471, 473 (Cal. 1969)
(misquoting Security Finance, so as to expand the sweep of fiduciary duties in a case
not involving dissolution, to state, "We recognized [in Security Finance] that the
majority had the right to dissolve the corporation to protect their investment if no
alternative means were available and no advantage was secured over other sharehold-
ers ... ."); Crain v. Electronic Memories & Magnetics Corp., 50 Cal. App. 3d 509,
522 (Ct. App. 1975) (repeating the dictum from Ahmanson, despite the fact that it was
irrelevant to the case at bar, which involved a sale of corporate assets rather than a
dissolution). Although the requirement that the majority secure no benefit over the
minority shareholders seems self-evident, nothing in Security Finance necessitated or
even invited the requirement that no other alternative to dissolution be available.
The Security Finance dictum had nothing to do with the facts of Ahmanson or Crain
and was used in the later cases to provide judicial momentum to override majority
action otherwise difficult for the court to address directly. A requirement of more
than equitable protection of minority shareholders should be discarded as judicial
overreaching.
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D. Could a Corporation Revoke Dissolution
Once Stockholders Approved It?
1. Current Law
States differ on how, if at all, a corporation can revoke a
shareholder-initiated dissolution. If the board could revoke the
dissolution, it could nullify the shareholders' action. Presumably,
a court would eventually stop the board from undoing the
shareholders' action, but litigation over the matter is undesirable.
New York and California provide little resistance to shareholder-
initiated dissolution. In New York, neither directors nor sharehold-
ers can revoke corporate dissolution by normal corporate ac-
tion."' New York does allow a court, upon the petition of the
corporation or of certain other third parties, to annul the dissolu-
tion."' Where the dissolution has not disadvantaged minority
shareholders, creditors, or other claimants, though, the court has no
reason to intervene. Only if shareholders initiated the petition to
annul the dissolution should a court even consider a petition from
"the corporation" to annul the dissolution.
132
In California, revocation is possible but does not threaten
shareholder sovereignty over dissolution. While shareholders can
revoke dissolutions generally, the board may revoke only board-
130 See WHITE ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 104, 1004.04 (noting that after the
department of state has filed a corporation's certificate of dissolution "[t]here is no
provision by which the dissolution ... can be revoked"); see also HARRY G. HENN &
JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 994
n.21 (3d ed. 1983) (explaining that in New York "once the articles of dissolution are
filed, the corporation is dissolved and such dissolution cannot be revoked").
" New York law provides that, after the filingofthe certificate of dissolution, the
supreme court "upon the petition of the corporation, or, in a situation approved by
the court, upon the petition of a creditor, claimant, director, officer, shareholder,
subscriber for shares, incorporator or the attorney-general, may suspend or annul the
dissolution." N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1008(a) (McKinney 1986). The issues
enumerated in § 1008 include procedural correctness, adequacy of notice, and
provision for satisfying claims. See id. § 1008. Presumably, directors and officers are
empowered to protect their own rights and those of other persons that might be
damaged by an unfair distribution of the proceeds of the dissolution, but § 1008 does
not entitle non-shareholders to negate a valid shareholder vote because they disagree
with its advisability. See id.
... For certain tactical reasons, it is probably advisable to permit shareholders to
revoke dissolutions that they approved earlier. See infra notes 138-39 and accompany-
ing text.
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initiated dissolutions.13  The statute does not contemplate the
board revoking a voluntary dissolution by the shareholders.
3 4
The Illinois statute clearly contemplates shareholders initiating
and authorizing voluntary dissolution without board action (and,
implicitly, against board wishes)"3 5 and appears to allow sharehold-
ers to revoke dissolution once it has been called.' Surprisingly,
however, Illinois also allows the board, without shareholder action,
to revoke a dissolution, a situation that invites management to
frustrate shareholders' wishes.'
37
2. Possible Improvements
The law should allow only shareholders to revoke or annul
dissolution, protecting creditors' and workers' entitlements by
statutory provisions that guarantee the benefits of bargains actually
made. When they vote on whether to dissolve, shareholders should
choose whether to bind themselves to accept the best deal the board
obtains or to preserve the right to revoke the dissolution. Without
this choice, there is the risk that dissolution could expose share-
'a' See CAL. CORP. CODE § 19 02(a) (West 1990).
Revoking dissolution should not be confused with rejecting a specific transac-
tion. California allows shareholders to turn down specific offers without thereby
freeing management from auctioning the company. California's statute requires that
shareholders approve dispositions of the corporation other than for cash. See infra
note 146 and accompanying text. In addition, 90% supermajority shareholder
approval is required for purchases by insiders. See infra note 147 and accompanying
text.
155 See supra note 96.
" Illinois provides that "[a] corporation may revoke its dissolution within 60 days
of the effective date of dissolution if the corporation has not begun to distribute its
assets or has not commenced a proceeding for court-supervision of its winding up."
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.25(a) (Smith-Hurd 1993). Although the statute
leaves open who is empowered to act as the "corporation," it would seem, in light of
shareholders' ability to initiate dissolution and of paragraph 5/12.25(b) discussed
below, that shareholders could take action to revoke the dissolution.
'" Illinois provides as follows: "The corporation's board of directors ... may
revoke the dissolution without shareholder action." Id. para. 5/12.25(b).
This provision would seem to represent a drafting oversight. It is efficient to
allow management to revoke a management-initiated dissolution after the sharehold-
ers approve so as to give management flexibility up to the last moment,just as merger
provisions typically allow boards to abandon mergers even after shareholder approval.
However, where the shareholders dissolve the corporation in spite of board opposi-
tion, it makes little sense to allow the board, via revocation, to override the
shareholders' choice. The current wording of the statute should be amended or
judicially reformed. Until it is corrected, it poses a potentially significant obstacle to
shareholders of Illinois corporations to use voluntary dissolution.
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holders to strategic behavior by bidders, on the one hand, or by
management, on the other.
Powerful arguments support shareholders retaining the right to
revoke. If S's shareholders can revoke dissolution, then they do not
risk seeing S liquidated wastefully if no bidders make satisfactory
offers or if bidders change their offers after shareholders have voted
to dissolve. Accordingly, allowing shareholders to revoke the
dissolution gives them a final say on the terms, including price, of
the deal, similar to shareholders' right to vote on a merger
agreement negotiated by the board.
Strong arguments against shareholder revocation also exist.
First, bidders expend significant resources in their attempt to
acquire a corporation. Permitting shareholders to revoke dissolu-
tion after bidders and independent directors have agreed on price
and structure will reduce bidders' incentives to bid. Two important
factors ease the effects of this problem: (i) market participants will
have already expended the search costs to identify the appropriate
target, and (ii) the dissolution regime, by forcing the auction,
eliminates most of the expenses of a takeover battle. Additionally,
the target board could bind itself to pay the winning bidder some
reasonable termination fee if shareholders revoke the dissolution.
The possibility that management, hoping to resume control after
shareholders revoke dissolution, might manipulate the auction
process to guarantee an unsatisfactory bid presents a second, more
serious argument against allowing revocation. 3 Normally, once
dissolution forces an auction, independent directors' integrity will
protect shareholders from management's strategic behavior. Where
shareholders dissolve the company to displace opportunistic
management, however, the existing directors have likely acquiesced
to the insiders' opportunism and may lack trustworthiness. If the
shareholders can bind themselves to taking the highest bid, they
thereby eliminate directors' incentives for mishandling the auction.
One possible solution to this dilemma would allow shareholders
to precommit to the strategy that they believe will best serve them.
Movement in the corporation's stock price will inform shareholders
how to act. When they vote, responding to the market's reaction to
the prospect of dissolution, shareholders could choose: (a) not to
dissolve, (b) to dissolve with the possibility of revocation, or (c) to
's8 See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 1, at 169 (describing auction practices
that can prevent the sale of a corporation).
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dissolve and bind themselves to accept the highest price offered,
relinquishing any right to revoke the dissolution. If shareholders
vote an affirmative majority of shares both to dissolve and to
relinquish the right to revoke, they will be bound to take the highest
bid, no matter what its amount. If shareholders vote an affirmative
majority of shares to dissolve, but fewer than a majority to relin-
quish the right to revoke, they will retain the right, on learning the
highest bid, to revoke dissolution.'
The law should distinguish between situations in which share-
holders disfavor a particular offer and situations in which share-
holders revoke the dissolution process itself. Certain states require
that shareholders approve specific types of transactions, such as
sales for consideration other than cash
4 ' or sales to insiders.14 1
Such provisions should invite a narrow construction so as to apply
only to the specific transaction voted on and not to the issue of
whether or not to dissolve. For shareholders to revoke the
dissolution, they must explicitly so vote. Thus, absent explicit
revocation, shareholder rejection of a particular offer would have
the effect of forcing management to conduct the auction again.
E. How Should the Board Conduct the Auction?
1. Current Law
Once shareholders authorize dissolution, the board of directors
must dispose of the corporation's assets, pay or provide for
corporate liabilities, and distribute the residue to the shareholders.
Following dissolution, a corporation may not engage in any
substantial new business. In fact, the law restricts corporate
activities to obtaining the best price for the shareholders and
winding up its affairs.'42 The wording of many dissolution statutes
139 For example, where two or more bidders bid aggressively such that before the
vote the premium is large, shareholders would likely want to bind themselves to the
highest price so as to encourage unconstrained bidding. Where shareholders are
attempting to rid themselves of opportunistic management, they likely will also want
to bind themselves to taking the highest bid, thereby precluding management from
any hope that by fouling the auction, it can regain power. Where, on the other hand,
the stock price movement is ambiguous and shareholders worry that the final price
will be unacceptable, they could vote for the dissolution, subject to their right to
revoke the dissolution after learning the final price.
140 See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
1 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
142 On the issue of a corporation conducting business following dissolution,
California law provides:
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is vague: legislatures typically phrase the provisions permissively,
allowing the board to marshall the assets and sell them in various
ways.' Left unsaid, but clearly implicit, is the notion that the
board should obtain the best available price for the corporation.
California's dissolution provisions give directors more flexibility
in auctioning the corporation than those found in New York or
Illinois. The California statute clearly expresses the board's duty to
maximize the benefit to shareholders and allows considerable
discretion in structuring the company's disposition.144 So long as
the board sells the assets for cash to an independent, third-party
buyer, the board can sell all or any part of the corporation's assets
without the approval of shareholders.' 45 If, however, directors
wish to dispose of the corporation through merger, consolidation,
share exchange, or sale of assets for any consideration other than
cash, they must secure shareholder approval for such transac-
tions.1 4' Additionally, for certain dispositions to insiders, Califor-
When a voluntary proceeding for winding up has commenced [upon the
adoption of the shareholder resolution electing to dissolve], the corporation
shall cease to carry on business except to the extent necessary for the
beneficial winding up thereof and except during such period as the board
may deem necessary to preserve the corporation's goodwill or going-concern
value pending a sale of its business or assets, or both, in whole or in part.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1903(c) (West 1990).
New York law provides: "(a) After dissolution: (1) The corporation shall carry
on no business except for the purpose of winding up its affairs." N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAw § 1005(a) (McKinney 1986). Illinois law provides that "a dissolved corporation
shall not thereafter carry on any business except that necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.30 (Smith-
Hurd 1993).
143 See, e.g., infra notes 148, 150.
144 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 1903(c) (West 1990), reproduced supra note 142.
Courts should read the statute's command for the board to sell the corporation's
"business or assets, or both, in whole or in part" liberally. Id. If a sale of the
corporation in its entirety would constitute the most "beneficial winding up thereof,"
the board should sell the corporation's "business ... in whole." Id. It should be
noted that other parts of the statute refer solely to selling assets. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2 00 1(g) (West 1990). There is no practical reason why the board should not
simply arrange for the acquisition of the corporation most advantageous for the
shareholders, including by way of statutory merger. Using the typical merger
technique would convey all assets and liabilities to the acquiring company's consoli-
dated enterprise and thereby spare the dissolved corporation the costs of continued
existence-winding up expenses, litigation costs, and the like. See, e.g., CAL. CORP.
CODE § 2010 (West 1990) (describing what corporate duties, such as prosecuting legal
actions, survive dissolution).
145 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2001(g) (West 1990).
4 See id. Section 2 0 0 1(g) requires that sales for any consideration other than cash
comply with § 1001, which requires shareholder approval of the transaction. The
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nia requires a ninety percent supermajority approval of the
transaction-a measure aimed at protecting shareholders from
insider overreaching.
1 4 7
The New York and Illinois provisions governing the board's
actions after dissolution are more restrictive than their California
counterparts. Although the New York and Illinois statutes contem-
plate the sale of corporate assets to satisfy creditors and benefit
shareholders, these measures do not explicitly provide the flexibility
inherent in California's statute. The New York statute seems to
require the dissolved company's board to structure the dissolution
as an asset sale, rather than as a merger. 4 There is, however,
case law interpreting the statute to allow a sale of shareholders'
interests, instead of assets. 149 Inasmuch as shareholders' interests
in corporations are often most easily disposed of through statutory
merger, courts should construe the statute to permit any normal
corporate acquisition. In New York, the statutes render it more dif-
ficult to accept securities than cash for the corporation's assets. 150
statute is appropriately liberal in granting the board the flexibility to act quickly: the
shareholder approval may occur "either before or after approval by the board and
before or after the transaction." CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(a)(2) (West 1990). If the
board has carefully auctioned the corporation at the best available price, the share-
holders will likely approve the transaction.
14" Section 2 0 01(g) requires compliance in all instances with § 1001(d) regardless
of the form of consideration received. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2001(g). Section
1001(d) states:
(d) If the buyer in a sale of assets pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section
or subdivision (g) of Section 2001 [regulating dissolution-related sales] is in
control of or under common control with the seller, the principal terms of
the sale must be approved by at least 90 percent of the voting power unless
the sale is to a domestic or foreign corporation in consideration of the
nonredeemable common shares of the purchasing corporation or its parent.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(d) (West 1990).
In addition to the supermajority requirement governing transactions in which
affiliates pay shareholders in other than the affiliate's common stock, California
subjects interested transactions to rigorous procedural requirements and strictjudicial
scrutiny for fairness. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1990); Remillard Brick Co.
v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952).
148 New York authorizes the corporation to "sell its assets," whether for cash as in
§ 1005(a)(2) or for securities or a combination of securities as in § 1005(a)(3)(A), or
to distribute its assets to its shareholders under § 1005(a)(3)(B). See N.Y. BUS. CORP.
LAW § 1005(a)(2), (a)(3)(A)-(B) (McKinney 1986). Although the language would not
prohibit selling all of the corporation's assets to one bidder, the statute's failure to
provide for a sale of the business could invite an interpretation that precludes a
disposition by way of statutory merger.
149 See In re T.J. Ronan Paint Corp., 469 N.Y.S.2d 931, 937 (App. Div. 1983)
(directing the public sale of the corporation if the shareholders could not agree to the
terms of a private sale).
" New York allows the corporation to "sell its assets for cash." N.Y. BUS. CORP.
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Like California, New York allows the board to sell the corpora-
tion's assets for cash without requiring shareholder approval., If
the sale is for any consideration other than cash, the corporation
must first provide for payment of its liabilities; then shareholders
must vote to approve the transaction.' 5 New York has no equiva-
lent to California's provision requiring supermajority approval by
the shareholders when the buyers are affiliated with the dissolving
corporation. Nevertheless, under general provisions of corporate
law, the transaction is subject to judicial review if conflicts of inter-
est create the potential for unfairness to the other shareholders.
53
Illinois does not detail the procedure through which a board
may sell a dissolved corporation. The relevant statute limits its
discussion to the collection and disposal of corporate assets.'54
LAW § 1005(a)(2) (McKinney 1986). New York also allows the corporation to sell its
assets for "shares, bonds, or other securities," but only "[aifter paying or adequately
providing for the payment of its liabilities." Id. § 1005(a)(3)(A) (emphasis added).
Courts should construe the word "after" broadly to accept the simultaneity of a
merger's timing, in which liabilities are assumed at the same instant as assets are
transferred. At the moment a merger becomes effective, the disappearing
corporation merges (disappears) into the surviving corporation and its assets and
liabilities become those of the surviving corporation. See e.g., § 906(b)(2)-(3). Courts
should construe § 1005(a)(3)(A)'s word "after" broadly so that the surviving
corporation's assumption of the disappearing corporation's assets and liabilities at the
moment of the merger's effectiveness satisfies § 1005(a)(3)(A)'s requirements.
15 See id. § 1005(a)(2) (authorizing a corporation, after dissolution, to "wind up
its affairs" through various actions, one of which is the sale of assets for cash with no
mention of a shareholder vote).
1.2 See id. § 1005(a)(3)(A) (requiring that a corporation, before it is permitted to
sell corporate assets "where the consideration is in whole or in part other than cash,"
must "pay[] or adequately provid[e] for the payment of its liabilities" and receive
authorization for such a sale "by a vote of the holders of a majority of all outstanding
shares entitled to vote").
15- See id. § 713 (detailing the duties and procedures that arise when a corporation
contracts or transacts with an interested party). The provisions protect interested
transactions from being voided solely because they are interested and specify
procedures by which adequate disclosure and disinterested procedure can help
sterilize the transaction. In manyjurisdictions, however, courts have been willing to
scrutinize and undo transactions that comply with procedural requirements if the
court finds unfairness. For an example of this phenomenon in California, see
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d 66, 74 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1952) (stating that courts will "grant appropriate relief" in a transaction between
corporations with common directors if the transaction involves "unfair dealing to the
detriment of minority stockholders").
" Illinois provides that "a dissolved corporation shall not thereafter carry on any
business except that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs,
including:
(1) Collecting its assets;
(2) Disposing of its assets that will not be distributed in kind to its shareholders
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The scope of winding up and liquidating should encompass more
than just asset sales. If the highest bidder wants to buy the
corporation as a whole and will assume the corporation's liabilities,
surely the board may sell the corporation under these conditions,
whether through stock purchase or statutory merger.
Structuring the disposition as a statutory merger, as opposed to
a sale of assets, would normally benefit all parties involved: by
operation of law, the surviving company assumes all of the liabilities
of the subject corporation. 55  In addition, mergers typically
impose smaller transaction costs than do asset sales.
Once management understands that it must auction the
corporation, it should do its best to get the highest price for
shareholders. First, the outside directors should conduct the
auction. Second, if insiders bid, California's supermajority
requirement for sales to insiders and disclosure under the securities
laws will pressure boards to make a thorough, disinterested
examination of the alternatives. Where appropriate, these directors
should use sophisticated investment banking firms, linking their
compensation proportionally to the amount of the proceeds,
thereby properly aligning their interests with those of shareholders.
2. Possible Improvements
Legislatures should modernize dissolution laws to make clear
that when shareholders approve dissolution, the board may use any
legal corporate transaction-asset sale, stock sale, or merger-to
dispose of the assets, business, and/or stock of the company.
Whatever the transaction, management should strive to obtain the
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.30 (Smith-Hurd 1993). The statute does not
limit what is "necessary to wind up and liquidate [the corporation's] business and
affairs," so the business of the corporation could presumably be sold to one
purchaser.
155 Thus, although a merger will not result in the immediate satisfaction of
corporate liabilities, the law mandates the ultimate satisfaction of such obligations.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 259 (1991) (stating that "all debts, liabilities and
duties of the respective constituent corporations shall thenceforth attach to said
surviving ... corporation, and may be enforced against it to the same extent as if said
debts, liabilities and duties had been incurred or contracted by it"); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 906(b) (McKinney 1986) (providing that, upon the effectiveness of a merger,
the surviving corporation "shall assume and be liable for all the liabilities, obligations
and penalties of each of the constituent corporations"); RMBCA § 11.06(a) ("When
a merger takes effect: ... (3) the surviving corporation has all liabilities of each
corporation party to the merger.").
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highest price for shareholders consistent with fully honoring the
entitlements of non-shareholders. Further, where necessary, states
should clarify that directors conducting the sale may accept, on
behalf of shareholders, any form of consideration, including
securities of the bidder. 56
The law should prevent insiders from using informational
advantages to benefit themselves at other shareholders' expense.
Given that managerial inefficiency will have moved shareholders to
dissolve the corporation, allowing management any unfair informa-
tional advantage during the auction would be singularly inappropri-
ate. The problem, then, is to design a regime that will allow
management's participation but discourage opportunism. Here,
California's provision requiring supermajority approval of sales to
controlling shareholders or their affiliates provides a useful
model. 5 Requiring that a supermajority of disinterested stock-
holders approve insider purchases of all or any substantial portion
of the corporation would offset insiders' advantages to some degree
and force insiders to bid generously. Alternatively, Delaware case
law concerning the auctioning of corporations provides useful rules
for a board's disposition of the company.
1 58
" For example, New York should eliminate the bias for cash sales evidenced by
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1005 (McKinney 1986). See supra notes 148, 150 and
accompanying text. A better dissolution regime would allow more liberal procedures
for the sale transaction.
157 See supra note 147. Note, however, that CAL. CORP. CODE § 1001(d) (West
1990) provides a loophole for insiders. If the affiliate of the company (i.e., an
insider) pays the corporation's shareholders with nonredeemable common stock of
the purchasing corporation, the 90% requirement does not apply. Implicitly, the
insider may then purchase the selling company's assets in the same procedure as may
other bidders. Consequently, courts should scrutinize for fairness insider purchases
that escape the 90% supermajority vote. See supra note 147.
158 In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994), the Delaware court explicitly stated that conducting an auction triggers the
same enhanced scrutiny as does using takeover defenses. "The decisions of this Court
have clearly established the circumstances where such enhanced scrutiny will be
applied .... (1) the approval of a transaction resulting in a sale of control, and (2) the
adoption of defensive measures in response to a threat to corporate control." Id. at
42. Although the QVC court did not explicitly state the reason for the enhanced
scrutiny, the scrutiny is likely grounded in the concern adduced in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co.: "[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting
primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers." 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
The conflict of interest that concerns the court may be management's favoritism
toward a preferred bidder over a disfavored bidder or merely management's hostility
toward a disfavored bidder. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 45 (noting the heightened scrutiny
involved when "competing bidders are not treated equally"); Revlon, Inc. v.
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F. Would the Law Grant the Board Sufficient Discretion to
Maximize Shareholder Value During Disposition
of the Corporation's Assets?
1. Current Law
After shareholders vote for dissolution, can the board run the
corporation so as to maximize its value to potential purchasers?
The disposition of a large public corporation takes time.
159
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986) (holding that
"when bidders make relatively similar offers, or dissolution of the company becomes
inevitable, the directors cannot fulfill their enhanced Unocal duties by playing
favorites with the contending factions"); see also Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan,
Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989) (citing same proposition from Revlon). The
Delaware court's move to extend its vigilance for conflict of interest from the
takeover defense context to the sale of control context was a wise one, reflecting the
court's appreciation of the target board's antagonism toward unsolicited bidders. The
auctions for Revlon, Macmillan, and Paramount demonstrate how favoritism for one
bidder and antagonism toward another can distort the auction process to the
disadvantage of shareholders.
Shareholder-initiated dissolution may dissipate this antagonism and the disadvan-
tage that accompanies it. Shareholders, in effect, solicit bidders, negating the concept
of the "unsolicited bidder" so reviled in boardrooms. If the board does not disfavor
one bidder as an interloper and favor another bidder as management's preference,
it will probably conduct a more emotionally even-handed auction. Naturally, to the
extent that the board acts to advantage one bidder over another, Macmillan's
strictures are appropriate: the board's favoritism must enhance shareholder interests
and "be reasonable in relation to the [shareholder] advantage sought to be achieved."
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288. When all bidders are on a level auction terrain, the
enhanced scrutiny would seem unnecessary, and the court should protect business
decisions taken in due care to preserve the company's marketability.
If insiders are bidding, then the strictures of the "entire fairness" standard as
articulated in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710-11 (Del. 1983) (stating that
when directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they
must demonstrate utmost good faith and fairness, which in an interested control
transaction requires both fair price and fair dealing), and its progeny and the caution-
ary sections of Macmillan and QVC provide formal protections against abuse. It
should be noted, however, that knowledgeable commentators have indicated doubt
that such protections are as effective as the Delaware courts think. See, e.g., VICTOR
BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATrON, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 786 (4th ed. 1993) (suggesting that the courts'
sophistication does not always provide a meaningful remedy).
'9 The auction could be over in a few weeks but more likely would take several
months. Brown and Raymond report an average time of approximately two and a
half months for contested hostile takeovers between 1980 and 1984. Brown &
Raymond, supra note 76, at 62. After 1984, takeovers took longer, due to boards'
ability to use the poison pill to delay bidders' purchase of shares tendered by
shareholders. See, e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422,
439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (validating poison pill as "a shield to fend off coercive offers, and
... a gavel to run an auction" and crediting it with helping the board extract a higher
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Requiring a corporation to suspend entirely its business during the
sale would ill serve society. No one would argue in favor of simply
shutting down a corporation during the auction process. Yet some
dissolution provisions seem to obstruct boards from protecting the
corporation's value during its disposition.
Illinois structures the dissolution process so as to provide the
board considerable flexibility in maintaining the corporation's value
up to the point the articles of dissolution are filed. Under Illinois
law, dissolution is effective not at the moment that shareholders
approve dissolution but only after articles of dissolution have been
filed with and accepted by the Illinois Secretary of State.160 After
the dissolution is effective, however, "a dissolved corporation shall
not carry on any business except that necessary to wind up and
liquidate its business and affairs." 61 Indeed, the statute renders
directors "jointly and severally liable to the creditors of [the]
corporation for all debts and liabilities" if the directors stray from
permissible business activity after filing in connection with dissolu-
tion. 162 In one case, a director was held liable for carrying on the
bid); Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181 (validating the pill as allowing the board to "protect[]
the shareholders from a hostile takeover at a price below the company's intrinsic
value, while retaining sufficient flexibility to address any proposal deemed to be in
the stockholders' best interests").
Given that dissolution will disarm takeover defenses, transfers of the
corporation's assets can occur faster than when sophisticated defenses interfere with
bidding. Consequently, the two and a half months that contested takeovers took
between 1980 and 1984 is likely a more accurate time frame than is the duration of
contested takeovers in the late 1980s or 1990s.
Where management liquidates a company piecemeal, the process tends to be
lengthy. Erwin reports average times of 0.66 years from the press date announcing
management's intention to liquidate to shareholder approval, see Erwin, supra note
61, at 96 tbl. 3.1, and 3.44 years from shareholder approval of the plan through the
final liquidating distribution of the proceeds, see id. at 17, yielding an average of 4.1
years from announcement through final payout, see id. at 14. Where firms are
auctioned as going concerns, however, the process should take no longer than a
hostile takeover in which the board can use defenses only to protect the auction.
'60 Illinois law provides:
(a) When a voluntary dissolution has been authorized as provided by
this Act, articles of dissolution shall be executed and filed ....
(b) When the provisions of this Section have been complied with, the
Secretary of State shall issue a certificate of dissolution.
(c) The dissolution is effective on the date of issuance of the certificate
thereof by the Secretary of State.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 805, para. 5/12.20 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
" Id. para. 5/12.30(a).
.62 Id. para. 5/8.65(a)(3).
For a case demonstrating the sweep of liability for carrying on business after
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corporation's business after dissolution notwithstanding the
corporation's subsequent reinstatement and irrespective of whether
the reinstated corporation ratified actions the director took on its
behalf. 6
Like Illinois, New York provides considerable flexibility in
maintaining the corporation's value by deeming the corporation to
be dissolved only upon the filing of the certificate of dissolution
with the New York Department of State, not at the time of the
shareholder's approval of the dissolution vote.1 64 New York case
law restricts directors' ability after dissolution to maintain the value
of the corporation by continuing ordinary business.1 65 In a recent
case, the court held agents of dissolved corporations personally
liable for entering into transactions-unrelated to winding up-on
behalf of the corporation.' 66 The law, therefore, should enable
directors to delay delivering the certificate of dissolution so long as
they move expeditiously toward a sale of the company.
As to timing, courts should give considerable latitude to boards
involved in good faith negotiation to auction the corporation.
Current law provides ample time.'67 Under New York law, courts
filing the articles of dissolution, albeit respecting an officer rather than a director, see
Steve's Equip. Serv., Inc. v. Riebrandt, 459 N.E.2d 21, 24 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (holding
that officers are personally liable for contracts entered into after dissolution if they
"knew, or because of their position should have known, of the dissolution").
..s See Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Brooklyn Bagel Boys, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 142,
146 (Il1. App. Ct. 1991) (noting that Illinois law, while allowing reinstated companies
to ratify earlier actions, "does not transform individual liability into corporate
liability").
164 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 1003-1004 (McKinney 1986); see also Beveridge &
Lewis, supra note 94, at 200 (listing the conditions that a New York corporation must
meet before officially dissolving).
" See, e.g., Lorisa Capital Corp. v. Gallo, 119 A.D.2d 99, 114 (N.Y. App. Div.
1986) (barring a corporation that had been dissolved for falling to pay franchise taxes
from suing until it paid its back taxes and reinstated its corporate existence). But cf.
Igbara Realty Corp. v. New York Property Ins. Underwriting Ass'n, 94 A.D.2d 79, 80
(N.Y. App. Div. 1983), modified, 470 N.E.2d 858 (N.Y. 1984) (reversing trial court that
had dismissed dissolved corporation's suit against insurer for reimbursement for fire
damage because the insurance policy was issued after dissolution and holding that
winding up corporation included taking care of its property until winding up was
completed).
166 See WHITE ON CORPORATIONS, supra note 104,1 1005.02; see also Brandes Meat
Corp. v. Cromer, 146 A.D.2d 666, 667 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (holding that purchases
made by defendant on behalf of corporation dissolved more than three years earlier
were unconnected with winding up the business and thus created personal liability for
defendant). The dilatory fashion in which the agents wound up the company
probably triggered the court's seemingly harsh judgment.
167 One could argue that the law gives boards too much time to negotiate auctions.
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can appoint receivers to oversee a dissolution, and, within one year
of qualifying, such receivers may settle accounts.1 6 New York
case law suggests that certain circumstances may permit even longer
time frames. 6  Thus, boards should have enough time to maxi-
mize returns to shareholders, but not so much time as to jeopardize
the dissolution process itself.
Under California law, shareholders' adoption of a resolution
electing to dissolve the corporation, rather than a filing of a final
certificate of merger, changes the legal rights of the corporation to
carry on regular business. 7 In the absence of any exception,
California law would force all ordinary business to halt upon
shareholders' approving dissolution. California, however, grants the
dissolving corporation's board of directors considerable discretion
by allowing directors to take actions to preserve the corporation's
going-concern value pending the sale of the company.17 1 Thus,
Courts will need to oversee management's progress in selling the corporation. To the
extent that management drags out the process, it increases costs and lowers returns
of arbitrageurs. Given that dissolution depends largely on arbitrageurs to bid up the
company's stock price in anticipation of a dissolution vote, allowing the board to stall
the auction will distort market signals about dissolution's desirability.
10 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1216(a) (McKinney 1986). The one-year period can
be extended by the attorney-general. See id. After 18 months, the attorney-general
is obligated to apply for an order that the receiver show cause why a final settlement
should not be made. See id.
... See In re TJ. Ronan Paint Corp., 98 A.D.2d 413, 420-21 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984)
(holding that "[t]he pendency of this [involuntary dissolution] proceeding for more
than three years is far in excess of the time reasonably required to effect a final
dissolution, even allowing for the animosity and hostility which have plagued the
proceeding").
170 California law provides:
(a) Voluntary proceedings for winding up the corporation commence
upon the adoption of the resolution of shareholders or directors of the
corporation electing to wind up and dissolve, or upon the filing with the
corporation of a written consent of shareholders thereto ....
(c) When a voluntary proceeding for the winding up has commenced,
the corporation shall cease to carry on business except to the extent
necessary for the beneficial winding up thereof and except during such
period as the board may deem necessary to preserve the corporation's
goodwill or going-concern value pending a sale of its business or assets or
both, in whole or in part.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 1903(a), (c) (West 1990).
'7' Section 1903(c) provides:
[T]he corporation shall cease to carry on business except to the extent
necessary for the beneficial winding up thereof and except duringsuch period
as the board may deem necessay to preserve the corporation's goodwill or going-
concern value pending a sale of its business or assets, or both, in whole or in
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California arguably would allow the board to continue to engage in
ordinary positive net present value transactions during the disposi-
tion, thereby enhancing the benefit to shareholders.
2. Possible Improvements
Dissolution law should charge directors with preserving the
going-concern value of the corporation's business. The law should
permit the board, where appropriate, to undertake reasonable
transactions not connected with winding up the affairs of the
corporation so as to maximize its attractiveness for bidders.
Directors running the auction should have the protection of the
business judgment rule, consistent with Revlon 72 and its pro-
geny. 
7 3
G. Can Poison Pills or State Anti-Takeover Statutes Stop
Shareholders from Calling for a Dissolution Vote?
1. Current Law
If shareholders vote to dissolve the corporation, they effectively
put the corporation into the Revlon mode. 74 At that point,
poison pills cease to act as legitimate defensive mechanisms and can
function only as a shield and a gavel to conduct a value-maximizing
part.
Id. § 1903(c) (emphasis added).
17 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45
(Del. 1994) (granting the board significant latitude in conducting an auction, but
mandating enhanced judicial review of transactions effecting sales or changes of
control in the target, which review focuses on the adequacy of the board's
decisionmaking process and the reasonableness of the directors' action given then
existing circumstances); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261,1288
(Del. 1989) (granting the board significant latitude in structuring an auction,
including the ability to treat bidders disparately, but requiring that if the board treats
bidders disparately, it must show that the disparate treatment enhances shareholders'
interests and that "the board's action must be reasonable in relation to the advantage
sought to be achieved, or conversely, to the threat which a particular bid allegedly
poses to stockholder interests").
174 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (holding that when the break-up or sale of a
corporation becomes inevitable, the board's duty changes "from the preservation of
[the company] as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at a
sale for the stockholders' benefit"); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) (holding that Revlon duties are triggered if the
"dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity [becomes] inevitable").
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auction.'75 Similarly, because state legislatures were not so obtuse
as to draft state anti-takeover laws to interfere with friendly
acquisitions, by forcing an auction of the corporation, shareholder-
initiated dissolution forces the board to treat the winning bid in the
same way it would treat a friendly bid and to suspend the potential
operation of state anti-takeover laws. Consequently, in conducting
the auction, management would have to approve the winning bid
and could not use the statute to prevent a disfavored bidder from
winning.
Could anti-takeover defenses, however, stop shareholders from
initiating a vote on dissolution? Would a call for dissolution trigger
the poison pill or other defenses? If so, shareholders could no
more afford to bring dissolution to a vote than unsolicited bidders
could afford to purchase shares tendered to them and thereby
trigger the poison pill.
a. Poison Pills
In the mid-1980s, poison pills, formally called shareholders'
rights plans, effectively removed target shareholders' ability to sell
their shares to a bidder without incumbent management's approval.
These plans provided, in form, for the distribution to target
corporation shareholders of rights comparable to complex warrants
that allow the holder to buy various securities, depending on the
circumstances, the sole purpose of which rights was to make
purchasing target corporation stock without board approval
prohibitively expensive.
176
1 See supra note 159.
176 In the earlier, "flip-over" variant, if the bidder engages in a combination with
the target, whether by merger or sale of assets, the "rights" are transformed and
thereafter obligate the target corporation (now under the bidder's control) to make
effective provision so that each holder of a right can purchase a specified, significant
dollar amount of the bidder's stock at half price. Thus, the bidder cannot afford to
carry out the merger or purchase of target assets, because the rights would entitle the
remaining target company shareholders to dilute disastrously the percentage
shareholdings of the bidder's original shareholders.
Similarly, in the later-created "flip-in" variant, if the bidder acquires "beneficial
ownership" of a specified, relatively low percentage of the target's stock, each right
is transformed into the right to purchase the target's stock at half price. The bidder,
however, is excluded from the discount purchase. Rights plans, however, permit the
board to redeem the rights as applying to any bidder it favors, even while retaining
them against the disfavored bidder. For summary explanation of the poison pill, see,
e.g., 3 MARTIN LIPTON & ERICA H. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS
§ 6.03[4], at 6-57 to 6-69 (1995); for the form of a typical Share Purchase Rights Plan
(the poison pill agreement) itself, see id. at 11-16 to H-95, especially H-19 to H-22
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In the face of the poison pill, a bidder typically could not afford
to purchase shares of the target corporation's stock without board
approval, even if virtually all of the shares had been tendered by the
target shareholders. Thus, even when bidders offered generous
premiums that shareholders overwhelmingly desired, management,
acting alone and clearly against shareholders' wishes, could prohibit
shareholders from selling their stock to the bidder by refusing to
redeem the pill.'7 7
Currently, takeover defense specialists have made shareholder
action even more risky by employing the SEC 13(d) rules' over-
expansive definition of "beneficial ownership" to define when a
shareholder has accumulated enough stock to trigger the poison
pill. 7 ' The risk for dissolution proponents is that any commu-
nications they have with one another may inadvertently trigger the
pill or trigger harassing litigation by management. If poison pills
can prevent shareholders from calling a vote on dissolution, they
can prevent shareholder-initiated dissolution.
In a string of important cases, Delaware courts, although
permitting significant infringement on shareholders' ability to
challenge management, have made clear that management may not
use a poison pill to frustrate shareholders from calling a vote.
179
(flip-in provisions) and H-51 to H-54 (flip-over provisions).
177 Thus, although holders of 93% of Interco's shares and of 87% of Pillsbury's
shares (including over 50% of employee-held shares) wished to sell their shares to the
bidder, only when the Chancery Court forced the targets' boards to redeem the pill,
did the boards do so. See supra note 25; see also Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury
Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1058 (Del. Ch. 1988) (noting that Pillsbury employees had caused
over 50% of the Pillsbury stock held by a trustee of the Pillsbury Employees Benefit
Plans to be tendered to the bidder).
75 See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text. For the SEC's definition of
"beneficial ownership," see Rule 13d-3 (defining beneficial ownership as possession
of voting and/or investment power enjoyed directly or indirectly, through any
contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship, or otherwise). See 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-3 (1995). For discussion of this Rule, see 5 Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN,
SECURITIES REGULATION 2183-87 (1990).
7 In Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 95,412 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1990), the Court noted that Rights Plans normally
are drafted so that the poison pill is not triggered by any agreement, arrangement,
or understanding to vote the company's securities that "arises solely from a revocable
proxy or consent given in response to a public proxy or consent solicitation." Id.
1 95,412, at 97,033. The Stahl court also interpreted Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) as effectively exempting from the language of rights plans
revocable proxies where counting such proxies for purposes of triggering the pill
would materially interfere with conducting a proxy contest. See id. 1 95,412,
at 97,036.
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992), affirmed that where a board employs
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Other jurisdictions would presumably follow Delaware in not
allowing shareholders to be disenfranchised. As described more
fully below, the safest procedure is for one proponent to initiate the
call for a dissolution vote by using SEC Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv), which
allows the proponent to publish its views on a matter on which
stockholders will vote. 180
b. State Anti-Takeover Statutes
Currently, a wide variety of state anti-takeover statutes exist, but
only the control share acquisition statutes pose any threat to getting
dissolution on the ballot. 1 ' Control share acquisition statutes
"various legal strategies either to frustrate or completely disenfranchise a shareholder
vote... [t]here can be no dispute that such conduct violates Delaware law." Id. at
91. Although Stroud allowed the corporation to adopt provisions that made it difficult
for a minority shareholder to have a realistic chance at gaining a seat on the board,
nothing in the opinion would allow a board to preclude shareholders from voting for
a dissolution.
In re Chrysler Corp. Shareholders Litigation, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,996 (Del. Ch. July 27, 1992), confronted a defendant
corporation's lowering of its poison pill's "flip-in" trigger from 30% to 20%, and then
to 10%, in the face of an investor taking a 9.8% position in the company's stock. The
court refused to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint that reducing the trigger to 10%
diminished their ability to receive hostile takeover proposals or engage in proxy
fights, finding that the facts and allegations created a "reasonable doubt that the
directors were motivated solely or primarily by entrenchment concerns." Id. 96,996,
at 94,350.
Although such decisions have allowed directors considerable latitude in obstruct-
ing dissidents' electioneering, they strongly suggest that shareholders should be able
to invalidate any poison pill that precludes shareholders from calling for a dissolution
vote.
" See infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text. In brief, the initiating
shareholder can publicize its intent to present its shares, demanding a vote on
dissolution on a specified date; other dissatisfied large shareholders should follow suit
and show up at the same time and present their shares with the same demand. By
calling for a meeting independently of one another but with enough aggregate shares
to cross the required threshold, large shareholders can put the dissolution vote on the
ballot without forming a group and triggering poison pills.
"8 For a description of the variety of statutes, seeJohn H. Matheson & Brent A.
Olson, ShareholderRights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover Legislation,
59 CEO. WASH. L. REV. 1425, 1440-52 (1991). The business combination statutes
block business combinations between the company and the bidder. See id. at 1440.
Fair price statutes prohibit takeovers, unless disinterested shareholders approve the
bidder's offer and the offer provides shareholders in the second-stage squeeze-out
merger consideration worth as much as that paid to shareholders who tendered their
shares in the tender offer. See id. at 1445-47. Disclosure statutes require extra
information from any would-be acquiror. See id. at 1447-48. Non-shareholder
constituency statutes allow directors to consider non-shareholder interests when
assessing a takeover offer. See id. at 1448-50. Shareholder rights plan endorsement
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typically remove voting power from the stock of bidders who
acquire certain levels of share ownership (usually twenty percent,
thirty-three and one-third percent, and fifty percent), subject to
restoration of voting power by disinterested shareholder vote.
182
Although aggregating shares for purposes of exercising voting
rights, including calling for a dissolution vote, would appear to fall
outside the scope of these statutes, control share acquisition statutes
have already chilled discussions among institutional investors, who
have worried that having such discussions would cause them to be
deemed a group holding more than twenty percent and would thus
result in a loss of voting power.'83 So to curtail shareholders'
voting rights would be to expropriate shareholders on behalf of
management; but such an interpretation is not beyond imagina-
tion. 18 4 Consequently, as with the procedure to avoid triggering
poison pills, a proponent wishing to call for a dissolution vote
should use SEC Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv)'s safe harbor to announce its
intention to present its shares in demand of a vote on dissolution,
thereby assuring that its shares will not be aggregated with others'
statutes expressly authorize poison pills that discriminate against the bidder. See id.
at 1450. Anti-greenmail statutes generally prohibit repurchases of the bidder's stock
at higher than fair market value. See id. at 1450-51. Cashout statutes, in effect, give
minority holdouts appraisal rights and force the bidder to consummate the takeover
at a judicially imposed price. See id. at 1451-52. Although these provisions would
impede or block a bidder's unsolicited acquisition, they do not address dissolution
and do nothing to interfere with shareholders' ability to call for a dissolution vote.
182 See id. at 1442-44 (describing a prototypical control share acquisition statute,
which prohibits the acquiror of 20% or more of a target's shares from voting those
shares unless a majority of disinterested shareholders grant the acquiror voting
rights).
18s See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 2, at 863 11.18 (citing cases in which courts have
invalidated proxies as violating state control shares acts, and noting the chilling effect
of state anti-takeover laws on the exercise of the corporate franchise). During the
struggle over whether shareholders would approve a sale of Centel Cellular Corp. to
Sprint Corp., large shareholders were surprised to find that Kansas's control share
anti-takeover statute made it risky to form groups to oppose the merger. See Anthony
Ramirez, Growing Revolt of Centel Holders, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1992, at D8 (citing
Kansas provisions, for example, that allow management to force a special sharehold-
ers meeting to consider the "voting rights to be accorded" to dissident shareholders).
Kansas officials expressed similar surprise. When informed of large shareholders'
concerns about Kansas's law, the general counsel for the Kansas Securities Commis-
sion expostulated correctly, "My God, that would be antithetical to corporate
democracy." Id.
" Stephen Bainbridge has argued that state anti-takeover laws could be used to
disable dissidents not just from conducting takeovers but also from conducting
successful proxy fights, consistent with accepted readings of the reach of the Williams
Act. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at Proxy Contests, 1992
Wis. L. Rnv. 1071.
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shares to reach the twenty-percent threshold.
2. Possible Improvements
Corporate law's legitimacy rests upon shareholders' ability to
confer with other shareholders and to call for votes as well as to
vote their own shares whenever shareholders have the right to do
so. States should make clear that poison pills and state anti-
takeover statutes may not interfere or threaten to interfere with
shareholders' ability to call for votes and to vote.
V. How WOULD DISSOLUTION WORK UNDER
FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS?
A. The Obstacles
Until recently, commentators have tended to view state
corporation laws as frequently damaging shareholders' welfare and
federal securities laws as offering shareholders beneficial protec-
tion."'5 With the new attempts to design more effective governance
structures, commentators have come to recognize the extent to
which federal securities laws, especially the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the "'34 Act"), 8 6 regardless of their original intention,"8 7
work to the advantage of management and to the disadvantage of
dissident shareholders.' In states that allow dissolution, in fact,
185 The clearest claims of the relative superiority of federal securities laws vis-Ai-vis
state corporation laws have tracked the debate over federalizing corporate law (pro
tanto supplanting state law). For useful descriptions of the debate, see ROBERTA
ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 14-31 (1993) (noting, among
other things, that the view that state corporate law represented the result of "a race
for the bottom" and that federal intervention was necessary to regulate corporations
constituted "for manyyears, the consensus view of commentators on corporate law");
Bratton & McCahery, supra note 35, at 1876-83 (describing the intellectual struggle
over the desirability of federal intervention into state corporate law).
186 15 U.S.C. § 78a-7811 (1994).
'"s For an abbreviated history of the evolution of the SEC's minimal restraints on
intrashareholder communications in 1935 to the current burdensome regulations, see
John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC: Investor Protection Versus Market Efficiency, 29
J. FIN. ECON. 241, 253-68 (1991); see also Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic:
Reconstructing Proxy Regulation, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1132-33 (1993) (noting that
Congress originally wished to protect shareholders from insider practices that limited
effectiveness of shareholder voting); Roe, A Political Theoy, supra note 30, at 46
(noting the SEC's responsiveness to managers' desire to impede proxy contests in the
1950s).
"8 6 See Pound, supra note 187, at 267, 279-80 (describing how current concentrated
ownership by institutional investors and advances in communications technology
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the '34 Act creates greater obstacles for shareholders to exercise
their rights than do state laws. The primary obstacles that the '34
Act presents for shareholders wishing to exercise their state-created
right voluntarily to dissolve their corporation include: (a) rules
under section 14(a) of the '34 Act governing proxy solicitations, (b)
rules under section 13(d) of the '34 Act requiring any person or
group owning over five percent of the company's stock to file a
Schedule 13D, and (c) requirements of section 16(b) of the '34 Act
forcing beneficial owners of more than ten percent of the
company's stock, among others, to disgorge profits made in
purchases and sales within any six-month period in the company's
stock.
1. Section 14(a)'s Proxy Disclosure Requirements
Section 14(a) creates complex requirements governing proxy
solicitations in public corporations.189 As part of these require-
ments, the SEC has required fastidious disclosure about dissolution
since at least 1937.10 Yet, in the voluntary dissolution described
here, it is not clear that disclosure will be at all useful. If propo-
nents believe that an auction may well benefit them, they will want
to trigger a shareholder vote on whether to dissolve the corporation.
At this point, their sole concern may be to get dissolution on the
ballot.
The best information on whether dissolution is advisable will
emerge from market reactions, not from claims of either dissidents
or managers. If a bid emerges, arbitrage will work to provide
market participants' valuation of the bid and of the likelihood that
shareholders will vote to dissolve. In the absence of a bid or
significant price movement, shareholders must decide something
promise to solve collective action problems but are retarded in doing so by restrictive
proxy regulations, which, ironically, were motivated by earlier congressional desire
to ameliorate collective action problems).
... Section 14(a) requires public corporations fully and truthfully to disclose
information concerning matters on which shareholders vote. Public corporations
must file this information with the SEC and disseminate it to all shareholders. For
general descriptions of the proxy requirements, see 4 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note
178, at 1916-2119; HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN,
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 963-86 (1995).
"9 See Pound, supra note 187, at 254 (describing the 1937 SEC staff's activism in
finding that a corporation's management failed to provide sufficient information in
connection with its recommendation for voluntary dissolution to shareholders,
thereby "creat[ing] demand for further regulation").
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that inherently involves an unknowable future. Therefore, once the
proponent has put dissolution on the ballot, she may well have
finished her role in the election."' 1 What, after all, can she say?
She can only state her view that shareholders likely will gain more
by auctioning the corporation than by letting current management
continue to run it.,9 2 Given the likelihood that management will
litigate over any positive claims for gains from dissolution, share-
holders averse to litigation or negative publicity may wish to remain
silent.' 93
Additionally, the proponent may desire not to provide specific
information because she may intend to rely, along with other
shareholders, on the market's reaction to the fact of the upcoming
vote on dissolution to convey information about market
professionals' estimate of S's value at auction.'94 Especially where
no bidder has surfaced, the information conveyed is reciprocal in
9 Because management's proxy card will present shareholders with the choice of
voting for dissolution, against dissolution, or of abstaining from the vote, sharehold-
ers will be able to vote for dissolution using management's proxy card. Proponents
of dissolution therefore have no need to solicit proxies, a point which should press
for shareholder communications regarding dissolution not to be deemed "solicita-
tions."
n The SEC's demanding requirements for dissolution-related disclosure may also
counsel for silence. In 1980, the SEC revised its rules governing projections and
forecasts. See Pound, supra note 187, at 268. Professor Pound regards the 1980
disclosure changes as the most critical for constraining dissidents. In particular, the
1980 changes require proponents of liquidation to use projections of distribution
value only when made "in good faith and on a reasonable basis." This requirement
creates disincentives for dissidents to present active, forward-looking analyses, since
proponents could always be sued. See id.; see also DennisJ. Block &Jonathan M. Hoff,
Forward-Looking Statements: Reducing Litigation Risks, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 25, 1994, at 5,
6 (stating that "criteria, such as the 'reasonable basis' and 'good faith' standards...
can be interpreted by a court to require further discovery or adjudication" by the
trier of fact). Courts have made clear, however, that corporate projections about the
results of future restructurings that are not worded as guarantees are not actionable
under the securities laws. See Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., [1992-1993 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 97,451, at 96,527 (5th Cir. May 12, 1993) ("Issuers
are not guarantors of the investments they sell."). Similarly, any good faith statement
of surmise by a dissolution proponent should not be actionable.
19s Naturally, when dissolution is first used, proponents who are not afraid of
litigation can help educate other shareholders by explaining how share price move-
ments signal the advisability of voting for dissolution. After a few dissolution-initiated
auctions, however, disclosure in favor of dissolving will probably cease to be
necessary, replaced instead by market signals and more or less balanced commentary
from the financial press.
1 The market could, of course, signal its doubt that shareholders will adopt the
vote for dissolution. This ability to provide unbiased information benefits the
potential proponent, as well as other shareholders, signaling that she need spend no
time or resources on a dissolution vote.
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character: shareholders must approve dissolution before an auction
is possible; but before they vote, shareholders want to know if
dissolving the corporation will call forth a bidder. The most
relevant information is the corporation's stock price as an indicator
of buyers' estimates of the value of the corporation, whether in an
auction or under current management. At most, a proponent could
venture opinions about the implications of stock price movements.
In the name of disclosure, however, the '34 Act's proxy rules
threaten to place a significant burden on any dissolution propo-
nents, even if the proponents only want to call for a vote and not
campaign for dissolution. If efforts to put dissolution on the ballot
result in a proxy solicitation, two daunting prospects face the propo-
nents. First, unless they can get an exemption, they must prepare,
file, and preclear their "proxy materials" with the SEC-a process
which involves considerable time and expense. Second, no matter
how accurate the proxy materials, management will likely sue
anyone proposing dissolution, 1° 5 claiming misleading or inade-
quate disclosure. The suit buys management time, 19 6 casts doubts
on the proponent's integrity and intentions, and potentially raises
problems for the proponent if it is an institutional investor that has
sensitive relationships with other corporations or is a public pension
fund that has to navigate tricky political currents."9 7 In the longer
term, such litigation, when consistently expected, decreases the
value to proponents by the amount of their litigation costs and
reduces their ex ante incentives to propose the dissolution. Thus,
management's ability to sue may discourage proponents from
defending dissolution. Nevertheless, when arbitrageurs or institu-
tional investors consider the benefits of dissolution-triggered
auctions for numerous corporations in their portfolios, they may
19s See Pound, supra note 187, at 272-73, 282 (describing how proxy regulations
increase the probability of tactical lawsuits by management against proxy dissidents,
thereby deterring proxy initiatives).
196 See 1 LIPTON & STEINBERGER, supra note 176, § 6.06[1], at 6-144 (noting that
"the ultimate disposition of these proceedings is often of less immediate concern than
the tactical advantage to be gained from ti'mely action to slow down the raider and
'chill' arbitrage activity in the target's stock"); Mark P. Cherno & Sandra F. Coppola,
Use of Litigation As a Takeover Defense, in 1 NEw DIMENSIONS IN SECURITIES
LITIGATION: PLANNING AND STRATEGIES 371 (ALI-ABA Course of Study ed., 1990);
Herbert M. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAw. 1433 (1977)
(acknowledging that one of the primary motivations of litigation is delay).
'9" See Roe, supra note 30, at 327 (noting that, as professionals in the securities
industry, institutional investors want to avoid news stories such as "XYZ Mutual Fund
Sued for Securities Law Violations").
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well decide that answering management's criticisms of dissolution
is worthwhile.
2. Section 18(d) Requirements
The second obstacle flows from the '34 Act's section 13(d).
Section 13(d) requires any person or group acting together that
acquires beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a class
of equity securities to file a disclosure statement with the SEC
within ten days of such acquisition."' To bring dissolution to a
vote, arbitrageurs or institutional investors must make a demand
and, under the regime proposed in this Article, must own more
than ten percent of the subject company's shares. 99 If shareholders
making such a demand for a dissolution vote are deemed a "person"
who has acquired beneficial ownership of the securities for purposes
of section 13(d), they must file the Schedule 13D.20 Filing a Sched-
ule 13D imposes unjustified costs and exposes the institutions to
strategic litigation by management.
20 1
SEC 13(d) rules should not, as a policy matter, sweep in
institutions' informal discussions about governance issues.
20 2
' See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1994).
1 See supra part IV.B.2.
The '34 Act specifies that when two or more persons form a group "for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities of an issuer," that group is
deemed a "person" for purposes of § 13(d). See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(3) (1994). By
hypothesis, the dissolution proponents are not interested in "acquiring, holding, or
disposing" of the corporation's securities; they only wish to put dissolution to a vote.
Therefore, they would seem to fall outside the purview of the Williams Act.
The SEC, however, has expanded Congress's sweep of what triggers § 13(d)
requirements beyond what Congress intended and has included an agreement for
voting securities in the list of activities that constitute "beneficial ownership" for
purposes of defining when a § 13(d) "group" has been formed. See Rule 13d-5(b)(1),
17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (1994). Since any discussions bearing on dissolution can
be argued to implicate voting, if only as a background issue, proponents of
dissolution must worry that management may sue them as constituting a "group" for
purposes of the 13(d) rules unless they file the Schedule 13D.
"' In the absence of egregious action, such as amassing shareholdings sufficient
to block other shareholders' action, the only real threats are those of embarrassment
and the litigation costs themselves. First, there is no reason to think that a court will
find any actionable misdisclosure. Courts that do find unintentional misdisclosure
typically force corrective disclosure. See Cherno & Coppola, supra note 196, at 394-95
(noting cases in which bidders were allowed to correct measures by curative
disclosure). Courts have imposed broader remedies, such as divestiture, rescission,
or having one's voting power sterilized, only where there are egregious and sustained
violations. See id. at 396-99 (listing cases in which courts granted various forms of
injunctive relief).
0 For similar criticisms of the overbreadth of the SEC's definition of what
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Proponents of dissolution will likely have no relationship among
themselves other than calling for a shareholder vote and will likely
not intend to increase their share ownership, stage a takeover or a
proxy fight, replace current management, or solicit proxies to do
any of these things or, indeed, even solicit proxies to vote to
dissolve the corporation. In most instances, they will simply wish
to initiate a vote, not to lobby for one position or another. Yet,
owing to the SEC's overbroad definition of "beneficial ownership"
for purposes of section 13(d),20 3 proponents who join forces to
call for a dissolution vote cannot know whether they must (and
consequently may feel obliged to) file a Schedule 13D. If they care
more about negative publicity than about the economic well-being
of their beneficiaries, they may simply leave their beneficiaries with
a lower return, rather than risk litigation. Worse still, the SEC has
aggravated the overbreadth of its definition, for purposes of section
13(d), of "beneficial ownership" by applying this definition to
section 16(b), 2 4 thereby threatening proponents with economic
damage to their beneficiaries, as well as reputational harm to
themselves.
constitutes a group for purposes of the 13(d) rules, see Bernard S. Black, Next Steps
in Corporate Governance Reform: 13(d) Rules and Control-Person Liability, in MODERNIZ-
ING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATIONS: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 225
(Kenneth Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992) (suggesting specific
deregulatory steps that the SEC should consider to encourage shareholder oversight
of large public company managers); Black, supra note 30, at 542-45 (suggesting that
the 13(d) rules are burdensome to institutional shareholders); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Proxy Contests: The Shape of the Future, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1992, at 5 (noting that the
13(d) rules are ambiguous and its application uncertain); Conard, supra note 26, at
162 (noting that while provisions of the subsection "may be appropriate for takeover
bidders .... they are grossly excessive for voting coalitions"); Gilson & Kraakman,
supra note 26, at 896-901 (criticizing the 13(d) rules for their application to concerted
action by institutional investors).
20- See supra note 200. Commentators have noted the pro-management, anti-
shareholder bias of the SEC's construction. See Black, supra note 26, at 542-45;
John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC 'Overregulation' of Proxy Contests, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 31,
1991, at 7; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 26, at 896-901. The SEC seems to have
no plans to review this state of affairs, and legal challenges to the rule as unauthor-
ized by the statute have so far been ineffectual. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050, 1063-64 (D. Del. 1982) (adopting, in a case minutely
inspecting the existence of a private right of action under § 13(d), the strictures of
the SEC 13(d) rules without any question as to the SEC's authority to promulgate the
rules).
... See infra note 208.
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3. Section 16(b)'s Disgorgement Provisions
The third and most draconian securities law obstacle facing
dissolution proponents flows from the '34 Act's section 16(b).
Designed to preclude insiders' use of inside information, section
16(b) provides that directors, officers, and ten-percent shareholders
of a public corporation must disgorge any "profits" made on "short-
swing" purchases and sales of the corporation's securities within any
six-month period."' If these matching transactions occur more
than six months apart, however, the insider is not liable under
section 16(b), even if she traded on inside information.
206
Section 16(b)'s threat to dissolution proponents is that, as a
"group" owning more than ten percent of S's common stock, they
might have to disgorge all "profits" from purchases and sales within
any six-month period during which the group exists. Because the
SEC applies Rule 13d-5(b)(1)'s overbroad definition of "beneficial
ownership" 2 7 to section 16(b), 208 if proponents owning more than
ten percent of the shares have to file a Schedule 13D, they will also
incur liability for any short swing profits.
Dissolution proponents will possess no inside information,
20 9
2o See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994). Under § 16(b), if the 10% shareholder
purchases shares of the corporation's stock at, say, $50 per share and sells at $60 per
share within six months of the purchase (or, indeed, sells at $60 and then buys at $50
within six months of the sale), she must give back $10 per share in "profit," irrespec-
tive of whether she made a genuine economic profit or whether she traded on inside
information.
"Profits," for purposes of § 16(b), are computed so as "to squeeze all possible
profits out of stock transactions" using the rule of "lowest price in, highest price out."
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943). For the most famous example of the draconian character of the statute's
"mechanical" provisions, see Adler v. Klawans, 267 F.2d 840, 847-48 (2d Cir. 1959)
(referring to a defendant liable on a $300,000 § 16(b) "profit" on trades on which he
actually suffered real economic losses of $400,000 (citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951))).
206 She could be sued under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but not under § 16(b).
21o See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
2" Rule 16a-l(a)(1) states:
Solely for purposes of determining whether a person is a beneficial owner
of more than ten percent of any class of equity securities registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Act, the term "beneficial owner" shall mean
any person who is deemed a beneficial owner pursuant to section 13(d) of
the Act and the rules thereunder ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-l(a)(1) (1995).
21 One might argue that credible nonpublic information about calling a dissolu-
tion vote should count as inside information. The proper analogy, however, is to the
information that a bidder has about its own tender offer; typically, such information
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yet still might bear liability. They will only call for a vote on
dissolution. Dissolution will not occur unless a majority of the
company's shareholders vote for it. If dissolution receives the
requisite approval and the board disposes of the corporation at a
premium, all shareholders will benefit pro rata. The commu-
nications about proposing a dissolution vote, thus, threaten no harm
that Congress meant to regulate under section 16(b).
From the point of view of section 16(b), however, the share-
holders who initiated the shareholder-benefiting vote may well have
to disgorge profits (as defined by section 16(b)) made after forming
the "group" to initiate dissolution. The SEC has not made the
status of intrashareholder communication under section 16(b)
sufficiently clear to free shareholders from fear that discussions
among themselves might cost them disgorgement. 210 Fortunately,
the mechanically draconian results of this statutory provision can be
avoided by equally mechanical steps.
211
belongs to the party that generated it and the law does not interfere with her use of
the information. See, e.g., Rule 14e-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1995) (making it
illegal for any person other than the offering person to trade on material inside
information concerning the offering person's tender offer).
210 See Coffee, supra note 35, at 1344-45 (noting that the SEC has failed to
define when institutional support for a candidate for director will cause the
institutions to be deemed constructive directors under a deputization theory, but
reporting that the SEC will deem subject to § 16 investors who collectively control
10% or more of a class of the company's equity securities and who form a "voting
group" that requires disclosure under the Williams Act).
211 One unattractive tactic for institutions would be to suspend trading in the
company's stock so that six months will have elapsed by the time the purchaser in the
auction closes the transaction and the institution would be deemed to have "sold" its
stock for purposes of § 16(b).
Alternatively, proponents could restrict the group to persons holding only a little
above 10% of the shares. After calling for the dissolution vote, they could sell enough
stock to bring them below 10%, then "disband," thereby limiting the amount of
disgorgement to "profits" on these last shares sold. For the legal theory behind this
tactic, see Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). In Reliance
Electric, the original defendant sold the increment of stock above 9.96% in one
transaction and the remaining 9.96% thereafter. The Supreme Court held that
shareholders are liable for profits only while they own 10% of the stock. See id. at
420. Therefore, once a shareholder's holdings drops below 10%, the statute no
longer applies. Thus, the only shares on which the Reliance Electric defendant could
be liable were those bringing its holdings below 10%. See id.
Arbitrageurs could call for a dissolution vote with minimal fear from § 16(b)
and with less public-relations distress than institutional investors. They could,
for example, coordinate their purchases, assemble barely over 10% of the stock,
and then call for the dissolution vote. Each investor could then sell its pro
rata portion of the increment above 10% and sever communications with one
another.
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B. Workable Solutions to Problems Created By Federal Securities Law
1. Current Law
Recent changes by the SEC in its proxy rules simplify commu-
nication among shareholders. 21 2  While not deregulating the
process to the satisfaction of many commentators and large
shareholders, 213 these changes give proponents serviceable means
to put dissolution on the ballot without enmeshing them in
prohibitive transaction and litigation costs.
2 14
The most practicable route for avoiding the obstacles created by
federal securities laws is Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv). Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv) of
the revised rules excludes from the category of "solicitation"
published statements of how a securityholder intends to vote and
the reasons for its vote, provided that the holder is not otherwise
engaged in a proxy solicitation other than one exempt under Rule
14a-2. 215 A proponent would, therefore, have to take care that its
Naturally, as long as § 16(b) punishes holders of more than 10% of the
corporation's securities, state legislatures should keep the threshold percentage for
calling for a dissolution vote at no more than 10%.
212 For the adopting release, see Regulation of Communications Among Share-
holders, Exchange Act Release No. 31,326, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (1992). For
description of the changes, see Fisch, supra note 187 (describing evolution of proxy
rules, the impediments proxy rules created for intrashareholder communication, and
the partial improvements effected by the 1992 amendments).
21S See e.g., Fisch, supra note 187, at 1197-99 (arguing that reforms do not go far
enough); Robert S. Frenchman, The Recent Revisions to Federal Proxy Regulations:
Liftingthe Ban on Shareholder Communications, 68 TUL. L. REv. 161,193 (1993) (urging
that "nonbinding, publicly disseminated voting alliances made by otherwise unrelated
shareholders" be excluded from the definition of "beneficial ownership" and "group"
status).
214 Prior to October 16, 1992, SEC rules defined "solicitation" very broadly. See
Rule 14a-l(l)(iii), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(iii) (1995); see also Long Island Lighting Co.
v. Barbash, 779 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that newspaper advertisements
were not, as a matter of law, exempt from § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act and
remanding the case to determine whether the advertisements were "reasonably
calculated to influence the shareholders' votes"); SEC v. Okin, 132 F.2d 784, 786 (2d
Cir. 1943) (holding that the SEC can regulate not only proxies but also "any other
writings which are part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation"). Well-established
caselaw subjected such communications (with some exceptions) to the proxy rules if
they were "part of 'a continuous plan' intended to end in solicitation and to prepare
the way for success." Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1966).
In 1992, however, the SEC amended the proxy rules to remove some of the burdens
from shareholder communications. These changes simplify communicating with
other shareholders who also wish to propose dissolution. See Fisch, supra note 187,
at 1165-70 (describing how the 1992 amendments to the rules make intrashareholder
communication somewhat easier but still leave proxy regulation too complex and
burdensome).
215 Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv) provides:
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communication does not contain material other than its reasons for
voting to put dissolution on the ballot that could be construed as a
proxy solicitation, unless it qualified for exemption under Rule
14a-2.
Under state law, shareholders can most easily call a dissolution
vote by simultaneously presenting to management sufficient
shareholdings to demand the vote. Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv)'s safe harbor
for public announcements would allow the primary proponent to
announce its intent to present its shares at a specified date and time
at corporate headquarters in a demand for a dissolution vote. Upon
this announcement, other shareholders also wishing to call a vote on
dissolution would present sufficient simultaneous demands at
corporate headquarters to force a dissolution vote. 216 Shareholders
could then coordinate their actions without any two-way communi-
cation among them.
The proponent must take care not to make additional com-
munications that could be construed as "otherwise engag[ing] in a
proxy solicitation" and thereby losing the safe harbor.217 Manage-
ment will likely argue that identifying a time and place for demand-
ing a dissolution vote not only conveys the proponent's views but
creates a venue for shareholder action where none would otherwise
exist. By creating this venue and stimulating this independent
demand, the argument goes, the proponent is "otherwise engag[ing]
in a proxy solicitation."
Such an argument stretches the already broad concept of
"solicitation" beyond the breaking point. Under the hypothesis, the
proponent will at no time solicit proxies from anyone. Other
shareholders demanding a dissolution vote will do so on their own.
The terms ["solicit" and "solicitation"] do not apply, however, to: ...
(iv) A communication by a security holder who does not otherwise engage
in a proxy solicitation (other than a solicitation exempt under Rule 14a-2)
stating how the security holder intends to vote and the reasons therefor,
provided that the communication: (A) Is made by means of speeches in
public forums, press releases, published or broadcast opinions, statements,
or advertisements appearing in a broadcast media [sic], or newspaper,
magazine or other bona fide publication disseminated on a regular basis
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-1(l)(2)(iv) (1995).
216 Each shareholder should notify management in advance that it wishes its shares
to be aggregated with those of the original proponent. In this way, each shareholder
can communicate with management without implicating securities laws that would
create obstacles to intrashareholder communication.
217 Rule 14a-l()(2)(iv), quoted supra note 215 (emphasis added); see also infra notes
218-19 and accompanying text.
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Later, at the actual shareholder vote on dissolution, the proponent
will presumably only make the public announcement allowed in
Rule 14a-l(l)(2)(iv). In the absence of any additional communica-
tions, the proponent clearly should fall within the boundaries of the
safe harbor.
21 8
Indeed, although Rule 14a-l()(2)(iv) allows the proponent to
state her reasons for demanding a dissolution vote, the proponent
could even forego stating her reasons and communicate only her
intent to make a dissolution demand on such and such a date and
time. Other shareholders will independently decide whether they
want to demand a vote without needing the proponent's reasoning.
By omitting her reasons, the proponent would demonstrate that
other stockholders based their own dissolution demands to
management on their own analysis and not on the proponent's
claims.
2 19
218 Courts have construed "solicitation" to include material not directly
soliciting proxies only if the proponent intends to solicit proxies or authorizations
at some point in the process. The broadest interpretation of "solicitation"
occurred in Okin, 132 F.2d 784. The dispute in Okin concerned whether the proxy
rules applied to a letter sent by dissident Okin "to shareholders asking them not
to sign any proxies for the company, and to revoke any which they might have already
signed." Id. at 786. Okin planned later to oppose management and make his own
solicitation to the shareholders. See id. The court held that the proxy rules
regulating proxy solicitations applied specifically to Okin's letter and generally
to "any other writings which are part of a continuous plan ending in solicitation and
which prepare the way for its success," as well as to formal proxies, powers of
attorney, consents, or authorizations. Id. Noting that by itself the letter would not
have constituted a solicitation, the court stated that "[i]f the complaint had not
alleged that the defendant intended to follow [the letter] up by actually soliciting
proxies.... we should indeed have great doubt whether it stated a cause of action."
Id.
Similarly, in Studebaker, 360 F.2d at 694, dissident Gittlin announced that he
intended to solicit proxies in opposition to management if management failed to take
certain actions. Thus, his communications with the other 42 Studebaker shareholders
to amass the five percent required to force Studebaker to turn over its shareholder
list also constituted "part of 'a continuous plan' intended to end in solicitation and
to prepare the way for success." Id. at 696 (quoting Ohin, 132 F.2d at 786). As the
court noted in quoting the SEC's amicus brief, the protective provisions of the proxy
rules were intended to reach "situations in which a stockholder is requested to permit
another to act for him." Id. at 696 n.2 (emphasis added).
In the dissolution context, the proponent will presumably not intend to ask
another to permit her to act for the other. See supra note 191. Thus, in the absence
of any intent to solicit proxies later in the process, a proponent who merely avails
herself of the right to solicit up to 10 solicitees or to make a public announcement
of her position or both should not be considered to be otherwise engaged in a proxy
solicitation for the purposes of Rule 14a-l(l)(2)(iv).
219 Although Studebaker involved a plan to later solicit shareholders and is,
therefore, not directly on point, the Studebaker court articulated a rationale that
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Several benefits flow from using Rule 14a-1(/)(2)(iv)'s exempted
public announcement rather than two-way communications. None
of the parties presenting their shares on the appointed day will
make any agreement (indeed, they likely will not even have communi-
cated) with any other. Consequently, they will not constitute a
group and will not be liable under section 13(d) or section 16(b) of
the '34 Act. Further, because under Rule 14a-1(/)(2)(iv) the
published announcement is not a solicitation, the communication
is not subject to the proxy rules, and management cannot sue under
Rule 14a-9, claiming misrepresentation.
Proponents should formally notify management well before the
special or annual shareholder meeting that they intend to call a
vote on dissolution at the meeting. Under current case law,
management would have to put the issue on the ballot. Manage-
ment may wish not to include the proposal, but thus far authorities
have not allowed such a degree of shareholder disenfranchise-
ment.220 Once the issue is on the ballot, shareholders who expect
a premium-yielding auction can vote to dissolve without needing to
campaign.
management would likely use to urge repeal or amendment of Rule 14a-1(Q)(2)(iv).
The court noted that "[p]resumably the [42] stockholders who gave authorizations [in
order to demand a shareholders list under New York law] were told something."
Studebaker, 360 F.2d at 696 (emphasis added). Where shareholders are willing to
make a special trip to the corporate headquarters to demand a dissolution vote after
learning nothing more than the fact that another shareholder intends to do the same,
any fear that they are threatened by misleading or inadequate disclosure is
unfounded.
' Management has, for example, sought to omit the dissident's proposal from the
proxy while claiming that the form of proxy conferred discretionary authority on
management to vote against the dissident's proposal, even though shareholders other
than the proponent were unaware of the proposal's existence and were presented
with no boxes in which to vote on it. Courts have ruled such practices invalid,
however, in instances in which the proponent gives management adequate notice. See
United Mine Workers, Local 7950 v. Pittston Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,946
(D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (holding that management did not have discretionary
authority to vote proxy cards against dissident proposals when management, having
had adequate advance notice of the proposals, refused to include in its proxy
materials meaningful disclosure to shareholders regarding the proposals); see also
Grimes v. Centerior Energy Corp., 909 F.2d 529, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (stating that
"the omission of a proposal not properly excludable under Rule 14a-8(c) will
necessarily be misleading under Rule 14a-9" (citing New York City Employees'
Retirement Sys. v. American Brands, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1073 (1991)).
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2. Possible Improvements
Shareholder proponents should be able to debate with man-
agement on a level playing field, one that allows genuine debate and
that does not force shareholders to use legalese pablum that
ultimately stupefies, rather than enlightens, the reader.221 Current
SEC restraints ultimately favor management: where confused,
shareholders will either vote with management or abstain. Absten-
tions count as votes against dissolving the company. Thus, there is
little reason to fear that shareholders will be confused into voting
for dissolution. Management can try to dissuade shareholders from
approving dissolution, and the SEC will punish wilful misdisclosure
by dissolution proponents. Accordingly, the SEC should (a) confirm
that shareholders can use Rule 14a-1(l)(2)(iv)'s exemption both to
call for a vote on dissolution and to signal how and why they are
going to vote, (b) otherwise liberalize the '34 Act to reduce burdens
on legitimate shareholder action, and (c) ultimately, allow share-
holders to use Rule 14a-8.
222
22 For an amusing, if dispiriting, example of SEC comments on dissidents' proxy
material that amounted to pro-management censorship, see Bernard S. Black, Disclo-
sure Not Censorship: The Case for Proxy Reform, 17 J. CoRp. L. 49, 77-85 (1991)
(reproducing punishingly fastidious SEC requests for changes and qualifications to
dissident's proxy statement that effectively silenced the dissident), excerpted inJohn
C. Coffee, Jr., Proxy Contests: The Shape of the Future, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 1, 1992, at 6.
If SEC rules really worked to promote investor communication, shareholders
holding sufficient shares would be able to use Rule 14a-8 to call for a dissolution vote.
Although the SEC has created a list of 13 categories of proposals that management
may omit, the list is supposed simply to spare corporations the nuisance and expense
of proposals that are not appropriate for shareholder action. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
8(c)(1)-(13) (1995).
In fact, the SEC has read Rule 14a-8's exclusions consistently to defeat share-
holder attempts to cause dissolution votes. For example, in De Anza Properties-X,
the SEC agreed with management to eliminate the proposal on the grounds that it
was necessary to protect shareholders from "confusion," despite dissidents' express
willingness, in order to eliminate any confusion, to disallow limited partners from
voting on the dissidents' proposal unless they first either voted "no" or abstained on
management's proposal. See De Anza Properties-X, SEC No-Action Letters, 1989
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 796 & 812 (July 11 and 12, 1989).
In the shareholders' attempt to request the dissolution and liquidation of Tri-
South Investments, Inc., the dissidents invited management.to print in its proxy
materials a statement to the following effect:
IF YOU FAVOR THE MERGER PROPOSAL, THEN MARK YOUR PROXY
ACCORDINGLY AND DO NOT MARK YOUR PROXY IN FAVOR OF
THE WITHIN SHAREHOLDERS' PRECATORY REQUEST. CON-
VERSELY, IF YOU FAVOR THE SHAREHOLDERS' PRECATORY
REQUEST, THEN DO NOT MARK YOUR PROXY IN FAVOR OF THE
MERGER PROPOSAL. IF YOU VOTE FAVORABLY FOR THE MERGER
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VI. OPTING OUT OF THE DISSOLUTION REGIME:
THE QUINQUENNIAL ELECTION
Because votes on dissolution are not without cost, the law
should erect reasonable constraints that will guarantee that
dissolution will not unduly burden corporations, while at the same
time guaranteeing shareholders a realistic right to use dissolution.
First, because the transaction costs of dissolution votes can be high,
the law should require a moderately high percentage of shares to
initiate such a vote. In addition, the law should allow shareholders
to elect to forego, for specified periods, voting on dissolution. This
Part discusses why dissolution votes might burden corporations and
describes a regime that would allow shareholders to opt out of such
elections for up to five years without relinquishing the primary
benefits of dissolution.
Under this scheme, shareholders' decisions about dissolution
would operate on three different levels: (1) whether to waive the
ability to vote on dissolution for the next five years, thereby
temporarily "opting out" of dissolution, (2) if the shareholders have
not waived this ability, whether to conduct a vote to dissolve, and (3)
in the event of an actual vote, whether to dissolve the corporation.
This regime would allow shareholders of well-managed companies
to benefit from the dissolution regime as a remote background
threat against a possible decline in quality without undergoing
actual dissolution votes, while giving shareholders in less well-
managed companies a more immediate means for encouraging
managerial improvement via dissolution votes that can be called at
any time.
PROPOSAL AND FOR THE PRECATORY REQUEST OF THE PROPO-
NENTS, THEN YOUR PROXY WILL BE TREATED AS A VOTE IN
FAVOR OF THE MERGER PROPOSAL AND YOUR INCONSISTENT
VOTE IN FAVOR OF THE PRECATORY REQUEST WILL BE TREATED
AS A NULLITY.
Tri-South Investments, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 53924, at *5 (Mar. 6,
1985). Given proponents' care to avoid confusion, it is difficult to see how the
SEC's implementation of Rule 14a-8 squares with its purported objective of fair and
complete disclosure and meaningful corporate suffrage.
For similar No-Action letters, see Banyan Strategic Land Trust, SEC No-
Action Letter, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) I 76,252 (May 28,
1992); May Petroleum Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1988 WL 234049, at *5 (Jan. 29,
1988).
REPLACING HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
A. The Costs of the Dissolution Regime
The present proposal benefits shareholders to the extent that
they use dissolution only when management has mismanaged the
corporation to the point that auctioning the corporation's assets will
improve shareholder wealth.223  Critics could claim that the
dissolution regime will distract good, as well as underperforming,
management, forcing them to divert valuable resources in order to
convince shareholders to vote against dissolution. Where a
dissolution vote is unwarranted, the dissolution regime could have
the effect of a nuisance suit, albeit one that management cannot
settle but must conduct to its conclusion.
To the extent that the stock market efficiently values stock, the
greatest disparity between actual and potential prices will result
from the existence of inefficient management. Theoretically, the
stock price of a well-managed corporation should approximate its
potential maximum. Any disparity should be small, and dissolution
should not be a realistic threat. Inefficient managements, on the
other hand, will have allowed greater disparities and should draw
pressure to improve their performance. Such managements should
pay attention to market reactions to their activities and announced
plans.224 To the extent that dissolution discourages value-reducing
s Similarly, contests for corporate control have also been rare, relative to total
merger activity. SeeJensen, Modern Industrial Revolution, supra note 17, at 837 (noting
that of the 35,000 mergers and acquisitions transactions occurring from 1976-1990,
only 364 of these offers were contested and of those only 172 resulted in hostile
takeovers).
'2 Indeed, such managements should use the market's reaction as a "trial balloon"
before they solidify major investment plans, in the same way political professionals in
Washington use preliminary "leaks" to test public reaction before actually making
legislative proposals. Post-leak movement in the firm's share price will convey the
market's verdict on the proposal, allowing management to abort those proposals that
would reduce shareholder value.
For an analogous proposal in the context of bidding for acquisition targets, see
Wilbur G. Lewellen & Michael G. Ferri, Strategies for the Merger Game: Management
and the Market, FIN. MGMT., Winter 1983, at 25, 34-35. Lewellen and Ferri present
an ex ante strategy for bidding in which management can use the pre-bid ratio of the
two companies' market prices to construct an initial bid and use the market's reaction
to gauge the value of synergies and, therefore, the bid's upper limit. As with the
present proposal, they note that where the bidding company's stock declines on news
of the bid, the transaction should be aborted. See id. at 33-34; see also George W.
Dent, Jr., Unprofitable Meigers: Toward a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 Nw. U. L.
REV. 777, 794 (1986) (arguing that courts should "enjoin as corporate waste or a
breach of fiduciary duty any acquisition the disclosure of which causes a material
decline in the price of the proposed buyer's common stock"). Although Professor
Dent is correct to rely on market signals as to the wastefulness of certain acquisitions,
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behavior, it will save, not waste, corporate resources.
Nevertheless, the possibility of shareholder-forced auctions
clearly puts at risk managers' jobs and the value of their expertise
in running S. Management, not unreasonably, will demand
compensation for this increased risk to their firm-specific human
capital.22 To the extent that society adopts more efficient mecha-
nisms for displacing inefficient management, displaced management
should receive compensation for surrendering its control over the
corporation.2
2 6
Dissolution might, at least initially, harm other corporate
constituencies-creditors, workers, communities, suppliers, and
customers. To an even greater extent than management, they
cannot know, when they make their firm-specific investments in the
corporation, whether management will act so as to reduce share-
holder value, thereby increasing the likelihood of dissolution. They
may then demand a premium to compensate them for any such
added risk, thus raising the corporation's cost for financing, labor,
and supplies.
227
relying on dissolution to punish such waste would be more "market-based" than his
solution and would also involve fewer difficult interpretive problems.
22 See e.g., Coffee, supra note 1, at 1236-37. Coffee fears that exposure to
external disciplining by takeovers would cause competent managers to exit or to
decline to join the "inefficiently managed" firm. Id. A fortiori, dissolution would
raise the same concern.
" One of the benefits of the agency cost literature is that it places greater weight
on realistic assessments of human conduct and less weight on moralistic assessments.
For important explorations of issues concerning agency costs, see, e.g., PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS (John W. Pratt & RichardJ. Zeckhauser
eds., 1985); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Coiporations and Agency
Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271 (1986); Fama, supra note 80; Eugene F. Fama & Michael
C.Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26J.L. & ECON. 327 (1983); Michael
C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AM.
ECON. REV. 323 (1986); Michael C.Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
Agency costs reflect the divergence ofinterests between management (the agent)
and the shareholders (its beneficiaries). To the extent that society can find
mechanisms to better align the interests of management and shareholders, these
mechanisms will expand wealth. Paying managers increased compensation in
exchange for their increased willingness to relinquish control over corporate assets
is a comparatively low cost method of redeploying assets. Almost by definition, in
order to have won its position, management has succeeded in the quite competitive
market for executive services. To impose a regime that would reduce the rewards for
climbing the corporate hierarchy is to reduce the incentives for skilled persons to
participate in that market. Managers who have ascended to top positions have certain
expectations about the rewards for their success, as do, more importantly, those who
look to follow them. Generously compensating managers displaced by dissolution
works the least damage on their and their successors' expectations.
" See, e.g., Sheridan Titman, The Effect of Capital Structure on a Firn's Liquidation
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If dissolution were to impose any costs, it would do so only
once, as parties adjust to the new regime. Over the long-term,
dissolution should lower these costs by making companies healthier.
Viewed statically, creditors, workers, and others would worry that
shareholders would vote frequently for dissolution, unmindful of
the impact on other constituencies and concerned solely with
recouping part of the value of the disparity. Viewed dynamically,
however, the threat of dissolution would likely discipline managers
who would not otherwise maximize the corporation's value, forcing
them to manage better. Thus, after dissolution becomes a powerful
source of discipline, managements would take the necessary steps
to maximize corporate value, thereby preventing, rather than just
reducing, significant disparities. Such improved discipline would
reduce the volatility of the company's cash flows, thereby decreasing
risks to creditors, employees, and the like. Ultimately, they, like the
shareholders, would be better off.
An optimal dissolution regime should elicit improved moni-
toring while keeping costs to a minimum. Forcing shareholders of
well-managed corporations to vote on dissolution would be wasteful.
Furthermore, even where management may not be optimal,
shareholders may wish to give management wide discretion, free
from the threat of dissolution. Consequently, the proposed scheme
creates provisions for shareholders to voluntarily waive shareholder-
initiated votes on dissolution for periods of up to five years.
B. The Quinquennial Opt-Out Election
The opt-out mechanism would operate as follows: every five
years, shareholders would choose either to waive or to retain the
right to vote for dissolution during the upcoming five-year period.
The default position will be an opt-out: unless an affirmative
majority of disinterested (non-management affiliated) shareholders
votes to retain the right to initiate dissolution, shareholders will be
deemed to have opted out of the dissolution regime and will not be
able to initiate dissolution for the following five-year period.
228 If
shareholders "opt in" by retaining the right to initiate dissolution,
they may initiate dissolution at any time during the following five-
Decision, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 137, 138-39 (1984) (stating that liquidation imposes
"increased maintenance costs" by increasing customers' reluctance to buy the firm's
products due to concern that the firm may discontinue operations).
22 Naturally, the board would at all times retain the right to initiate a vote to
voluntarily dissolve the corporation.
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year period. During this period, shareholders holding, say, twenty
percent of the outstanding shares could call a special meeting, and
shareholders holding ten percent could call for a dissolution vote at
any annual meeting. If holders of the required percentage of shares
call for an actual dissolution vote, shareholders will vote whether to
dissolve.
229
Management can win the quinquennial election to "opt out" of
dissolution simply and inexpensively in many, perhaps most, cases.
First, management's control of the proxy machinery and normal
shareholder inertia favor management. In the absence of some
party affirmatively soliciting shareholders to opt in or some market
movement that encourages shareholders to do so, shareholders will
hear only management's side of the argument.20 Shareholders
favoring opting in will have to finance their own recommendations.
Thus, corporations will opt into the dissolution regime only in
exceptional circumstances where shareholders can clearly benefit:
where proponents of dissolution are both disgruntled and capable
of convincing other shareholders to opt in or where stock price
movements reflect the market's perception that a significant
disparity exists or will exist in the next five years.
, For similar proposals for allowing periodic shareholder votes, see Coffee, supra
note 1, at 1262-63 (recommending requiring supermajority provisions to be renewed
every three years by a shareholder vote of similar magnitude); id. at 1281 (describing
the SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers' recommendation requiring
supermajority provisions to be renewed every three years by a shareholder vote);
Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Co~porate Governance: The
Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Ciu. L. REV. 187, 224-36 (1991) (proposing
mandatory five-year moratoria on hostile takeovers with quinquennial, rather than
annual, shareholder elections allowing changes in control); Romano, supra note 17,
at 165-66 (proposing, among other reforms, amending the Williams Act to allow
shareholders to opt out of the Act's coverage if they do not wish the firm to hold
auctions, thereby encouraging more takeover bids, though perhaps at lower premi-
ums). The current proposal obviously shares more in common with Romano's or
Coffee's proposal than with Lipton and Rosenblum's. The latter proposal is
unappealing because it follows essentially a socialist, or at least command economy,
model for running free market firms, proposing that management run the
corporation according to five-year plans. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra, at 225-27.
Reducing directors' discretion to respond to changing conditions would discard the
dynamic responsiveness of capitalist forms of organization.
2 0 Clearly, shareholders are unlikely to campaign for opting into dissolution
unless there exists some credible evidence that the right to vote annually on dissolu-
tion will, in fact, be valuable. Counsel to management will articulate all the costs that
opting in will impose on the corporation. Shareholders will understand that the costs
of the annual vote on dissolving the corporation falls on them. As such, where there
is little reason to expect a disparity that would justify forcing an auction, shareholders
will see opting into the dissolution regime as wasteful.
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Similarly, management will have the advantage in any actual vote
on dissolution itself. Management must put dissolution to a vote
only if the required percentage of the shares (ten percent, twenty
percent) so requests. Collective action problems work against
shareholders expending such resources. Shareholders bear the
actual costs of bringing the issue to a vote, plus their pro rata share
of any loss in S's value owing to transaction costs of the vote itself.
Thus, proponents' interests align with those of the other sharehold-
ers; they will trigger a dissolution vote only when the expected
returns to all shareholders are exceptionally high.23 ' Active
shareholders can learn from experience when dissolution is most
likely to benefit them. To the extent that earlier shareholder-
induced dissolutions of other corporations fail to create gains for
shareholders, shareholders will have less incentive to call for a vote
on dissolution. Significant dissolution-induced premiums, on the
other hand, will build credibility for forcing auctions.
Shareholders, however, should be able to "opt out" only for
limited periods. Without periodically recurring shareholder votes,
management could take advantage of collective action problems and
freeze shareholders permanently out of the dissolution regime.3 2
2"' One potential objection to the perfect alignment of interests of dissolution
proponents and other shareholders is the possibility that a large shareholder would
threaten management with initiating a dissolution vote in order to be bought off by
managers, similar to being paid greenmail for withdrawing a hostile takeover. For the
problem generally, seeJeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and
Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 381-84 (1991)
(describing how shareholders can "pursue private wealth maximization" by
threatening a shareholder initiative). Such side-dcals between management and
dissident shareholders would be much less likely in the dissolution context than in
either a greenmail or a shareholder-initiative context. Greenmail payments could
stave off management displacement only because takeovers are so difficult to launch.
Management could gamble that once the greenmailer was gone, no other bidders
would emerge. Dissolution, by contrast, would eliminate much, if not all, of the
expenses of displacing management. Accordingly, management's repurchase of the
stock of a shareholder threatening dissolution will only increase the disparity; other
dissolution proponents could (and would) arise with relative ease. Specific
shareholder initiatives, on the other hand, require complicated calculations involving
strategic planning and valuation and are likely to be based on relatively private
information not available to other shareholders. It is one of the theses of this Article,
however, that many market participants will know of the existence of substantial
disparities, making it impossible to buy off all potential dissolution proponents.
.2 The SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers proposed a similar require-
ment respecting supermajority provisions. There the fear was that management
would paralyze shareholder action by requiring supermajority votes that could never
realistically be obtained. Under the Advisory Committee's proposal, shareholders
would have had to approve supermajority provisions by the same level of shareholder
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Such a permanent waiver is unnecessary for able management,
whose shareholders will vote repeatedly to opt out of the scheme.
Therefore, shareholders opting out of the dissolution provision
should have to ratify this decision every five years.
233
CONCLUSION
Optimal corporate laws improve the efficiency and fairness of
the conduct of business. One best secures the efficiency and
fairness of corporate law, as of market economies and democratic
societies generally, by giving contending parties the ability to pursue
their interests, effectively but without wrongfully coercing others,
against the noncoercive resistance of competing interests. Current-
ly, corporate law's tilt against hostile takeovers hinders shareholders
from directly replacing corporate managers, their putative agents.
Instead, shareholders must rely on infrequent proxy fights,
infrequent intervention by independent directors, and takeovers
that occur less frequently than shareholders prefer. Dissolution
constitutes the most elegant means for shareholders directly to
displace inefficient management, by letting them, uncoerced by
bidders or by management, compel poorly run companies to be
auctioned.
Both shareholders and non-shareholder constituencies would
benefit from the use of voluntary dissolution to discipline manage-
ment. Dissolution already stands ready to be used in several
commercially important states, including New York, California, and
Illinois.23 4 Most states, however, including Delaware, do not give
shareholders the right to initiate voluntary dissolution.2 5 There-
fore, the "reform" position is for states that do not currently give
shareholders that right to do so and let the self-regulating processes
of voluntary dissolution winnow inefficient managements and
impose heightened managerial discipline.3 6
approval as the provisions would require to approve a transaction. They would also
have to renew these provisions every three years. See Coffee, supra note 1, at 1253
nn.328-29, 1263 n.356 (referring to Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, Report of Recommendations 141 (July 8, 1983), recommendation
36, at 36-37).
2"s Such a regime of five-year elections would parallel the regime proposed by
Lipton & Rosenblum, see supra note 229, with the difference that shareholders could
give themselves the right to choose dissolution between quinquennial elections.
See supra note 13.
s See supra note 12.
2s6 The two most important practical reforms would be (a) for states, including
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Can such a reform occur immediately? Perhaps not. But the
reform can occur. Minority shareholders in close corporations have
protections today that took many years to obtain. The history of
involuntaryjudicial dissolution to protect close corporation minority
shareholders from oppression demonstrates that even when reforms
are slow in coming, they are worth pursuing. In 1940, the idea of
using involuntary judicial dissolution to protect minority sharehold-
ers was so novel that George Hornstein felt it necessary to explain
why courts could legitimately take such action." 7 In 1952, courts
continued to construe statutes permitting judicial dissolution to
remedy deadlock so narrowly that, in order to spur more liberal use
of judicial dissolution, Carlos Israels disparaged the corporate
entity's hallowed status as a "sacred cow."23 Yet by the mid-
1960s, minority shareholder proponents could point to courts'
greater willingness to use involuntary dissolution to curb oppres-
sion, while pressing for expanding the remedy still further. 239 In
1975, in the first edition of his influential Oppression of Minority
Shareholders, Professor F. Hodge O'Neal began urging courts to
adopt the "reasonable expectations" standard for judging proper
Delaware, that currently allow shareholder-initiated dissolution to be effectuated by
unanimous shareholder action to allow it to be effectuated by holders of a majority
of the shares and (b) for the next iteration of the RMBCA and states following the
RMBCA paradigm to amend § 14.02 to allow shareholders to initiate dissolution by
majority vote. The change in (a) would make shareholder-initiated voluntary
dissolution available in the following states where, realistically speaking, it is currently
unavailable: Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia. See
supra note 12. The change in (b) would make dissolution available in the following
10 states that currently follow the RMBCA model: Alabama, Georgia, Iowa,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. See supra note 12. If these two changes were to be made, the current
situation would be reversed, and only the following 13 states would deny shareholders
the right to initiate dissolution: Colorado, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland,
Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
and Virginia. See supra note 12.
2
1
7 See George D. Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind
up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 236, 249-
51 (1940).
215 Carlos L. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of Deadlock and
Dissolution, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 778, 778 (1952).
11 See Comment, Oppression As a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolution, 1965
DUKE LJ. 128, 138 (discussing the benefits of "liberalizing the remedy of dissolu-
tion"); Note, Dissolution of the Close Corporation, 41 ST.JOHN's L. REV. 239, 255 (1966)
(arguing for the use of dissolution to protect minority shareholders of close
corporations facing "controvers[ies] involving the personal relationship between
individuals").
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treatment of dissenting minority shareholders.2 4 ° By the 1980s,
this standard had found widespread judicial acceptance. 241  In
1983, Minnesota became the first state explicitly to adopt legislation
including "reasonable expectations" as a standard for judicial
dissolution, followed by North Dakota in 1986.242 Thus, although
minority shareholders had to wait decades forjudicial dissolution to
be shaped into an effective remedy, the reform eventually occurred.
Now that minority shareholders in close corporations have
meaningful protections, "minority"2 4 (i.e., non-management)
shareholders in public corporations are the next logical constituency
for the remedy of dissolution. Managerialists will likely employ the
rhetoric used against takeovers to decry this use of voluntary
dissolution. Voluntary dissolution's inherently uncoerced nature,
however, precludes managers from justifying their opposition by
claiming that they are "protecting" shareholders. Given the
voluntary nature of dissolution and the fact that it requires approval
by an affirmative majority, any managerial opposition to dissolution
must derive from a desire to deprive shareholders of the choice to
specify the end, as well as the beginning, of their collective
investment in the corporation.
For the law to allow shareholders to interfere in the day-to-day
conduct of the corporation's business and affairs is to hurt share-
holders. Thus, protecting management with the business judgment
rule against shareholder complaints normally increases shareholder
welfare. Nevertheless, for the law to allow the shareholders' agents
to preclude their principals, as a group, from cashing out their
investment when they collectively wish to do so is to abandon the
principle that the shareholder-principals, rather than the manager-
agents, are the true beneficiaries of corporate law.
... See Thompson, Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, supra note 41, at 193
(noting that O'Neal's treatise advocated the reasonable expectations test as "the most
reliable guide to a just resolution of disputes among shareholders").
243 See id. at 213 (listing states that have adopted a "reasonable expectations"
standard).
242 See id. at 215.
245 See supra note 25 and accompanying text (illustrating how management
can treat public corporation shareholders holding more than 90% of the
company's stock as peremptorily as insiders treat minority shareholders in close
corporations).
